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PREFACE
One of the many distcrticns that war produces is that
each belligerent believes himself to be the sole
possessor of trust and justice. We know of no case
in which those who have gone to the extreme of a
military confrontation have ever recognized in their
opponents the slightest degree of reason. When
situations become critical belligerents do not display
toward neutral parties the understanding and tolerance
that they so fervently claim for their own cause. Because of these special considerations, we venture to
presume that neither Arabs nor Jews will be satisfied
with our statement, since combatants consider only
their allies as friends. And we, in all truth, are
not their allies, but are certainly their friends.

Columbian Ambassador
Julio Caesar Turbay Ayala,
General Assembly,
June 27, 196?.

The treatment of this topic is designed to show how
the United Nations was employed in a situation of crisis

and to trace the interactions of states, international law
and organization which culminated in the passage of Resolution
214.2.

Our three foci of investigatory interest are political,

legal and organization&l

We have sought to allow each

.

approach its position in accordance with their salient or
secondary natures at different junctures in the institutional
playing-out; of this crisis.
A realistic study of the relationship between these

factors would begin with

a

review of the policies and

iv

behavior of the area and superpower states which were
parties
to the crisis.

Our particular concentration here is upon

the upswing toward war.

political.

Our framed reference is chiefly

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one whose elements

are of long standing.

The next section treats each issue

of this conflict in its legal form and explores the case

which each of the direct parties makes, and whose conflicting
tension is reflected in the United Nations and its resolutions.
The third section traces the activities which occurred in the

United Nations from the period prior to the outbreak of war
through November 22, 196?.

Here we are concerned with the

relationships between states, international law and organization in the unfolding interplay which led up to the adoption
of Resolution

2i|2.

The concluding section expectedly sum-

marizes and draws judgements upon the points presented
earlier.

Our central view is of the United Nations as

a

vehicle

or instiniment of political conflict or its resolution.

Al-

though the United Nations has been used as a vehicle or tool
of great power policy in the past to manage or contain

crises, this was one case in which the situation slipped
out from under great power control and posed an obstreperous

life of its own before the passage of Resolution

suggested the general
ment

.

ou.-clines

2I|.2

which

for a potential peace settle-

.

V

La Rochefoucauld once wrote:

"Quarrels would not

last long were the wrong all on one side."

In keeping with

this we have not conducted our inquiry on the assumption

that either party to this conflict is "guilty" or "inno-

cent," have not attempted to indict or absolve either side
to this dispute; rather, if there by any single motivating

force to this inquiry, it is that what has been termed an

Arab-Israeli death embrace not become
for us all

a

nuclear death embrace
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CHAPTER
THE SIX DAYS' WAR:

I

BUIIDUP AND HOSTILITIES

Perhaps the most widely quoted article on
the

proximate origins of the Six Day War, by Charles
W. Yost,
carries the thesis that "no government plotted
or intended
to start a war in the Middle East in the
Spring of 196?."

Rather, Yost finds it "more likely that they blundered

into it" propelled by the dynamic of "common
intolerance

and mutual harassment

""'
.

While there is no lack of in-

triguing speculation which lays the burden of more- or- less

premeditated guilt at the hands of either Arab or Israeli,^
Yost's judicious approach is not only most analytically
comfortable for our purposes, but appears to conform most

satisfactorily to the unfolding events as we perceive
them.

If this be so,

then each party to the crisis con-

tributed in some measure to the proximate origins of the
crisis.

It is the task of this section to delineate

these contributions, if this be the proper word.

The

reader is reminded that we are concerned here only with
proximate causes to the war.

The grievances in this

dilemma are, unfortunately, of near historical standing,
so much time has passed without an equitable settlement.

However, the long-standing crimes and injustices involved
are of less interest to us here than the eveniJs and attitudes

2

which, occurring in 1966 and 196?, led up to the war.

It

is in this rough sense that we use the word "proximate"

to inform the reader of our intent and interest.

Similarly to the others, the Israeli contribution
was crucial.

There are certain events with which Israel

may be charged for being liable and certain attitudes
and motifs in Israel policy which we shall discuss here;
the events first.
On November I3, 1966 the regular troops of Israel

launched a massive retaliatory attack on the Jordinian
village of Es-Samuand environs,

Jordanian civilian and

military casualties included 18 killed and

5^4-

wounded

while nearly 200 homes and other structures were
demolished, the majority totally so.

3

The representative

of Israel pointed out that 71 raids had been conducted

against Israel since January, 1965

territory in the preceding

6

(II4-

from Jordanian

months) across both Syrian

and other borders, that Israel was holding Arab Governments accountable for inciting or stopping these incursions, that the action was a limited and local one,

and that every state possesses the right to protect its
citizens from such terrorism and sabotage.^

Regardless of

the merits or their lack thereof concerning Israeli

retaliation policy, criticism here centers upon the size
and strength used, the target chosen and the ramifications

which were either not foreseen or, if foreseen, simply ignored.

3

The reprisal raid was the biggest
since the 1956 war
and not Syria, but more moderate Jordan,
was the principal

victim of these raids. ^

It appeared that Israel had not

chosen Syria because of mounting Soviet
interest there,
the recent defense pact with the United
Arab Republic

and the higher Israeli casualties which the
more rugged
Syrian terrain would have brought.

The more moderate,

isolated, American- influenced and accessible Jordan
was

chosen instead.

In consequence. King Hussein's position

was strongly besieged, both from within and without, the

United States exposed and embarrassed, Arab moderates
undermined, Arab extremists emboldened and Russian influence heightened.

Arthur

Goldberg, chief United

J.

States Delegate stated that Es-Samu was a raid "the nature
of which and whose consequences in human lives and in

destruction far surpass the cumulative total of the various
acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of
Israel."^

On November 25 the Security Council adopted

resolution 226 (1966) by a vote of li;-C-l which stated
that the membership "censures Israel for this large-scale

military action

.

,

.

[and]

.

.

.

emphasizes to Israel

that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated

and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will

have to coi:sider further and more effective steps as

envisaged in the Charter."*''

The vote was unusually lop-

sided (only New Zealand abstained), the language of the

1^

resolution was unusually blunt and forceful, the possibility
of sanctions raised and even the United States joined in
the condemnation.

This was doubly unusual, not only be-

cause the United States was censuring Israel, but because

heretofore the United Nations had censured only acts of

member governments; this time it was censuring the Govern ment itself

.

The second incident, on April 7, 196?, grew out of

divergent interpretations between Israel on the one hand,
and the United Nations and Arab states on the other hand.
Israel claimed that the Syrian- Israeli General Armistice

Agreement

Q

had given her near- complete sovereignty over

the demilitarized zones.

9

Included among Israel's per-

ceived rights in these zones was the right of cultivation.

Any number of observers and Security Council resolutions
attest to this and other Israeli activities in the de-

militarized zone.^^

Both the stand of the Arab states

and the "authoritative" interpretation of various of the

provisions of the Israel- Syrian General Armistice Agree-

ment written by Dr. Ralph Bunche, converged upon the
point that:

"Questions of permanent boundaries, terri-

torial sovereignty

.

.

.

and the like must be dealt with

in the ultimjate peace treaty and not in the Armistice
Agreement."

"^"^

According to the Syrian view, when Israel

began such cultivation, it initiated an activity which
conceivably could prejudice in Israel's favor the claims

5

to these lands, since title to them
could be decided only
when and if peace and agreement came.^^
On April 3 the

Israeli press announced the cultivation
of certain disputed sections of the Israeli- Syrian
demilitarized zone.
On April 7 such plowing began, Syrian small
arms fire
commenced and the battle escalated such that
jet aircraft

fought just outside Damascus with the Israeli
pilots
reportedly buzzing the city itself after dispatching

six

Syrian aircraft.^-^
Israel termed this a reprisal while the Arab states

called it a deliberate provocation to incite

a

new

war."""^

The deep pursuit of Syrian aircraft in this second, large-

scale and dramatic action by Israel upon bordering Arab

states was cause for concern in Damascus, Amman and Cairo.
Moreover, an Arab state had been invaded without any

military response from the U.A.R. with which it had had
a formal treaty of mutual defense since 1966.

Repeated

massive reprisals of this type could only place a leader
such as Nasser, whose ascendant leadership had been slipping, in a position such that he would feel it necessary
to respond massively in kind.

Walter

Z.

Laqueur, a fair

observer, but one sympathetic to Israel wrote:
Moreover, Israel's policy of retaliation had lately
exacerbated the conflict. But for Samu and the
battle of 7 April, there would not have been a war
in 1967. .
Had Israel refrained from major
.
raids, the storm might have passed it by, and left
the Arab leaders entirely absorbed in their own
.

6

bitter conflicts. Then in a few years time,
Arab governments might be readier to resign some
themselves to Israel's existence. 15

Then there is the matter of Israeli bellicosity
in

speech in early and mid-May.

On May ?, Prime Minister

Levi Eshkol said that Israel would "adopt suitable

counter-measures against the foci of sabotage and their
abettors."

On May

ll|,

Eshkol stated that Israel would,

concerning border incursions, "respond at a place, time
and by a method of OUR choosing

Jerusalem published on May

li;

""''^
.

A dispatch from

in The New York Times

reported a highly placed Israeli source as threatening
"military action aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime"

unless Syria ceased her support and incitement of incursions by the Palestinian guerrilla organization,
Pateh.

18

Finally, on May

the usually authoritative

Jerusalem Post Weekly reported ultimatum- like statements
from the Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister predicting an inevitable "major military clash" with Syria,
The dispatch continued very specifically:

Military experts here believe that Israel is prepared
to risk Egyptian intervention in its determination
to put an end to Syrian aggression.
The anticipated clash is not thought likely to
assume the dimensions of a full campaign but to be in
the nature of a military expedition intended to take
the wind out of the Syrian's sails once and for all."^"
Not that Syria or Pateh were innocent of provoking
Israel so that this sort of situation came about, but

certainly Israel, at this tim^, was considering an

7

extraordinary retaliation. Just
below the level of a "full
campaign," but at or above the
threshold which might
stimulate an Egyptian response.
One line of interprets-

tion attempts to explain away this
Israeli contribution
by claiming that a Western wire
service sent a "garbled"
account of official Israeli thinking
at that moment which
was then printed by newspapers in
the rest of the world. 20
While it is entirely possible that
this occurred, such an
interpretation does not explain the
appearance or content
of the dispatch domestically printed in
the usually

authoritative Jerusalem Post Weekly and
cited above.
May 19 Secretary-General U Thant said:

On

Intemperate and bellicose utterances by officials
and non- officials ... are unfortunately
more or
less routine on both sides of the lines in
the
Near- East.
In recent weeks, however reports
emanating from Israel have attributed to some
high officials in that state statements so
threatening as to be particularlv inflamatory in
the sense that they could only heighten emotions
and thereby increase tension on the other side
of
the line.^-"-

It is extremely likely that such Israeli statements

could have persuaded not only the Damascus regime but
also

Nasser that a major military strike was in the offing

which could endanger Damascus itself.
The first proximate Arab contribution to the Six Day

War began with the Fateh raids from Syria.

In early 1966

a more radical regime came to power by a coup in Syria.

Armed forays by Fateh commandos into Israel proper usually

ebbed after Israel retaliated,
although public opinion
and concern in Israel reached newer
heights after the
raids inevitably began again.
Israel charged that Syria
was violating her United Nations
Charter obligations
and

the 191+9 Armistice Agreement by
permitting unlawful borde

crossings and the use of force.22

gyria retorted that

she had no authority to obstruct the
drive to redress

and self-determination promised to the
Palestinian Arabs
by the U.N. Charter, but denied them by
^3
Israel.

in-

cursions and incidents increased in number
as late 1966
and early 196? passed; Israel reported eight
incidents

attributed to Syrian- based groups in the twentyfive
day period between April ll|. and May
196?,^^
8,

Prim.e

Minister Eshkol spoke of "ever- fresh graves" in a
speech
on May 15.^5 Merits of all cases aside, the policy
of

Syria to promote and encourage such activities to emanate

from her territory was both unrealistic and adventuresome
Syria was militarily weak in comparison to Israel.

It is

dangerous to conduct a campaign of violence against a

stronger opponent who is known to respond violently when
in this sort of a position.

U Thant could have had this

in mind when he stated on May 19 in the same report which

noted Israel's verbal bellicosity that Fateh activities
"are a major factor

...

[in aggravating the situation

and increasing tension] in that they provoke strong

9

reactions in Israel by the government
and population
alike.
The second proximate Arab contribution
to the Six Day

War centers upon the United Arab Republic's
decision to
terminate its consent for the continued

presence of United

Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) stationed
in the Sinai
3ince 1957. This action and the ramifications
which
followed stemmed from the actions we have described

above.

On May I3 Nasser stated that he received
reports from

both Syrian and Soviet intelligence that "there
was an

enemy plan for the invasion of Syria" and decided
"not
to accept this silently.

pressures:

"^"^

Nasser was under multiple

his military venture into Yemen was debil-

itating Egypt's never strong economy, PL 48C wheat purchases from the United States had been cut off, and he

had come under withering Arab criticism for not reacting
to earlier Israeli incursions against Jordan and Syria.

Nasser's successes had soured and his influence and
prestige were slipping.

If Syria were attacked she cer-

tainly could call for Egyptian assistance under the
Treaty of Mutual Defense of November, I966.

It is

important here to understand the Arabs' conviction concerning Israel's willingness to "try it [armed conquest]
again" as well as their determination never to be caught

militarily unprepared and off-guard as was the case in
1956 against the combined British- French- Israeli

10

operation.

A display of determination and force then

would serve not only his position in the Arab world, but
possibly to deter Israel from invading Syria.

Israeli

observers believed, on the other hand, that Moscow and
the Syrian regime had "bluffed" Nasser into serving the

more radical and warlike policy of Damascus. 29

But,

unquestionably, both Arabs and Israelis would take

Nasser's posturing for cant so long as buffering UNEP
forces were stationed on Egyptian territory.
On May 15 Nasser put U.A.R. armed forces on alert

and began moving them ostentatiously through Cairo to
the Sinai.

On May 16, 2200 hours GMT, the Chief of Staff

of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces, General Fawzy,

sent a written message to Ma jor-General Rikhye, Commander

of UNEF, requesting withdrawal of "all UN troops which
install observation posts along our borders."

Secretary-

General U Thant notified the Permanent Representative of
the United Arab Republic of compliance with his country's

request by letter on May 18.
The alacrity by which this decision was reached has

provided fodder for a major and long- las ting controversy.
The Secretary- General held that the "consent and coopera-

tion of the host country is essential to the effective

operation and

,

.

.

very existence" of any UNEF- type

force; that just as "Israel exercised its sovereign right
to refuse the stationing of UNEF on its side" so, the

11

United Arab Republic Government should not then "be told
that it could not unilaterally seek the removal of the
"^^
forces.
We choose at this point not to enter into a dis-

cussion of the various other legal positions concerning
the Secre tary- General

'

s

action.

But a few comments on

certain aspects would be in order.

First, Alastair

Buchan then Director of the Institute for Strategic
Studies (London) suggests that Nasser did not expect

UNEF to be withdrawn so meekly, and that there was doubt
expressed even in Israel that Nasser wanted so rapid a
31

withdrawal.-^

Buchan tells us that Dag Hamraarskjold had

left Nasser "in no doubt that the Secretary- General would

not withdraw UNEF simply when Egypt requested it" and
that "an exchange of views would be called for towards

harmonizing the positions. "^^

The public commitments of

the United Arab Republic and U Thant's unexpected behavior

made it difficult for Nasser to back down when he got more
than he bargained for.

Secondly, the total withdrawal of

UNEF placed the UAR and Israeli troops in an eyeball-toeyeball confrontation situation the likes of which had net

been seen since 1956 when Israel claimed the massing of
Egyptian troops in the Sinai as a casus belli

.

Third,

Sharm El Sheikh was now openly devoid of neutralizing
forces and beckoned to be occupied by U.A.R. troops

— an

act

which placed them in a position to thrgaten the passage of

12

ships thi*ough the Straits of Tiran.
On May 22, Nasser announced the re- imposition of a

blockade of the Straits of Tiran to ships flying the
Israeli flag and ships of other countries carrying

strategic goods to Israel.
casus belli in 1956.^-^

This too had been one of the

Egypt claimed the waters were

exclusively Arab; Israel claimed the rights of

a

littoral

state; Egypt invoked the belligerent status which flows

from a continuing state of war; and Israel (with other
maritime nations including the United States) claimed the
right of innocent passage.

Israel had repeatedly warned

through the 7/oar3 that free and unimpeded passage was a
vital interest of the state and that an attempt to change
that status would bring war.

Nasser himself estimated

the chances for war at 100 percent after the closure of

Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.
Once again we point out that while this is not the

appropriate place to weigh the various legal positions,
a number of points do need to be made.
a step which separated Egypt from Syria;

First, this was
it certainly was

of no immediate protective value to Damascus.

Secondly,

prior to Kay 22, Nasser's moves had been spectacular, but
innocuous; now, under the taunts of other Arab States-^
It

Nasser took a step v;hich galvanized

Israel-'-'

and escalated

the crisis to a level at which war was nearly inevitable.

Finally, Nasser's offer to take the Straits question to

the International Court of Justice,

statements that he

would not attack first, but wished merely a return
to the
pre- 1956 situation coupled to Israeli hesitation, and

great power urgings of caution and restraint all seemed
to
point to a spectacular diplomatic success for Nasser which

might isolate Israel, damage its "credibility" and, once
Israel accepted this perceived limitation of sovereignty,

psychologically "appeared to be the beginning of the end,
the slow strangulation of the Jewish state.

"-^"^

Finally,

there is no way of calculating the intensity of the long-

repressed Arab feeling toward Israel which inundated and

unified the Arab world while providing more fuel for the
unintended, but now raging, irreversible f lames.

How-

ever, according to some analysts, Israel would have to

accede to this.'^39

Whether or not Jerusalem or Cairo

literally meant what they said, in the dangerous world of
international politics it is more than likely that contentions, and especially actions, will be looked upon

gravely and that adversaries will act in response to them.
It is also worthy to note that with the signing of the

Jordanian- UAR Defense Treaty on May

last of factors

present before the Israeli attack in 195^-- the multiplication of raids into Israeli territory, border troop buildups, a blockade at Tiran and the defense agreement with

Jordan- -all had recurred.

The Individual Soviet contribution
to the crisis

stemmed from Moscow's interest in
deterring an Israeli
invasion, thereby to assist her favored
regime in Damascus.
The nature of the Soviet role beyond
this is not
clear.

Information was passed on to Nasser
concerning alleged
Israeli troop concentrations and, it
appears, that certain
assurances were conveyed to Nasser prior to
his closure
of the Straits of Tiran on May 22.^^
The Soviet role
must be explained within the context of
general Soviet
interests in the Middle East. For while
Russia is com-

petitively interested in increasing Soviet influence
in
the Middle East and minimizing that of the
United

States,

there also exists a cooperative interest among
the super-

powers in avoiding extra-area escalation to nuclear
war.

Soviet policy toward Israel is aimed toward threats and

political pressure to make Jerusalem give up its gains and
not at the physical annihilation of the state.

Moreover,

the continued existence of Israel induces continued coopera-

tion on the part of Arab states with the Soviet Union to

blunt the perceived threat of Israeli expansion while being

useful to polarize a previously Western domain.

Within this

context it would be reasonable to guess that Soviet efforts
to protect the Damascus regime would coincide with Nasser's

aims for leadership in the region.

Hie muscle- flexing and

sabre-rattling of pre-May 22 days would appear to conforra
to these wishes, although at least one report has it that

15

Nasser merely informed the Soviets of his
request to have
UNEP withdrawn and acted despite their
cautioning>^

But

the closure of the Straits and the events
which unfolded

thereafter do not appear to have been within
the control
of the Russians.^
The Soviets did encourage Arab initiatives at
the

beginning while later exercising only the weakest
constraining influences. This attitude was of crucial

value

in creating the crisis.

Russia supported Egyptian

mobilization in the Sinai, dampened proposals for the

United Nations' involvement in the situation, tried to
bully Israel and acted in a restrained manner only in the
avoidance of a superpower confrontation.

While the

Soviets underestimated Israeli determination and strength,
it overestimated the United States'

restraining influence

on Israel, and the Arab capacity to handle the full war

situation which came about.

So, amidst the quick pace of

developments and spectacular successes extracted by Nasser,
the Soviet Union found itself swept along, not unwillingly

at first, by its public and private commitments to Arab
states.

What other reason, for example, is there for

awakening both Nasser and Eshkol at 3:00 A.M. on May 2?
to deliver notes to pajamad Heads-of-s tate which attempted

to moderate the situation somewhat ?^-^

interest in encouraging

i;ho

The Soviets had an

initial events of what turned

cut to be a full-scale subsystem confrontation; they exercised

16

little or no moderation over events as they unfolded;
and, consequently, the major reactions and counter- reactions

occurred in Cairo and Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus rather
than Moscow, Washington or New York.
The major individual contribution of the United States
to this crisis lay in Washington's unwillingness, hesitancy

and erraticism in acting.

Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles and President Dwight D, Eisenhower in 195? had con-

veyed both in letter and speech their assurances to Israel
that the Straits of Tiran would remain open to unimpeded
Israeli shipping despite the pullback of Jerusalem's troops

and then withdrawal by UNEF forces.^

Half-hearted sug-

gestions and attempts by the United States in 196? to

assist the opening of the Straits to free and innocent
passage came to naught.

And it soon became apparent

that the only power that would reopen the Straits to Israel

would be Israel herself.

On the other side of the coin,

the UAR and Israel were left without an intervening or

mediating power between them, given this United States
policy.

On his trip to the United States on May 26,

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban found President Lyndon

Johnson sympathetic, but in no mood to be hurried into a
new theatre of hostilities given the then- current commitii6

ment in Viet Nam.^

Much American behavior during this period underlines
the general (and in this case specific) indecisiveness of

17

American policy which flows from tho "pattern of
limited
commitment, limited objectives
limited understanding."^''
.

.

.

The prime conditioning factor of United States
Middle East

policy is its recognition and support of the State of
Israel.

This has precluded the realization of any real

policy of "even- handedness."
Charge

d'

David Nes, United States

Affaires in Cairo in 196 7 through the June war,

has alleged that despite such tens ion- constraints as oil

investments and the global- strategic position of the area,
U.S. commitments were not as limited as one would believe.

During the months before the June I967 hostilities
the military intelligence requirements required by Wash-

ington from American embassies, the Central Intelligence

Agency and military intelligence staffs in the Middle East
were largely based on Israeli needs, not on American interests.

The effectiveness of the Israeli air strikes on

June 5> 1967 was assured at least in part by information

on Egyptian airfields and aircraft disposition provided

through American sources.
forniation,

With political and economic in-

it has long been State Department practice to

provide the Israeli Embassy in Washington with copies of
all our reports from Middle East embassies considered to
be of interest.

Geoffrey Kemp,

a

student of arms control

policy and security in the region concluded that the
de facto aim of the Western powers' arms policy has been

18

not equilibrium, but to provide sufficient
arms to Israel
such that she "would be in a marginally superior
military

position over any combination of local Arab countries

.

"^"^

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco stated that
the
United States "has supported the security and well-being
of Israel for two decades, with

a

constancy rarely sur-

passed in the history of relations between nations,"

On

the other hand, for reasons of transportation and com-

munication, land bridges, oil and strategy the United
States seeks friendship and influence with the Arab
states.

It is the contradiction between these policies

which traditionally projects a "floundering" U.S. diplomacy
in the area and helped stymie potential United States

influence in this particular case.
There followed a number of "forceful initiatives "^'

by the United States which included on May 3I a UN draft
resolution (S/7916) which criticized UNEF's hasty departure,

questioned the legal grounds for the Straits blockade and

urged a "breathing spell" during which the Gulf of Aqaba
would be at least temporarily reopened.

The United States

also attempted to reopen the Straits to Israeli shipping
at first, by an international naval task force to test the
blockade, and then by a declaration of maritime powers

which stated the right of innocent passage for ships
through the international waterways of the Strait of Tiran

and Gulf of Aqaba coupled with their willingness to "assert"
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this right for their own ships.

The first initiative

failed and the second was formally alive
though unofficially
nearly dead by the start of the war.

An interesting insight is provided by David
Nes,
former acting chief of the United States
mission

in Cairo

from February I967 until literal hours before
the June
war— an insight denied us in the Soviet case of how

con-

trol of the crisis slipped out from under the
U.S., and

may even have been accelerated by American behavior
during
the slide toward war.

According to Nes, President Lyndon B.

Johnson's administration had long and evasively delayed
the

firm extension requested by Egypt of a $150 million

a

year

PI48O food plan which was absolutely central to planning,

national diet, foreign exchange and to internal economic
development.

Nes holds that the original plan was "sold"

to the American Congress as a manner of influencing Nasser
to behave in ways compatible with United States aims.

But

at the end of the original three-year program period.

Congress balked at approving an extension on the grounds
that "the U.S. had failed to receive the advantages on

which the plan had been predicated. "^^

Nes holds that

because Johnson chose to respond evasively rather than to
provide a candid explanation of congressional difficulties,
"there was created in the Egyptian mind a feeling that our

basic policy of friendship and normal relations had changed
to one of hostility,"'

'

Next, in the economic area
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Washington postponed releasing for domestic development
projects the United Arab Republic pound reserves which were

held by the United States, and placed pressure on the
international bank to prevent the U.A.R. from utilizing

drawing rights to hard currency to which Cairo was
entitled.

Washington was the only creditor of Egypt

(among whom Nasser counted most of the V/estern powers)

which refused to reschedule the U.A.R. debt.^^

In addi-

tion, the "refusal" of the U.S. to continue discussing

certain large development projects important to Egypt,
such as nuclear desalinization and Suez Canal modernization (which Washington had previously looked upon with
favor), coupled with

"Uhe

distinctly cool U.S. response to

Nasser's request to mediate the Yemeni problem and to an
invitation extended to Secretary of State Dean Rusk to
visit Cairo

— all

of these cumulatively added up to a new

official view of U.S. intentions:

All of these were minor irritations in themselves
but taken together, they created an impression with
the Egyptian leadership that the U.S. was endeavoring to force them into international bankruptcy, was
isolating them in the Arab world and was, in effect,
pursuing a policy designed not only to undermine
their position in the area, but also to create
opposition within Egypt which might result in the
overthrow of the Nasser regime.
There is good reason to believe that backed into
a corner as it were, by the series of American actions
end inactions, by interpreting them as signs of
hostility. President Nasser and his principal governmental advisors felt that they had to break out of this
encirclement through some sort of dramatic political
action. The action that they finally took is, of
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of course, well-known and part of
history resulting
in the hostilities known as the June
117.SS

^

In consequence, American influence
in Cairo fell

an extremely low ebb:

t(

Nasser would not even receive the

State Department's special emissary, Charles
Yost, who
arrived in Cairo on May 29; nor did he respond
to Johnson's

handsigned messages:
On his [Nasser's] desk lay an unanswered
letter he
had received from Johnson the previous week
"I
have received a nice letter from President
Johnson,"
ne Informed the French Ambassador in Cairo,
"an^
don't intend to answer it for the time being. "5b I

Just at the crucial moment when American influence

was at its lowest, the need for its focused exercise in
Cairo was at a height.

Moreover, the chosen behavior

of the Soviet Union left the responsibility for peace-

keeping to the U.S.

The point may be illustrated by

sequential newspaper dispatches during late May:
So far, Moscow has played a passive role, a passivity
that hinders Washington by leaving it the burden of
resolving the current crisis.
This handicap is
significant at a time when Moscow's voice carries
great weight in Arab capitals while Western influence
in Egypt and Syria is at a low ebb. 57

The diplomatic problem for the United States became
one of not only holding the Israelis in check, but
finding some face-saving way for Mr. Nasser to retreat
on his blockade .5°
The essence of the problem as seen
therefore is to find a face-saving
the United Arab Republic can avoid
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.
.

.

at the White House
formula by which
or rescind its
,59

Not only did the United States face the problem of
lack of influence in Cairo, but in Jerusalem as well.

It
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seems surprising that despite Israel's vital
dependence on

Washington's good graces for vast military, and
especially
economic gifts and aid, that Washington did not have
more
of a voice in Israeli decision- making, but such was
the
60
case.
One crucial moment was the Israeli cabinet meeting

which followed Abba Eban's talk with President Johnson:
The Johnson administration had been fearful that
Israel's military leaders might persuade Premier Levi
Eshkol and the cabinet to approve an offensive to
try to force President Gamal Abdul Nasser to lift his
blockade of the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships.
The object of greatest White House interest
.
.
.
today was the meeting of the Israeli cabinet, which
it was felt, might provide the major test of the
President's persuasiveness with Abba Eban.
The Administration has hesitated, therefore, to
offer any new commitments of support for the Israelis
fearing that such commitments would poly encourage the
most militant quarters in Jerusalem.

Two points need to be made here.

First, on a theo-

retical level, when a small state perceives a sufficient
threat to a vital interest which is not viewed as effec-

tively countered by its great power protector, the small
state may act alone.

Second, despite the reduced nature

of the world due to modern communications, the final de-

cision for war was made in Jerusalem, and there was little

Washington could do about it.
civilization's web.

Such is the delicacy of

So is this crisis crucial to human-

kind.
The United Nations played a v;eak and steadily de-

clining role in the crisis until the outbreak of war.
various reasons, the Security Council did not hold its

For
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first meeting on the Middle East
situation until May 2i^,
was not consulted on the Ul^P
withdrawals, and met for
eight days, until June 3 without
formulating a position
on the Straits question. Vnile the
United Nations may be
criticized for failing to exercise any
influence of significance on the developing crisis,
criticism for contributing to the war must be shared
between the area and
great powers: both the Arab States and
Israel chose to
cajole and threaten each other rather than
demand Security
Council action during this period; the great
powers pre-

sented increasingly rigid and visible disagreement
on

substantive matters.

For example, while the Soviet Union

as late as May 29 questioned the necessity for the
Security

Council even to deal with the Middle East situation,^^ the

United States, once its forceful initiative on the Straits
of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba came to naught, refused to

alter its public stand and awaited the outbreak of war.
In this developing crisis the United Nations did not

appear to have an independent political role concerning
the peace and security of the world.

Rather, its inability

to affect significantly the course of events indicates

mirror- like the reflective nature of small, and especially

great power disagreement, and the symmetrical United Nations
paralysis which occurs when great power aims conflict than
converge.
issue:

This inay be opitcmized in the UNEF withdrawal

while the UAR requested their withdrawal,

Israel

2k
was unwilling to permit UNEF stationing
on her side of
the cease fire line and the United
Nations lost considerable of the effectiveness which it possessed
in the area.

Great power disagreement and lack of
coordination in the
Security Council did not permit the reinstitution

of such

a force in the Middle East,

In fact, during this upswing

phase preliminary to conflict, the great powers
by their

staunch support of their client states, and consequent

rigidity of position reduced the chances for compromise
and accommodation at the area level, thereby assisting
in
the unintended drive toward war.
On June 5, I967 the armed forces of the Israel Govern-

ment swung into action as Abba Eban said, to
repel the attempt which was mounted three weeks
.
.
.
ago to procure our encirclement and strangulation and
thereafter to work with our neighbors to build a
better and more stable system of relationship. These
are our objectives; these are our aims, ^3

Militarily, the fulfillment of these aims began with

unbelievably devastating air sweeps directed at the air
forces first of Egypt, then of Syria, Jordan and Iraq.

The

advance planning and superbly trained initiative of the
Israel Air Force staff and pilots destroyed the bulk of
the Arab aircraft on the ground the very first day.

Accord-

ing to General Mordechai Hod, Commander of the Israel Air

Force,

i^-lO

Arab planes were destroyed on the first day, 19

on the cjecond day, Ik on the third and 9 on the fourth. ^

Simultaneously, Israel infantry, armor, helicopter and
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then airborne troops struck at the
Gaza Strip and penetrated
as deeply as forty miles into the
Sinai Peninsula on the
first day.^^ Khan Yunis and el Arish
in Gaza and northern
Sinai were captured on the first and
second
days (June 5

and 6), respectively.

On June ? the Mitla Pass was blocked

and the final fate of thousands of
Egyptian fighting men
and their vehicles, now fleeing, sealed.
Parachutists
took Sharm el Sheikh and were deploying
up and down the
Suez Canal by June 8. Egyptian manpower
losses in the
Sinai campaign were put at 11,500 officers
and soldiers
killed, over 5,000 captured and 80 percent
of Egyptian

equipment lost (destroyed or intact).

Israeli losses were

put at 275 officers and enlisted men killed and
800

wounded.

Fighting began between Israel and Jordan on June
5.
Against perhaps the most stubborn and courageous of Arab
resistance, fast wheeling Israeli forces captured the

cities of Jenin, Rair^llah and Nablus by late June

7

aided

by the efforts of their air force now helpfully concentrating on Jordanian and Iraqi armor.

A coordinated attack

by Israeli artillery, armor, aircraft and infantry

simultaneously began the encirclement and isolation of

Jerusalem on June 5.

Early on June

7

the assault on the

Old City began, climactically seizing the Wailing Wall,
a feat which released a floodtide of emotions among

Israelis, before the Israeli force pressed on to Bethlehem
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and Hebron.

By the evening of June

7

when the representa-

tlves of both Jordan and Israel accepted
the cease-fire
in the Security Council the entire
West Bank was in
Israeli hands.
The Jordanian Government estimated
its
losses at just under 7,000 killed, wounded,
missing or
captured (the majority killed).
Israel losses against

Jordan exceeded those in the Sinai operation:

officially listed as killed and

Jerusalem Government.

1,1^.57

299 were

wounded by the

Losses of Jordanian equipment were

proportionately high.^®
Until June

9,

action on the Syrian front was com-

prised primarily of artillery and air bombardments broken
only by minor Syrian armor and infantry attacks on
June 6.

Following the Jordanian collapse, Israeli troops

wheeled north while its air force concentrated its operations
against the Golan Heights.

The offensive against Syria

was delayed by Israel because of uncertainty over Security
Council activity which might cause Israel to suffer

casualties in vain, and perhaps by Soviet sabre-rattling

which threatened intervention.

The buildup of Israeli

troops actually was ordered into operation after Israeli

and Syrian representatives in the Security Council had

formally agreed to a cease-fire.
Where fighting occurred on the Maginot Line- like

Syrian front, it was fierce and casualties relatively heavy
on both sides; the technology of air strikes and artillery
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mingled with frequent age-old hand-to-hand
combat in
trenches and prepared positions especially
at the northern
Syrian stronghold at Tel Pahar.^^
Rotable indeed was the
Israeli advance in the northern Kfur
Szold-Banias
region

where the Israelis fought up

a rootless

mountain behind

mine removers and bulldozers preparing
the way for the
tanks which followed.
The fall of Kuneitra

on June 10

signified to the Syrians that little if any
help could be
expected from the rea- and that the Israelis were

on their

way to encircle and trap them.

A headlong retreat by the

remaining Syrian forces began which, while it
saved their
lives and provided additional troops for the defense
of

Damascus, literally left only mobility as a restraint on
the Syrian territory Israel could seize.

Syrian losses

were put at approximately 2,50C killed and 5,000 wounded.'''^

With the conclusion of the war Israel found itself

controlling about

i|.7,C00

square miles of Egyptian,

Jordanian and Syrian territory in contrast to the pre- June
1967 Israel of about 8,000 miles.

An additional one

million Arabs now lived in areas under Israeli control.
The war was quick, furious, rapidly moving and militarily

decisive.

Certainly there could be no question of the

paramountcy of the armed forces of

a

modernized nation, in

comparison with those of developing states within the
then- parameters making up the Middle Eastern international

system.

Arab losses were great not only in terms of land.

6,
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but also in terras of a particular type of man.

The armed

forces compose a significant percentage of
the modernized
manpower pool available to the Arab world. William
Polk
has estimated that the loss of 25,000 to
30,000 such men
"amounts to perhaps five percent of the modernized
labor
force of the Arab countries.

In terms of

parison with the United States.

approximately five million

a

rough comr

This would be a loss of

men.""^-^

We can only acquire

glimpses of the psychological exhilaration, despair,

accommodation and intransigence engendered by the war.
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their totals which might help explain the discrepancy
between their own and Hod's estimates.

7,

1967, p. 16.
.
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^^""^^ From War
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to War (New York:

Pegasus,

66.

The New York Times

67.

Safran, op. cit .. p.

68.

Ibid .

69.

S. L. A. Marshall, Swift Sword;
The Historic.n l Record
of Israel's VictorT, June 1967 /New Yor^k- American
Heritage Publishing Company, Inc., I967),
p. I31.
See also The New York Times June 12, I97I, which
reported:
"It was a new kind of fighting for the
Israeli Army.
Here in the hills of Syria there
was no element of surprise and no chance to make quick
flanking movements around stubborn pockets of resistance. Friday was a day for uphill infantry
assaults on bunkers and barbed wire." The dispatch
went on to cite that in the first day's fighting one
Israeli battalion was more than decimated (if the
word be used in the sense of taking at least a tenth
part of), while another counted an advance of only
150 yards into Syria after a full day's carnage.

.

.

June 8, I967.
3I4.9,

368.

p.

.

.

.

.

70.

Safran, op. cit ., p. 38I.

71.

William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World
(Rev. ed.
Cambridge: Harvard university Press,
1969), p. 302. Mr. Polk's work dealt with the Arab
"core" countries extending geographically from the
Tigris to the Nile rivers, and from the Mediterranean
to the Arabian Seas.
;
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CHAPTER

II

LEGAL POSITIONS OF DIRECT PARTIES
A "Just and Lasting Peace" between Arabs and Israelis
is the

dream of all men in all lands, not just the dream of

men who inhabit or are concerned with the Middle East.

But

the Arab- Israeli conflict, the Palestinian problem, the

question of Arab or Israeli aggression

— however

one's

position on the compass of sympathy or bias affects the
semantic choices mianifesting his perception of the

problems
decades.

— the

problem has been with us for more than two

Not only that, the fact that the conflict is

geographically embedded in an area of significance particularly vital to the West, the facts of transit-

communications linkage between continents, oil and simple
geostrategic position all being descriptive of the Middle

East lends a note of real possibility to the escalatory,

holocaustic scenarios of Great Power nuclear confrontation

depicted as springing Medusa- like from the maws of this
problem.
Oddly enough this eruption may have unrecognizably

carried within itself the seeds of settlement which could

grow into peace-- certainly not strong and sturdy at first,
but peace nonetheless.

Arthur Lell has written wisely:
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r

^

nevertheless a recurring
affairs, that the worse the
situation becomes, the more drastic
are the remedies
international
^^e
n^^r'^^'^'^r'^^^
The paradox
is only superficial.
Clearly, conflict
""^^ situation has deteriorated
^«.1n.1ti
^^TL^'^^l
seriously and
therefore demands a basic solution.
?r,%

c_ity.
^

It was this sort of sentiment-- that
after the bitter

harvest of more than two decades of war,
belligerency,
guerrilla or terrorist activity, this hemorrhage

of men,

treasure and emotion "had become a burden to world
peace,

and that the world community should finally insist
on the
establishment of a condition of peace, flowing from the
agreement of the parties."^

The United States, though it

tended to protect the interests of Israel in the United
Nations, recognized this while the Soviet Union was still

singularly engrossed in the more immediately gratifying
though arid effort to condemn Israel for "aggression."^
But the United States was hardly alone in its perception.

During its session of June

6,

196?, seven members of the

Security Council--Argentina, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Japan,
The United Kingdom and, surprisingly, Mali joined the United

States in agreeing to the necessity either to face up to
the fundamental problems at the root of the conflict, and
to attempt to solve them, or expect to meet the problem

in a crisis situation again. ^

Such a feeling certainly

provided much of the motive drive which eventually resulted
in the November 22, 196? Security Council Resolution,
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Such an approach certainly is
consistent with the
basic mission of the United Nations
as set forth in its
Charter.
Certainly it is consistent not only
with Article 1
which sets forth the purposes of the
organization, but also
with Article 2 which describes the
principles in accordance
with which members shall act. Among
other purposes and
principles the former calls for the United
Nations to
"maintain international peace and security,"
to settle

breaches of the peace "in conformity with
the principles
of justice and international laW and to
act as "a centre
for harmonizing the actions of nations" toward

these ends;

the latter speaks to the peaceful settlement
of inter-

national disputes such that "security and justice
are not
endangered" while refraining from the threat or use of
force.

The principle is also consistent with Article

2I4.

which confers on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security."

Nor need we but mention this principle's

conformity with Articles 33 and 2k which has to do with
the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" as well as with

Article

i;0.

As for the rest, the content cf the hope for "A
Just and Lasting Peace" will unfold simultaneously with

our discussion.
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To the victors belong the spoils and throughout the

Arab- Israeli conflict, the most sought-after spoil has

been land.

With her lightning conquest, Israel greatly

increased the amount of land under her control.

The Gaza

Strip, crowded hothouse of Palestinian misery and re-

sistance; the Sinai Peninsula, historical defensive buffer

for the possessor state, natural offensive threat to the
state denied its possession; the West Bank, vessel for

Jerusalem and vital strategic dagger; and the Golan Heights,
threat to Israel, pride of Syria

— all

Israeli Blitzkrieg- type campaign.

were taken in the

For the first time in

Israel's history, virtually every prior threatening area

was in her hands and her jagged, indefensible boundaries
now were straightened and more manageable.

In a sense,

land is a "zero'-siim" quantity in the Middle East equation.

And what Israel had won, Arabs had lost.
Palestinians this time

— Arabs.

Not just the

Syrians, Jordanians,

Egyptians and Palestinians now shared a common experience

which to them irrefutably proved again the threat which
an expansionist- minded Israel posed.

Israel was forced

to disgorge its 1956 conquests by a United States President

who believed in conformance "to the strong aentiment of the

world coirmiunity as expressed in various United Wations
resolutions relating to withdrawal."^
conformance was insisted upon.

In 19^7, no such

1^0

The Israeli case is as follows:

by "going to war"

the Arab Governments had automatically
repudiated the

armistice agreements and its demarcation
line.
Israel
will not withdraw from the conquered
areas until the Arabs
ceased their claim to a legal state
of war, nonrecognition
of the sovereign equality of Israel,
hostile actions and
continual threats against Israel's existence
and
agree to

free passage through international waterways
for ships of
all nations.
Once before, in 1956, the Israelis had
withdrawn from territory on the basis of
promises and understandings rather than a binding peace treaty
negotiated

directly and without the intermediaries of even
the closest
friends.
Therefore, Israel felt justified in retaining
these conquests until peace actually came.^

At first

espousing no territorial claims, Israeli officialdom

quickly changed its mind.^
the United States'

Remembering on the one hand,

1957 position that the Charter precluded

"using the forcible seizure and occupation of other lands
as bargaining power in the settlement of international
dis-

putes" and the American commitment to "remedying" Israel's

"legitimate grievances" concerning the Gulf of Aqaba and
the Gaza Strip° and, on the other hand, the promises and

understanding which never materialized after Israel's unconditional withdrawal, Israel felt justified in acting

differently this time.

This time Israel would not withdraw

1^1

except as part of a firm conditional agreement, negotiated
on a face-to-face basis, in which such questions as
the

Arab claim to a state of war, borders, recognition and
refugees would be dealt with.*^

Jerusalem was not about

to entrust its security either to a great power or an

international organization which had proved unreliable
in the past.

At the moment of crisis, the United Nations

had been paralyzed while the United States vacillated.
Israel would retain control of the occupied territories

until a peace settlement was negotiated and her terms met.
In the meantime,

Israel constructed the Bar- Lev line of

fortifications along the Suez Canal, sprinkled Nahal
fortified kibbutzim in the West Bank and annexed Jerusalem.
There are two separate points to the Arab position

concerning Israeli troop withdrawal.

The first point

relates to the maintenance of armed military forces in

foreign territory without the consent of the host state;
the second point concerns the inadmissibility of

acquisition of territory by war-- the more familiar "no
fruits of aggression" principle according to Charter

articles

I

and II.

International law prohibits the maintenance of armed

military forces on the territory of another state without
that state's consent.

Article IC of the Covenant of the

League of Nations and ths 1926 Kellogg-Briand Pact were

cited by Secretary of State Stimson and recognized by the

k2

League in the Stimson Doctrine in which the United States

refused to recognize any alteration of rights steimning

from the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in
The principle, "no fruits of aggression" is

1931.-^^

firmly rooted in contemporary international law.
Moreover, the Arab case continues, Article 5i of
the United Nations Charter accepts the inherent right of

state self-defense upon armed attack only "until the

Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."

The interpretive

content of phrases such as these are subject to wide
differences.

It appears that territorial occupation by

military forces of another state must cease when peace
and security are restored, even if the case is put forvard
that such occupation was initially justified as a defensive

measure.

Arab states insist that the first step toward

establishing peace, on the basis of the principle, is the

withdrawal of Israeli forces.

However, Israel insisted

on withdrawal only as part of a more complete settlement.

Principle certainly requires that Israel not retain its

occupied areas as a bargaining weapon, claims the Arab
case.

For if Israel extracted territorial or political

concessions as a result, a premium would be put on
aggressor
aggression which, in effect, would "permit the
for
fruits of his aggression to gain the ends
to use the

which he went to

war."-^"^

This could only encourage

aggression generally in other parts of the world and
specifically, according to the Arab view, by an Israel

whose design had always been perceived as expansionist.
The precedent of Israel striking the first blow and being

allowed to retain the fruits of its conquest while in consequence dictating the terms of a settlement to its liking
could only weaken the foundations of the United Nations

and international law, claims the Arab case.

Moreover,

Israel's current unilateral dissolution of the Armistice

Agreements and Commissions was disputed by Secretary-

General U Thant who in 196? pointed out:
there has been no indication either in the
•
•
•
General Assembly or in the Security Council that
the validity and applicability of the Armistice
Agreements have been changed as a result of the
recent hostilities or of the war of 1956; each
agreement, in fact, coni;ains a provision that it
will remain in force "until a peaceful settlement
between the parties is achieved." Nor has the
Security Council or the General Assembly taken any
steps to change the pertinent resolutions of either
organ relating to the Armistice Agreements or to the
earlier cease-fire demands. The Agreements provide
that by mutual consent the signatories can revise or
suspend them.
There is no provision in them for
unilateral termination of their application. This
has been the United Nations position all along and will
continue to be the position until a competent organ
decides otherwise .-^^

Related to, yet beyond the principle of withdrawal

from occupied territory lies the more specific principle
of inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.
We shall shortly review the case of Jerusalem.

Israeli

statements have made clear that there will be no
return
to the status quo ante in the Gaza Strip, Sinai,
the West

Bank or Golan Heights if Israel's current alms are fulfilled.

But simple military occupation of territory

legally that of another state gives no title to that
occupied territory.

This was affirmed in the Pan American

Conference of 1890 through the Buenos Aires Declaration
of

1936"'"^

and Lima Declaration of

1938"'"^

and finally,

the Bogota Charter of the Organization of American States
in

I9I4.8.

Plebiscites rather than force or occupation

were required for territorial transfers under

V\foodrow

Wilson's Fourteen Points and applied in some of the peace
settlements."^^

Article 10 's guarantee of territorial

integrity for members found in the League of Nation's
Covenant carries this implication. 1
Pact of 1928"^^ concurred in this.

'

The Kellog-Briand

Territorial acquisitions

were rejected by the Atlantic Charter. 19

Finally, it may

be pointed out that:

The Charter of the United Nations contains no
collective declaration of non- recognition of territorial changes effected through non- pacific means,
but the members of the United Nations have pledged
themselves to suppress acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace (Art. I, par. 1), to settle
their disputes by peaceful means (Art. 2, par. 3)
to refrain from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrioy or political independence
and to refrain from
of any state (Art. 2, par.
giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
It is hardly possible that
action (Art. 2, par, 5).
recognition of illegal acquisition could be compatible with these obligations.^^

The case of Jerusalem is such that it requires

separate treatment.

On June 7 after bitter fighting

Israel announced the capture of Jerusalem's Old City and
its environs since

191^.3

governed by Jordan.

On June 28,

1967 the state of Israel announced its unilateral annex-

ation of these conquered territories.

Much of what has

been previously written concerning withdrawal from con-

quered territories applies here.

But because of its

annexation, unlike other conquered territories and primarily

because of Jerusalem's special significance as an eternal
city, holy to three faiths and host to their shrines, this

sector of land, this city and its environs takes on a
special significance of a nature dissimilar from other
21
areas

For 3,000 years, control of Jerusalem has been
22
acquired by conquest.

Disputes and friction--at least

among Christians concerning shrines and their control were
not unknown to the city.

Articles I3 and

2

3

In the twentieth century.

of the League of Nations mandatory

agreement for Palestine made special mention of the city's

unique religious character and of the mandatory's responsibility to protect the rights of all religious character
and of the mandatory's responsibility to protect the

rights of all religions, their Holy Place, access, worship

and control of them,^^

In 1937, the Report of the Peel
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Coxnmisslon recommended an enclave to
include and surround

Jerusalem and Bethlehem under continued
British control,
but because of its religious character,
separate from
the rest of the proposed partitioned
Palestine.
The

Anglo-American Committee on Palestine and
Related Problems recommended in 19i|6 that while
"international
guarantees" should protect the interests of
the three
faiths, the continuing mandatory (British)
government
should closely supervise holy places and their
vicinity.
On November 29,

l9i^-7,

the General Assembly of the

United Nations passed Resolution 181 (II) better
known as
the Palestine Partition Resolution.

resolution began:

Part III of the

"The city of Jerusalem shall be estab-

lished as a corpus separatum under

a

special international

regime and shall be administered by the United Nations"-a point

which only carried out the proposal of the majority

report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).^^
The spiral of deterioration in Palestine made faint any

possibility of implementation.

The de facto holdings of

Israel (the New City) and Jordan (the Old City) were

formalized in the Israeli- Trans Jordanian Armistice Agree-

ment of

191+9
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which created

a status quo

which lasted

until 1967.
The General Assembly reconfimed its commitment to

internationalization by passing Resolution

19i;

(III)

on

December 11,

I9I18,

Resolution

191;

(III)

created a Con-

ciliation Commission for Palestine and
deemed that the
city and its environs should receive
"special and
separate treatment from the rest of Palestine"
while being
placed "under effective United Nations control. "^^
On

May 11,

19ii9,

the General Assembly admitted Israel to

United Nations membership by Resolution
273 (III). This
resolution specifically recalled the General Assembly's
"resolutions of 29 November

19i;7

and 11 December I948"

which sanctioned the internationalization of Jerusalem
and the right of the Palestine refugees to compensation
or
return.

The resolution continued by "taking note of the

declaration and explanations made by the representative
of the Government of Israel before the Ad Hoc Political

Committee in respect of the implementation of said
decisions," 29 The post-1967 Arab case points out here
that Jerusalem has been annexed and the Palestinian

refugees not offered the choice of return or compensation.

Especially concerning the refugees, Jerusalem vigorously
placed the blame for the stalemate upon the Arab states.
Just one year later, on December 9,

Assembly approved by

a two- thirds

1914-9

,

the General

margin Resolution

303 (IV) which reasserted internationalization as a goal

for Jerusalem and directed the Trusteeship Council to plan
for and seek implementation of this goal.-^^

The Trustee-

ship Council attempted to put forward a plan for a

demilitarized, neutralized, internationalized
corpus
separatum under United Nations auspices, but
failed to
arouse the necessary Jordanian or Israeli
^-^
support.

A modified statute which instead was more
congruent with
the Jordanian- Israeli position was submitted
to the

General Assembly but no further action was taken.

The

General Assembly did not act on the question of
Jerusalem

again until I967,
Both Israel and Jordan strengthened their de facto
if not de

.jure

presence in Jerusalem by placing educa-

tional, medical and government institutions in the area.

Both Israel and Jordan annexed their areas.

annexed its sector of Jerusalem in

I9I4-9

Jordan

and proclaimed

the city to be its second capital in 1959.

In 1950

Israel's Knesset proclaimed Jerusalem to have been the

capital of the State since independence; in I953 the last
ministry, the Foreign Ministry, was moved from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem.

The United States still retains its

embassy in Tel Aviv, as do the Soviet Union and many other
states as an expression of the nonrecognition of the

designation of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

The con-

struction of a new $7 million Knesset building in Jerusalem
on August 30, 1966 indicated the Israeli intent to stay. 33

Following Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and its
environs on June 27, 196? (which included the taking of

k9

substantial West Bank territory nine
miles north to Kalandia
airport and to within one mile of
Bethlehem
to the south, 3^

the General Assembly in its fifth
emergency special session

passed Resolution 2253 (ES-V) on July

whelming vote of 99-0-19.

1967 by the over-

The Assembly expressed its

deep concern at the situation in Jerusalem in
consequence
of "the measures taken by Israel to change the
status of

the city," considered "that these measures
are invalid,"

called for Israel to "rescind" these measures and to
"desist forthwith" from such future actions while calling
on the Secretary- General to report on the resolution's

implementation within one week.^^
Open Israeli determination to retain Jerusalem re-

gardless of U.N. action or world opinion contributed to

another groundswell of sentiment which Israel was unable
to stem despite later conciliatory efforts.
a second Pakistan- sponsored resolution,

On July

ll].,

22Sk (ES-V), was

adopted by a General Assembly vote of 99-0-18.
received the report of the Secre tary- General,

Having
the Assembly

deplored and took note of the "non-compliance" by Israel

with Resolution 2253 (ES-V) and reiterated its call to
Israel to "desist" from future alterations in the status
of Jerusalem while requesting the Secretary-General to

report on implementation.
The Israeli case, like virtually every facet of

this conflict, has its roots deep in esjiotion and the
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question of security.

To

wit— David

Ben Gurion, after

referring to Jerusalem, "by decree of our history our

capital"^^ continued:
Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and inseparable part
of the State of Israel, just as it is an inseparable
part of Jewish history, Jewish religion, and the
Jewish soul. Jerusalem is the very heart of the
State of Israel. M-0

An emotion of another type is revealed by Walter
Eytan
The people of Israel as a whole can never forget the
[19i|-8]
.
.
.
siege- -any more than they have
been able, since Lhe Babylonian exile, to forget
Jerusalem itself. Having, as they see it, with their
own forces alone saved Jerusalem from the Arab
attempt to destroy it, they can never agree to
see the city subject to a foreign, even if an
"international" regime. Despite all anxiety for
the Holy Places, the United Nations and its members
did nothing to protect Jerusalem, apart from passing
resolutions.
Israel resented this bitterly at the
time and resents it to this day. The Jews of
Jernisalem would not dream of relying for protection
on an "international" governor and police.
This attitude, with which the official policy of
the Israel Government conforms, has led Israel into
conflict, or at least open disagreement with other
countries, and at times with the United Nations
.

.

.

itself
The objective of Israel, then, was national control

of the eternal city, in direct contradiction with the

professed goal of

19i|.

(Ill),

(19i|8),

which

v;as

to grant

Jerusalem and its environs "special and separate treatment

from the rest of Palestine."
The constant overlayer in Israel's position is that

of the special interests and rights of her claim to

Jerusalem.^

Below this surface constancy changes in
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position have occurred in consequence of IsraeliJerusalem
holdings.

While she held only the New City with its

largely Jewish population, the Government of Israel

addressed the U.N. about self-determination and functional
internationalization.

Self-determination was necessary

because no "regime for the protection of religious interests
can' endure amidst a discontented,

population."

aggrieved and turbulent

Rome- like functional internationalization

was opposed to territorial internationalization; the safe-

guarding of holy shrines did not necessitate the internationalization of Jerusalem in toto

,

merely an official

U.N. presence to supervise their protection, ensure free

access and the like.^^

Just as such an arrangement did

not violate Italian rights and sovereignty, so the same

would be true for Jerusalem and its inhabitants, went the
Israeli approach.
Later, after winning all of Jerusalem, Israel policy

changed.

According to vhe Israeli thesis, the Jordanian

attack violated the Armistice Agreement between the two
parties and released Israel from any of its obligations.

According to Foreign Minister Abba Eban, "the term 'annexation'
[re:

...

is out of place.

27 June 196?]

.

.

.

The measures adopted

.

.

,

relate to the integration of

Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres, and
furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy

Places."^

52

This theme was carried forward while an opening was

presented to the Christian countries on 11 September 196?

when Abba Eban informed Secretary- General U Thant by
letter
This does not foreclose the final settlement of
certain important aspects of the Jerusalem situation
which lie at the origin of the international interest
in the city.
I refer to the need to secure appropriate
expression of the special interest of the three great
religions in Jerusalem. ... I am confident that in
an atmosphere of international tranquility substantial
progress could be made toward this aim, which has
hitherto had no concrete fulfillment .^5

Meanwhile, the Personal Representative of Secretary-

General U Thant to the area reported conversations with
Israel leaders which included the Prime Minister and

Minister of Foreign Affairs in which "it was made clear

beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to
place under its sovereignty" the newly conquered Jerusalem;
that it was the "declared objective" of the Israel Govern-

ment "to equalize the legal and administrative status" of
all inhabitants of Jerusalem, and that the "process of

integration was irreversible and not negotiable."^
The Arab case is also at base emotional, and to

comprehend it fully we would need "to borrow from religion
"^''^

its deep feelings and from poetry her sweet tunes.

Jerusalem is venerated by both Moslem and Christian Arabs.
Though too rooted deep in emotion, the Arab position here
relies also upon a legal basis.

The very backbone consists

of the already cited Resolutions l8l (II) of November 29,

1911-7
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which called for "a corpus separatum under
national regime
and

1914-

(III)

.

,

.

a special inter-

administered by the United Nations,"

of 11 December 1946 which instructed the

Conciliation Commission established by the same resolution
to submit proposals for "a permanent international regime

for the Jerusalem area "providing maximum local autonomy

for distinctive groups consistent with the special inter-

national status of the Jerusalem area."

Resolution 3G3 (r/)

(19i+9)

In addition,

which, never having been re-

pealed, supplanted or modified, continued to stand as the

official position of the United Nations.

The international-

ization of Jerusalem which 3^3 (IV) recommends provides
at least a temporary congruency to U.N. and Arab goals

while creating tension between the objectives of Israel
and the world body.

Arab policy too has changed.

From the outright

rejection of the partition resolution and the internationalization which was part of it, Arabs came to accept inter-

nationalization.

Until the 196? war, the Arab case rested

chiefly upon the dissimilarities between the Israeli and
the U.N.'s conception of Jerusalem's status.
the 1967 War, the Arab position broadened.

2253 (ES-V) and

2251|

Following
Resolutions

(ES-V) indicated that the world

cora-

inunity considered Israel's action as invalid and -called

for their rescission.^^

Even the United States did not

recognize the step of annexation as valid.

Arab

inhabitants of the old city were opposed to civil incor-

poration into the Israel administrative system*

This they

saw as a violation of accepted international administrative and legal structure in that territory.

Inhabitants

also complained that the United Nations Charter and Uni-

versal Declaration of Human Rights were being violated
so long as the population of East Jerusalem was denied

the rights of self-determination.^"''

While the Israel

Government points to the exclusion of Jews from the
Wailing Wall prior to the 196? War, Arabs point to an
alleged two-hour prayer service conducted by the chief
Rabbi of the Israel Army in the Ha ram Al- Sharif Mosque on

August 15, 1967» a provocation which "infringed upon the
inviolability of
In addition,

a

Holy Place venerated by all Islam."

the charge was made that on August 12, 196?,

the Israeli Minister for Religious Affairs stated that

The occupational authorities considered the Mosque
of Omar and its outlying buildings as their property
either by past acquisition or by recent conquest.
He also expressly proclaimed that those authorities
were determined sooner or later to rebuild their
temple on the Dome of the Rock itself.

If any single controversy pervades the others in

this Gordian knot of complexity, it is the disagreement

over interpreting the state of war and concept of
belligerency.

Whether we are dealing with issues of

innocent passage, borders or recognition, the question
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of war and belligerency arises.

The controversy is between

what might be termed the "classical concept" and the
"more modern view" of the state of belligerency in relation
to the Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab

States.

These are the only legal instraments which govern

the relationship between the Arab states and Israel.

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 62

(19l|.8)

which called upon the states to conclude Armistices as
"provisional measures," negotiations resulted in Armistice

Agreements between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt,
Lebanon, Jordan and Syria on the other, between February

and July 20,

2[(.

19ij.9.^^

The Arab case holds that a state of war continues

until terminated by a peace treaty.

In this classical

view a state of war persists during an armistice or truce.
For

The Armistice Agreement itself is cited as evidence.

example, Article

ii

of the Agreement reads,

"the principle

that no military or political advantage should be gained

under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized; "and Article

9

reads "no provision of this Agreement

shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and positions
of either party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement

of the Palestine question" [emphases mine].

position also notes Article

1

The Arab

which reads in part:

"No

aggressive action by the armed forces-- land, sea or air

102

^

1^.8.

1^9.

P^^^®

in Islam and
'nV®"^"^^®^a;«^;'
Abu-Lughod, ed.. The Arab T^^^.?^'^''''?^'
i^^JConfrontation
o f June IQ67 (E vans ton:
!

Northwestern University Press, 1970),
p. 1^.
See below. Chapter III,

United States Ambassador Goldberg stated"l wish
to make it clear that the United States
does not
accept or recognize these
.
[Israeli] .
measures as altering the status of Jerusalem."*
.U.N. Document A/PV. 15I|4, July II4.,
1967, p. ii8.
See also The New York Times July
1^, 196?.
.

.

.

50.

S/8li^.6,

51.

Ibid

52.

Ibid ., p. 259.

September 12, I967, p. 252,

.

2^1'
^^^i see also U.N. Document
Rev. 1 (19i|9), for Egypt; i|2 U.N.T.S. 28?,
No. 655; see also U.N. Document S/1296/ Rev. 1
(19ii9)
for Lebanon; i|2 U.N.T.S. 303, No. 656; see also
U.N. Document S/I302/ Rev. 1 (19i;9) for Jordan; and
i|2 U.N.T.S. 327, No. 657; see also
U.N.T.S. 327,
No. 657; see also U.N. Document S/I353/ Rev. 1 (I9I4.9)
for Syria.
The Egyptian- Israel General Armistice
Agreement may also be found in Hurewitz, op. cit.
pp. ^299-30^ while the complete text of the IsraelSyrian General Armistice Agreement may also be
found in Appendix I of N. Bar-Yaacov, The Israel Syrian Armistice (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The
Hebrew University, I967)

S/126V

.

Sk*

See Michel Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion;
The Armed Prophet
trans, by Len Ortzen (Englewood Cliffsl
PrenticeHall, 1966), p. 155 for word by Ben-Gurion' s official
biographer who had access to his personal notebooks.
See also Shabtai Rosenne, "Directions for a Middle
East Settlement - Some Underlying Legal Problems,"
and Leo Gross, "Passage Through the Strait of Tiran
and in the Gulf of Aqaba," both in John W. Haldermann,
ed. , Th.e Middle hast Crisis:
Test of International"
Law (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana. 1969), for divergent
ana'lyses which support an analysis favorable to
Israel of this incident.

SS»

See E. L. M. Barns, Between Arab and Israeli (New
York:
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of either party shall be undertaken," while
noting the
Israeli lightning dash across the Negev to
the Arab
fishing village of Om Rashrash (now Elath)
on the Red Sea.
The Egyptian- Israeli Armistice Agreement is
dated February 2^,
19if9; Ben Gurion authorized "Operation Fait
Accompli" which
took Om Rashrash on March 10, 19^9.^^ Article
VIII of the
same Armistice Agreement notes that "the village
of El

Auja and vicinity
.

.

,

...

[as defined later in the Article]

shall be demilitarized and both Egyptian and Israeli

armed forces shall be totally excluded therefrom."

On

September 21, 1955, two companies of Israeli infantry
entered and occupied the El Auja demilitarized zone.^^
Commercial Cable Co. v. Burlson

(19i;9)

found that

"an armistice effects nothing but a suspension of

hostilities; the war still continues "^^
.

Also Oppenheim

is most often cited by the Arab case:

Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term,
are all agreements between belligerent forces for a
temporary cessation of hostilities.
They are in no
ways to be compared with peace, and ought not to be
called temporary peace, because the condition of war
remains between the belligerents themselves, and
between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points
beyond the mere cessation of hostilities .57
If this general trend of analysis is accepted, then
a

traditional state of war continued to exist between the

Arab states and Israel since the conclusion of the
Armistice Agreements.

191^9

Plxercising the rights of a bellig-

erent is not against the terms of the General Armistice
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Agreements in the Arab view.
Israeli's collusion with Britain and France in 1956
is put forward as

leading to an aggression which was a

clear violation of the Charter and inconsistent with

Israel's claim to be a peace-loving member of the United
Nations, as are Arab charges of military action by Israeli
forces carried out against neighboring Arab states since

Finally, if the Charter is obligatory upon the

19il.8.^

Arabs, so too it is upon the Israelis.

The international-

ization of Jerusalem and the right of the Palestinian

refugees to return or compensation are two points on which
U.N. resolutions have not been implemented, the Arab case

selectively points out, despite Israel's assurances to the
contrary.

Resolution 273 (III) of May 11,

1914-9

by which

Israel was admitted to United Nations membership specifically
noted, "The declaration by the State of Israel that it

'unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations
Charter' while specifically recalling Resolutions I8I (II)

of November 29,

19i|7

and 19^ (III) of December 11,

I9I4.9,

the latter of which called for the compensation or return
"at the earliest practicable date" of the Palestinian

refugees

—a

pledge which has not been fulfilled.
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The Israeli position claims "a more modern view which

treats an armistice more as a peacy treaty. "^^

The view is

that in certain cases an armistice takes the place of a

treaty to all practical purposes.

Because of the longer
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time period between an armistice and a peace treaty, that

intervening time may be treated differently; Israel suggests the de facto termination of the state of war in
place of merely the cessation of hostilities.

To wit,

Security Council Resolution 95 of September

1951

1,

stipulated
that since the Armistice regime, which has
.
•
.
been in existence for nearly two and a half years,
is of a permanent character, neither party can
reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent. ^1

Further, the Israeli position points out as a matter

of principle that "the very existence of a state of war
is

utterly incompatible with membership in the United

Nations and the obligations imposed by the Charter. "°
The basic premise is that the Armistice Agreements did

mean what was written and that, for example, according
to Article I of the

Israel- Syrian Armistice Agreement

as well as the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement:

No aggressive action by the armed forces-- land,
sea or air, --of either Party shall be undertaken,
planned or threatened against the people or the
armed forces of the other. ^3

According to Article

2

of the Charter, member-states

are called upon to "settle their international disputes

by peaceful means" in addition to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" or acting in

a

manner inconsistent
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with the United Nations' purposes,

while the use of force

is legitimate in the case of individual
or collective

self-defense^^ if under U.N. authority during
armed
attack.
Israel was admitted to United Nations

member-

ship on May 11,

19l^.9.

Since a state of war with a

"sovereign equal" under the Charter is outlawed,
Israel
has the clear right to demand not only that the
Arab
states which are fellow signatories to the Charter drop

their claim of being in a state of war with Israel, but

also abandon their charge that Israel has no right to
exist. 66

Finally, continued Arab threats against the very

existence of the people and state of Israel are immoral,

contradictory to all canons of law and ethics, and un-

paralleled in the contemporary world.
Israel claims that her sovereignty, territorial in-

tegrity and political independence should be recognized

consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Her boundaries remain undetermined, cease-fire or armistice
demarcation lines.

According to the Israeli position

because the Arabs, by their agression, violated the
original

19/4-7

partition recommendation Israel no longer

felt constrained to her old UN-demarcated boundaries in
the course of protecting herstslf

,

Moreover the Israelis

were attempting to implement l6l (11) by setting up

a

Jewish state, v;hile the Arabs nevei* attempted to create
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an Arab State.
1914.7

The Arab States were ready to assent to the

partition resolution in

19l;9.

Because of the Arab

states' aggression and fighting which followed, Israel

came to occupy larger areas of Palestine than originally
planned.
is

In 196? Israel swelled in size even more.

not interested in territory except as

a

Israel

means of ensuring

security.
The Arab position disputes the legal right of the

United Nations in the late

19i|-0's

to have decided the

disposition of territory iramemorially Palestinian and
notes the

inhiei'ent

right of an indigenous population to

determine by itself its own government and constitution.
In returning to the origins of the case it also notes

that in reference to the Balfour Declaration which was

merely a statement of policy until incorporated into the
mandate of Palestine:
The most significant and incontrovertible fact is,
however, that by itself the Declaration was legally
For Great Britain had no sovereign rights
impotent.
over Palestine; it had no proprietary interest; it
had no authority to dispose of the land. The
Declaration was merely a statement of British
intentions and no more.^*^
So, according to the Arab position, the Balfour

Declaration was issued without Palestinian participation
or approval while the right of the United Ilations to

dispose of and treat the Palestinian territory and Arabs
(the former in large bulk Arab-owned,

the latter by a large

majority Arab) as they did, erodes the legality of the

61

State of Israel from the moment of its conception.

The

original partition was illegal, the land Israel holds
rests solely on military conquest

(19i|3

or 196?).

Jus

ex in.juria non oritur (rights do not arise from wrongs)

and military conquest does not confer lawful sovereignty.
To the Arab view, the question of sovereignty, secure and

recognized boundaries and the like are inadmissible in

keeping with the postulate that

a

poisonous tree can pro-

duce only poisonous fruit.

Security Council Resolution

21^2

(196?) affirmed

the necessity "for guaranteeing freedom of navigation

through international waterways in the area."

Certainly

to solve this problem v/ould put an end to one of the

longest- lasting and most critical points of contention

between Israel and Arab states.

It was the denial of

such freedom concerning the Straits of Tiran which proved
to be a proximate causative factor igniting the Six Day

War.

Similarly since

19ij-8,

Egypt placed a variety of

restrictions upon free Israeli transit of vessels and
cargoes through the Suez Canal.

Any lasting peace

settlement must come to grips with the problems associated

with the waterways
The Suez Canal controversy svrirls around divergent

interpretations of a number of documents and principles.
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The documents include:

(1)

the Constantinople Convention

signed on October 29, 1888;^"^

(2)

Armistice Agreement of February

the Egyptian- Israel

21^,

I9k9;'^^ and General

Assembly Resolution 2322 of September

1,

195l.'^-'-

The

principles are those of territorial sovereignty, that the
Suez Canal is an international waterway and, finally, that
the Suez Canal is a neutral waterway.

The Israel case is

one which extends the principles of internationality and

neutrality while restricting that of territorial sovereignity
and placing one set of interpretations upon these documents.
The United Arab Republic case is one which extends the

principle of territorial sovereignty while restricting
those of internationality and neutrality in their exegesis,

naturally coming forth with divergent interpretations.*^^
The reader is reminded of our earlier discussion of

belligerency, which is central to the task at hand.
Israel claims that the U.A.R.'s varied restrictions

and closures upon the transit of Israeli ships and cargo

through the Suez Canal is in violation of international
law,

the Constantinople Convention, the

19i].9

Armistice

Agreement and Security Council Resolution 2322 (1951).

Freedom of the seas and in particular innocent passage
through international waterways is looked upon as a cornerstone of customary international law, one which would lead
to an identity of attitudes between almost every "maritime

nation" and Israel.

"^-^

Article

I

of the Constantinople
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Convention sweepingly reads:

"The Suez Maritime Canal

shall always be free and open, in time of
war as in time
of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of
war, without
distinction of flag." The Israeli case holds
that the

grant is wide and broadly construed that there
can be no
doubt. as to its meaning,

that the contravention of passage

for Israel's ships and cargoes is therefore illegal.

The

Israeli case holds that the Rhodes Armistice Agreement
not

only suspended the hostilities between Egypt and Israel,

but also put an end to this state of war, it being
the
purpose of the agreement to terminate the acts of belligerency.

Inspections of cargo for contraband and

blockading the canal to Israeli vessels was held to be
irreconcilable with the intent of the Armistice.

It was

such a line of reasoning which led to the passage of

Security Council Resolution 2322 (1951) if its language
be a guide.

The resolution called upon Egypt:

To terminate the restrictions on the passage of
international commercial shipping and goods thiK)ugh
the Suez Canal wherever bound.

The resolution recalled the "pledge" in the Armistice

Agreements against any further acts of hostility between
the parties "and considered violations inconsistent with

the objectives of peaceful settlement and permanent peace

while stating that after the two-and-a-half year existence
of the Armistice

Neither party can reasonably assert that it is
actively a belligerent or requires to exercise
the^right of visit, search, and seizure for any
legitimate purpose of self-defense.
On the other hand, the Egyptian case notes that

Article X of the Constantinople Convention provides that
there may be measures which the territorial sovereign

"might find it necessary to take to assure by their own
forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public

order."

The Egyptian position notes the limitation on

Article X placed by Article XI which requires that such

measures "shall not interfere with the free use of the
canal."

The pull of territorial sovereignty,

inter-

nationality and neutrality are particularly and paradoxically strong here.

In his classic work, Baxter writes

that while free passage is guaranteed to all vessels, the

United Arab Republic may take defensive measures in time
of war so long as these do not interfere with free passage

for nonbelligerents.

The Egyptian position notes how few

ships have been affected by these practices, and that free

passage for vessels of other nations has not been impeded.
Moreover, the United Arab Republic can hardly be expected
to permit use of the canal to carry war materials to

Israel.

The "aggressions" of 1956 and I967 are pointed

to in support of this basic right of self-defense.*^^

Egypt denies that the Armistice Agreement put an end to the
state of war and claims that an armistice only suspends
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hostilities; the war still continues

If Egypt is to

.

respect Israel's claim to the internationality
and
neutrality of the canal, Israel must respect

the terri-

torial sovereignty of Egypt.
free passage under Article

Israel's right to invoke

I is

not denied.

Rather, it

does appear anomalous for Israel to deny Egypt's
right to
invoke Article X while committing aggressions
against it.

Finally, Great Britain provided the precedent of a de

facto closure of the canal to hostile shipping during

World War 11.^^
Controversy over passage into the Gulf of Aqaba
through the Straits of Tiran swirls around four fundamental

points of difference:
in international law;

(1)

(2)

the status of the Gulf of Aqaba

the status of Israel as a littoral

state to/on the Gulf of Aqaba; and

(3)

freedom of passage

through the Straits in addition to

(i^.)

the expected tension

over the state of war and rights of belligerency.'^^

Our

discussion of the Arab and Israeli cases will center upon
these points while certainly not excluding others.

It is

appropriate to point out at this time that the Gulf of

Aqaba is about 100 miles long,

7 to

15 miles wide and

bounded on three sides by the State of the United Arab
Republic,

Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Before the

entrance lay the islands of Sanafir and Tiran validly

occupied by the United Arab Republic.
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Although the mouth

of the Gulf is nine miles wide, the only navigable channel
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by which Aqaba

my

be entered

U

the four mile wide Strait

of Tiran which lies between the
island of Tiran and the
Sinai Peninsula.
The Arab position holds that
Aqaba consists of in-

land, internal waters subject to
absolute Arab sovereignty.
The Gulf is a mare clausum, not an
international waterway

by its very geographical configuration.

Even if the Gulf

were considered as part of the high seas,
the narrowness of
the Gulf means that territorial areas
of littoral states
overlap one another.®^ This has become
even more obvious
since Arab states have extended their territorial
limit
from six to twelve miles, thus making all of the
maximum

fifteen-mile wide Gulf subject to the territorial juris-

diction of bordering Arab states.

Finally, the Gulf has

been an exclusive and historic Arab route under Arab

sovereignty to the shrines of Islam.
The Arab position further holds that Elath and

Israel's five-mile long Aqaban frontage was seized in

violation of the Egyptian- Israel Armistice Agreement.

March

9,

19i^-9,

On

thirteen days after the signing of the

Armistice with Egypt and taking advantage of the one free
flank this afforded,

Isi-t.eli

military units set out for Om

Rashrash (now Elath) which they took on March 15.

Since

this action occurred in violation of the already- signed

agreement, Israel's presence on the shores of Aqaba does not

confer on her the standing of

a

littoral state.

Moreover,

67

this coastal area was not within the temporary borders

established for Israel by the Security Council Resolution
of July 15,

191^.8.

Israel's occupation in Arab eyes is,

therefore, an aggression and a belligerent occupation.®"^

Oppenheim tells us:

"An occupant in no wise acquires

sovereignty over such territory through the mere fact of

having occupied it."
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Israel is not a legitimate

littoral state and therefore possesses no rights to free
passage through these waters.

The only entrance to the

Gulf of Aqaba is through the Straits of Tiran, an area
totally within the territorial waters of the United Arab
Republic and Saudi Arabia.

Because Aqaba is not regarded

by Arabs as part of the high seas, because of the existent
state of war, because of Israel's illegitimate littoral
status, Israel is not deemed by the Arab case to be

entitled to free passage through the Straits of Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba.
The Israeli position holds that the Gulf of Aqaba is

an international bay shared by more than one state and

that the Straits of Tiran are, like other international

Straits connecting portions of the high seas and of an

international bay open to innocent passage by vessels of
all nations,®-^

As international waters, Egypt is legally

bound to permit innocent passages.®^

Otherwise, Israel

is justified in protecting its own rights and interests.

So-called Arab "immemorial possession" was interrupted by
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Ottoman Control lasting from 1517 to I918.

After then,

Aqaba was bounded by the Mandate of Palestine from which

both Jordan and Israel emerged.
religious usage may be dismissed.
a mare

Any claim flowing from
Even were it considered

clausum the waters of Aqaba could not be subjected

to a regime which excluded one of the littoral states.

A

final point is that the Convention on the Territorial Sea

and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 provides for innocent
passage through straits used for international navigation

between high seas and the territorial sea of

a foreign

state in addition to parts of the high seas.^^

Israel's retort to Arab charges concerning a possible

invalid presence on the shores of Aqaba notes the point
that the

19ij.7

General Assembly Partition Plan Resolution

provided that Israel should reach and include a section of
the Aqaban coastline formally under the Mandate.

The

Israeli position also notes that no armistice demaraction
line was drawn along the Gulf of Aqaba.

position naturally bases itself on the

The Israeli
1914-7

Resolution.

The distinction then is drawn between control and deploy-

ment of forces.
present.

Control exists even if forces are not

The extension of Israeli military forces to

Aqaba following the Egyptian- Israeli Armistice Agreement
simply made congruent control and deployment of forces.
So the presence of Israel and its port, Elath, on the Gulf

of Aqaba is therefore legitimate and within the boundaries
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of the Jewish state.

Israel is a legal littoral state

and Aqaba consists of international waters according to
its
case.

While the Straits are undeniably located in Arab

territorial waters, Israel claims the right of free passage
there and through the waters of Aqaba.

The Israel case

cites an Egyptian aide-memoire handed to the United States
in 1950 which allowed that the occupation of the islands

of Tiran and Sanafir was not intended to hinder innocent

passage through the Straits which would remain open.^^

A

proclaimed state of belligerency, enemy vessels or contraband cargoes do not come under this umbrella's protection,
however, for in a clear state of war a state may deny

passage to enemy vessels.
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and

Contiguous Zones, as mentioned above, provides for
innocent passage through Straits used for international

navigation not only between parts of the high seas, but
also between high seas and the territorial sea of a foreign
state.

Egypt, however, has not ratified this document.

Whether a state of war legally persists perhaps is
the single most significant legal factor which affects

passage through these waters and Straits.

In a clear state

of war, a state may deny passage to enemy ships or ships

carrying contraband cargo.

The Egyptian aide-memoire of

1950 and the 1958 Convention of the Territorial Sea would,
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for example, be inapplicable.

Israel, therefore, cites

Security Council Resolution 95 (1951) as support for her
view, reflected in the language of the resolution, that

neither

Is,rael nor Egypt can

reasonably assert that it is

an active belligerent or can Justify the acts of visit,

search or seizure as a function of self-defense.

Although

neither Aqaba nor Tiran are referred to in the operative
section of the resolution, this may be taken as a validly

political if not

a

legally correct view of Aqaba and Tiran

congruent with the position of Israel.

As we are aware

from our previous discussion, in particular of the Suez
Cenal, Egypt continued to maintain the classical view

that only a peace treaty could terminate the state of war

and cited the 195^ and I967 wars as buttressing evidence.

Of all the problems which compose the Arab- Israeli

conflict, none is more critical to peace or so intractible

than that of the refugees.

In 1967 the Report of the

Conanissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
estimated that there were a total of 1,11^4,390 refugees
living in Syria, 160,720 in Lebanon, 316,776 in the Gaza
8q

Strip and 722,687 living in Jordan.

'

There were about

262,000 Palestinians who were cut off from their fields,

property or livelihood, but did not lose their home and,
therefore, though needful are not eligible for UNRVA
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assistance.

There is a second group of intermediate

refugees-- 11,000 Arabs who were expelled from their

homes and villages in demilitarized zones by Israel
after
the July 1, 1952 deadline for eligibility for UNRWA
aid.*^^

Finally, there is the final category of refugees-120, 000

registered old-time refugees who fled for the second time
in the 1967 war from Israeli- occupied areas to Arab lands,

and approximately 232,000 previously unregistered in-

habitants of Jordan, Syria and the Sinai Peninsula who
became new refugees for the first time during the same
war.^"^

The Israeli case cites "abundant evidence" that Arab

orders and threats "first set the Arab masses on the move
in 19i;8."
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Since the Arabs first caused the problem, so

it was up to the Arabs to solve it.

Since "equality of

status" was necessary in possible negotiations dealing with
the refugee question,

the parties to the conflict in the

Israeli view could not be "the Palestine Jews and Palestine
Arabs, but the Palestine Jews and the Arab States.

"^-^

Israel would not negotiate with the original party, the

Palestinian refugees, but only with sovereign Arab Governments when the time came since "equality of status" between
the negotiating parties was requisite in Jerusalem's eyes,

Arab aggi^ession and Arab violation of Resolution I8I
(i9i|7)

(II)

released Israel., in its own eyes, from the ResoluQh

tion's detailed provisions regarding minority protection.'^

Arab governments were accused
of "Machiavellian" use
of
their displaced kith or kinfolk
and in their grasp of the
worth of the refugees as a political
asset and means to
their own selfish political ends.^S
Moreover, that
the

pattern of pre- 19^8 Arab life "no
longer exists and cannot
be restored"96
^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^
would be more humane to permit these
refugees to settle

amidst their own culture and people
in an Arab world large
enough in area and sufficiently rich
in resources to meld
and absorb them.
The refugees therefore should be
settled
in the neighboring Arab countries
and integrated
into the

region's economic

life.^'^'

Israel is small; repatriation is

dlfficu:!t for this reason and especially
because of the

serious social, political and security
consequences

attendant upon such a reality, not to speak of
the state of
war which the Arabs purport continues to exist.
It is the

Arab states which have refused to face up to the
reality of
the existence of the State of Israel and to
resettle
the

refugees in the countries to which they have journeyed.
There is no longer any home for Arabs to return to.

Arabs

have "continued to cling" according to Israel's long-time

Director-General of the Foreign Service, Walter Eytan, to
the postulate found in I9k (III)

(19l|8)

which entitled

Palestinian refugees to "return to their homes" or to com-

pensation for property lost for those choosing not to re98

turn.

The problem is extremely complex, stipulates the
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Israeli case.

Israel has shown its willingness to meet the

problem by offering to accept 100,000 refugees in
by releasing t 2,790,000 of Palestinian refugees' bank

accounts by June 30, 1960,^^^ and by approving entrance
permits for 20,658 "new" refugees to return to Israel by

August 31, 1967.

"^^"^

The refugee problem is only part of the total political

problem which can be solved only by means of an overall
peace settlement, continues the Israeli case.

Not only are

the aspirations of the refugees to be considered, but also

the vital interests of the relevant states.

Israel is not

responsible for the origin of the refugee problem, nor is
she responsible for its continuance.

The Arab states

cynically have used the refugees to suit their own purposes.
To repatriate Arab refugees to their previous homes in

Israel would be to ask Israel to place

own heart.

"dagger" at her

a

Moreover, social and economic development has

unfolded along lines which simply preclude the return of
any but a token number of repatriates.

The Palestinian

refugees must be resettled in societies and states which
are Arab.

No other solution is both fair and possible.
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The Arab case begins by denying the Israeli charge

that Palestinian Arabs were urged by their leaders and via

radio broadcasts to fell the country.

I.

F,

Stone commented

on this point in general in his famous article in the

August

3,

1967 issue of The New York Review of Books

;

Ik

The argument that the refugees
ran away "voluntarily"

''"^^^^ ^^^^^ '"^'^^
so untU^
after ?hrfi^hif
^^g^^i^g
--^as over not only
rests on myth
hii; ?^<, ^
'"^^ ^^^^Sees no right to
retu^-^ H^vr'p'^''
""V^
Germ-n
Jews
no right to recover their
?
^tl
I
property
because th-y too fled?103

^

Stone himself ci^es the work of
Erskine Childers, an
Irish broadcaster with a great interest
in the Palestine
question, who sought tc test the Israel
claim that "the
Arabs left because they were ordered to,
and deliberately
incited into panic by their own leaders. "^^^
Childers
writes in a passage often referred to:

Examining every official Israeli statement about
the
Arab exodus, I was struck by the fact that
no primary
evidence of evacuation orders was ever produced.
The
charge, Israel clai-ed, was "documented,"
but where
were the documents?
There had allegedly been
radio broadcasts ordering the evacuation; but Arab
no dates
names of stations, cr texts of messages were
ever
cited.
In Israel i- 1958, as a hopeful of serious
assistance, I asked to be shown the proofs.
I was
assured they existed, and was promised them. None had
been offered when I left, but I was again assured,
I
asked to have the m^-terial sent on to me.
I am still
waiting. lOp
The Arab case claims that the Palestinian refugees

left their homeland not of their own free will, but because
of fear of and threats by Zionist forces.

April

8,

19ii-8,

Indeed, on

more than one month prior to the declaration

of Israel's independence, members of the Stern gang and
Irgun Zvai Leumi, Zionis:; terrorist organizations, seized
the hitherto neutral Arab village of Deir Yasin and murdered
25I4.

men, women and children.

to World War II'

s

This crime, comparable only

massacre of the village of Lidice, was
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widely publicized and Arab mass flight, which had been
going on since early

accelerated.

1914-8,

107

According to

'

Christopher Sykes:
It can be said with a high degree of certainty that
most of the time in the first half of 19i4-8 the massexodus was the natural, thoughtlesness pitiful
movement of ignorant people who had been badly led
and who in the day of trial found themselves forsaken
But if the exodus was by and
by their leaders.
large an accident of war in the first stage, in the
later stages it was consciously and mercilessly helped
on by Jewish threats and aggression towards the Arab
populations ^^iB
,

.

.

.

.

George Kirk comments on this point:
[about April,
At this stage of the fighting
Arab flight
to
the
attitude
Jewish
The
19i4.8]. .
that
evidence
clear
is
there
since
was ambiguous,
tranquilize
to
tried
at
Haifa
authorities
the civil
At a later stage, the
.
the Arab population.
confine their pressure
not
Israeli armed forces did
on the Arab civilian population to playing upon
their fears. They forcibly expelled them: for
example, the population of Akka (including refugees
from Haifa) in May; the population of Lydda and
Ramla (including refugees from Jaffa) in July; and
the population of Beersheba and western Galilee in
October.
.

.

.

.

,

.

.

Nadav Safran, himself Jewish, born in Egypt and an
eminent student of the area's history and politics has

written succinctly:
On the basis of first-hand observation it can be said
that until about the end of May- early June 19i|8, the
refugees from areas under Jewish control left, and
left in the face of persistent Jewish efforxis to
persuade them to stay. From that time on, they were
expelled from almost all new territories that came
under Israeli control. HO

General of
John Davis, an American and former CommissionerRefug
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
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(UNRWA) is very often cited in seeking
to refute the
Israeli allegation that Palestinian
refugees are being

held as idle hostages by insensitive,
uncaring Arab governments which seek their own political than
the
refugees'

human ends.

Davis writes that about 20 percent of
the

191+8

Palestinian refugees were skilled and from urban
areas—
consequently this group quickly became self-supporting
and
have not been dependent upon doles from UIJHWA
or similar
organizations.

number of

19i|8

Approximately 70 percent of the total
refugees were surplus, illiterate farm

laborers in a part of the world already surfeited with
them.

The problem is compounded, Davis writes, for

the refugee son:

... in the Middle East, as in all developing areas
of the world, well over 95^ of all youths learn work
habits and skills by working beside their fathers.
Because, in general, rural refugee fathers have been
unemployed, their sons have had but limited opportunity,
if any at all to learn even the self-discipline of work
or the skills of their fathers. Therefore, in competition with other young people, particularly the
Indigenous rural boys, who are migrating from farms to
urban centers in vast numbers, the maturing refugee
boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage 112
.

Davis points out that the refugee host countries of
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the United Arab Republic have
spent more than $100 million for direct refugee assistance
(education, health services, camp sites, housing, etc.)--

which Davis (who is sympathetic to the Arab case) calls
"generous and hospitable."

Davis comments on host country

resistance to resettling Palestinian refugees on new land:
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We have devoted more space and dociimentation in

responding to specific Israeli charges to this point
than were given to the charges themselves.

We expect

the American reader to be far more conversant with the

Israeli than Arab side.

Therefore, we feel it incumbent

to present more space relating the Arab interpretation.

Finally, a scholar as deeply concerned for the

safety of Israel as Walter

Z.

Laqueur could, while

retaining the belief that Arab governments had maintained the refugees to serve their own political
ends,"^"''^

yet write:

A more imaginative approach might have had results,
it would not have worked a miracle.
True, there
was the talk about using the refugees as a fifth
column--but how many refugees would have played
that role? Was not Israel strong enough to absorb
all the refugees who would have actually chosen to
return? An Israeli declaration to take back by
stages all refugees willing to return would have
been a risk, but not perhaps so great a risk as
most Isi-aeli leaders thought.
It is unlikely that most refugees would have
come back, and such a declaration would have
taken the wind out of the sails of the Arab
governments and compelled them to face their
The Arab case continues by citing Article VIII

cf the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
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of Man approved at Bogota in

which reads:

1914-8

"Every

person has the right to fix his residence within
the
territory of the state which he is a national, to
move
about freely within such territory, and not to leave
it
except by his own will."^-^^

Article I3 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights provides that everyone
possesses "the right to freedom of movement and residence"

within each state and the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to re turn.

""'-'

In addition,

the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
of 1966 provides for similar rights consistent however

with "national security, public order public health or
morals, or the rights or freedoms of o thers

""^'^
.

The Arab position also holds that the refugees

were denied their basic right to self-determination as

provided for in Article V of President Wilson's Fourteen
Points, 119 the second and third principles of the

Atlantic Charter

^

and Article

I,

paragraph 2, and

Articles 55, 56, 73, 76 and 79 of the Charter which
provided in general for self-determination and self-

government in keeping with the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned. -^^^

In addition. Article 2 of

the Mandate described the obligation of "safeguarding
the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants

of Palestine, irrespective of

racft

and religion.

"-^^^

When partition was being considered, Arab members of
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the United Nations pointed out that no change in the

Mandate was legitimate until all the people of
Palestine had given their consent.

An advisory

opinion of the International Court of Justice on the

compatibility of partition without consent was sought
under Article 80 of the Charter by the Arab states.
This was rejected.

Even

a

12 ^

general reading of the law of war requires

the belligerents to spare the noncombatant population

as much suffering and destruction of property as

possible and "refusal to allow repatriation or

compensation would violate the law."^^^
Bernadotte stated in

a

Count Folke

report to then-Secretary-General

Trygve Lie
The right of innocent people, uprooted from
their homes by the present terror and ravages
of war, to be returned to their homes should be
affirmed and made effective, with assurance of
adequate compensation for the property of those
who choose not to return.
The liability of the provisional government
of Israel to restore private property to its
private owners and to indemnify those owners
for property wantonly destroyed is clear.
[There would occur] ... an offense against
the principles of elemental Justice if those
innocent victims of the conflict were denied
the right to return to their homes while Jewish
immigrants flow into Palestine and offer the
threat of permanent replacement of the Arab
refugees who have been rooted in the land for
centuries -^^
.

.

.

.

To charge that Arab aggression and violation of

Resolution 181 (II)

(I9I4.)

alone is responsible for the
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hostilities, thereby releasing Israel from further

responsibility on the refugee question
area of great controversy.

to enter an

is

Certainly it is clear that

outside the urban, compound- like areas where British

control continued, public order had broken down and the

hands of neither side were free of blood.

For example,

Menachem Begin, the leader of the extremist Irgun,
described in his autobiography how his troops conquered
a near- totally- Arab Jaffa

approximately three weeks

before the Arab armies opened hostilities.
On December 11,

I9I4-8

the United Nations General

Assembly approved of Resolution

19k-

(II)

which resolved:

That the refugees wishing to return to their homes
and live at peace with their neighbors should be
permitted to do so at the earliest practicable
date, and that compensation should be paid for
the property of those choosing not to return or
for loss or damage to property which, under
principles of international law or in equity,
should be made good by the governments or
authorities responsible -'-^
.

The Arab case emphasizes the right of the refugees
to choose themselves between repatriation or compensa-

tion.

The resolution also created a Conciliation Com-

mission which struggled long and valiantly to solve
the problem.

The United Nations Relief and V/orks

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
was created by General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV)
(I9I4.9).

Each year the General Assembly has gone through

the motions of reaffirming the principles embodied in
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19k (III)

{19ij.8)

but makes no move toward implementation.

Pertinent resolutions are as follows:

December 11,
393 (V) and

512

(VI)

19i|.8;

3914.

302

(V)

(IV)

of December 8,

of December 2 and

(Ill)

1914.

11;,

and 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952;

of

1914.9;

I95O;
6II+

(VII)

of November 6, 1952; 720 (VIII) of November 2?, I953;
818 (IX) of December

1^.,

I95I4-;

916

(X)

of December 3,

1955; 1018 (XI) of February 28, 1957; 1191 (XII) of

December 12, 1957; 1315 (XIII) of December 12, 1958;
1I}.56

(XIV) of December 9,

1959; l60k (XV) of April 21,

1961; 1725 (XVI) of December 20, I96I; 1856 (XVII) of

December 20, 1962; 1912 (XVIII) of December
2002

(XIX) of February 10,

December 15, 1965; and

215I4.

1965; 2052

3,

I963;

(XX) of

(XXI) of November I7,

1966."^'

Whereas the Israelis point to the fact that over
l;5C,

000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands were willingly

absorbed by Israel between

I9I4-8

and 1958,"'"^^ Arabs

point to the Jewish experience in Europe during and

after World War II.

The Arab case notes that the

principle seems firmly established that
case Israeli

)

a

state (in this

could seek inderinif ication from another

state in restitution for acts committed against persons

who were not their citizens at the time of the
injuries' commission.

Accordingly, Arab states then

are entitled to seek redress for the Palestinian

refugees.

However, while Germany paid over one and a
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half billion dollars in reparations to the Jewish state,
organizations and individuals, the Palestinian refugees
have not been so fortunate.

United Nations support for

the refugees is evidence of its felt- sense of respon-

sibility in this matter.

It is a moral

contradiction

of the deepest nature for Israel to deny the Palestinians

their right to return to land within living memory and
for centuries theirs vrhile terming the

''law of

Return"

for the world's Jewish population the "right that built
the state.

"-^^^

Don Peretz cites estimates of the value of

abandoned lands at tP 100,383,781| movable absentee

property at iP 18,6C0,00C and abandoned Palestinian
non- Jewish immovable property at

Peretz was led to conclude:

i,P

22 , ICO, 000.

"^^"^

"Abandoned property was

one of the greatest contributions toward making Israel
a viable state."

1 32
^

The Arab position holds that Israel

seized and utilized the property by means of such

illegitimate laws as the abandoned Areas Ordinance
(19i^.8),

Cultivation of Waste Lands Regulations

Absentee Property Regulations

(19i4-8),

(19^-8),

Absentee Property

Law (1950) and Development Authority Law (1950)."^^^

Oppenheim states:
Immovable private enemy property may under no
circums tancos or conditions be appropriated
Should he conby an invading bellr.gerent
fiscate and sell private lands or buildings.
.
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propert^^lT'^

"'^^'''^

^'^^^ ^^^^^^^^ to the

Oppenheim further- states that if

a

foreign state

enacts legislation which confiscates
without compensation property of citizens of another
state:

Such legislation may properly be treated
as a
nullity and, with regard to rights of
property,
as incapable of transferring title to
the State
concerned either within its territory or outside

Resolution 181 (II)

(igii?)

prohibited the expro-

priation of Arab-owned lands in the Jewish State
except
in the case of full payment prior to public
use.

Resolution 19k (III)

(I9I4.8)

further stipulates the

refugees' right of return and of property compensation

for those who chose not to return.

Neither resolution

has been respected let alone implemented.
Israel has always insisted that at least some

refugees would be allowed to return, given

a

final

peace settlement, but has asserted the hypocrisy of

Arabs living in what has always been envisioned as
Jewish community.
reported:

a

The New York Times on June 26, I967

"According to unimpeachable sources, the

Israelis are driving Arabs out of occupied Soutn Syria,"

And on July

3,

I967, Moshe Dayan was reported as saying

that he was happy to see the Arabs go and did not "want

them to come back.""^^^
Given the vastly larger number of refugees from

6k
the 1967 war the Israeli position emphasized
resettle-

ment in Arab areas more than ever before, with
provisions even for a possibly autonomous West Bank
state.
But severe problems and potential dangers remain.

Michael Howard and Robert Hunter recognized this in
stating that:

"two and a half million Jews now control

territory containing nearly a million and a half Arabs,
and whatever settlement is made on the West Bank, Arabs
are likely in the future to make up at least a quarter

of Israel's population."

Not only will Israel face

the usual problems of a multi-racial society, but in

addition one containing
and Hunter conclude:

a

hostile minority.

Howard

"on her ability to solve this

problem, Israel's future security will depend.

"-'•^^

Demilitarized zones exist between Israel and
three of the four Arab states which are contiguous

with it:

Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.

Originally

created as a vehicle to prospectively dampen the conflict, and similarly envisaged in resolution

21^2,

the

existence of demilitarized zones in the past has often
served the function of tinder for a flame.

Jerusalem

was the scene of a number of neutral areas, no-man's
lands, and demilitarized zones between Jordan and
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Israel--residues al] of the

19i].8- 19ij.9

fighting.

The best known demilitarized zone is
that of

Mount Scopus in northerly Jerusalem.

Under

Article VIII of the Jordan- Israel Armistice
Agreement,
joint special committees were to be set up to
"enlarge the scope" and "effect improvements
in

application" of the agreement ^38
.

Qn July 7,

.

.

.

19i|.8,

the governments of Israel and Jordan agreed to
divide
the Mount Scopus area into three sections:

the first,

Israeli though with no contiguity with Israel contained
the Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University; a
second

sector contained the Arab village of Issawiya; and

a

third sector contained the Arab Augusta Victoria

hospital. ^39

These areas were to be demilitarized;

Jewish and Arab civil policemen were to be limited in
numbers to their respective zones, and to be under the

control of the Chief of Staff, UKTSO.

The United

Nations flag was to be overhead and the U.N. to inspect

both zones and the fortnightly resupply and replacement
convoys from Israel to the Israeli sector of Mount
Scopus

Culturally, the Mount Scopus area was of sig-

nificance because of the Hebrew University whose
".

.

.

National and University Library, vrith over a

million books
ten years. ""^^^

.

.

.

[had]

.

.

.

not had a reader for

In a humanitarian sense,

the Augusta
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Victoria and Hadassah Hospitals also wore
of significance.
Tactically, Mount Scopus crucially and
strategically

overlooked roads approaching Jerusalem,
especially from
the Arab West Bank, and is vital to any
party hoping
to control all of Jerusalem.

Article VIII of the Egyptian- Israel Armistice

Agreement read:
The area comprising the village of El Auja and
vicinity, as defined in paragraph 2 of this
Article shall be demilitarized, and both Egyptian
and Israeli armed forces shall be totally excluded
therefrom.
The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice
Commission established in Article X of this Agreement and the United Nations Observers attached to
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
the full implementation of this provi3ion.
The movement of armed forces of either party to*
this Agreement into any part of the area defined
in paragraph 2 of this Article, for any purpose,
or failure by either party to respect or fulfill
any of the other provisions of this Article, when
confirmed by the United Nations representatives,
shall constitute a flagrant violation of this
Agreement I4I
.

.

El Auja

(Hebrew:

Nitzana), is the site of

a

historically strategic crossroads which comprise one
of the chief invasion routes across the Sinai, linking

by road Beersheba in Israel with all the Sinai

Peninsula and Egypt.

It follows

that the party in

control of it enjoys a priceless military advantage.
In 19i|8,

1956 and I967, the decisive Israeli attacks

against Egypt were launched from this area.^^
Article V of the more complete Israel- Syrian
General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 19^9 stated:

87

The Armistice Demarcation Line and
the Demilitarized
Zone have been defined with a view
toward sepamtinS
the armed forces of the two Parties
in such a manner
as to minimize the possibility of
friction and
incident. While providing for the gradual
restoration of normal civilian life in the
area of the
Demilitarized Zone, without prejudice to the
ultimate settlement.

Paragraph 5 of Article V continued:
(a) Where the Armistice Demarcation
Line does not
correspond to the international boundary between
Syria and Palestine, the area between the Armistice
Demarcation Line and the boundary, pending final
territorial settlement between the Parties, shall
be established as a Demilitarized Zcne from which
the armed forces of both Parties shall be totally
excluded, and in which no activities by military
or paramilitary forces shall be perrtd.tted.

(e) The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission
shall be empowered to authorize the return of
civilians to villages and settlements in the
Demilitarized Zone and the employment of limited
niiiiibers of locally recruited civilian police in
this zone for internal security purposes.
.^^3
.

.

Intervening subparagraphs described entrance by

armed forces, military or paramilitary, by either Party
Into the Demilitarized Zone as a "flagrant violation"

of the Armistice Agreement, gave to the Chairman of
the Mixed Armistice Commission, and Observers

responsibility for implementation and called for the
scheduled withdrawal of armed forces from the Demilitarized
Zones

Because of the particularly complex and difficult

nature of the armistice negotiations. Dr. Ralph Bunche,

acting mediator, wrote an "Explanatory Note to the

Governments of Israel and Syria" on June 26,

19l|9

in
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an effort to effect a compromise on
disputed points.
In it Dr. Bunche stated:

The question of civil administration
in villages
and settlements in the demilitarized
zone
provided for, within the framework of an is
armistice agreement.
Such civil administration, including policing, will be on a
local
basis, ^without raising general questions
of administration, jurisdiction, citizenship and
sovereignty.
Where Israeli civilians return to or remain in
an Israeli village or settlement, the civil
administration and policing of that village or settlement
will be by Israelis.
Similarly, where Arab civilians
return to or remain in an Arab village, a local
Arab administration and police unit will be
authorized,
.

.

.

.

.

.

Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial*
sovereignty, customs, trade relations and the like
must be dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement
and not in the armistice agreement,
I call attention to the fact that in 'the
Israeli-Trans Jordan Armistice Agreement in
Article V, paragraph c, and in Article VI,
paragraph 2, the armistice demarcation lines agreed
upon involved changes in the existing truce lines,
and that this was dons in both cases without any
question being raised as to the sovereignty over
or the final disposition of the territory involved.
It was taken for granted by all concerned that this
was a matter for final peace settlement.
The same
applies to the provision for thn al-'Auja zone in
the Egyptian- Israeli Agreement Il44
.

This Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria
is divided into three noncontiguous, but constituent

sectors

— the

northern, central and southern sectors.

Together, they comprise about 66,5 square kilometers.

Though of strategic importance, to be sure, they are of
less significance than Mount Scopus, and certainly less

important than El Auja.

Where part of their value does
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lie is in access to water and in their land.

The

Banyas River ran through the northern demilitarized
sector; the central demilitarized sector touched upon

and/or incorporated Lake Hula, its marshes and the
Jordan River.

'The

southern demilitarized sector

extended along about one-quarter of the shores of
Lake Tiberias

(Hebrew:

Kinneret).

The rich farmland

of the central demilitarized sector, especially, was
a constant and bitter source of contention between

Arab and Israeli farmers.
Incidents between Arab states and Israel which

occurred in the Demilitarized Zones in Jerusalem, the
Sinai, and between Syria and Israel are, unfortunately,
too numerous to review thoroughly.

But at least some

of the more intense incidents must be sketched to

convey at least

a

caricature of the conflict.

Tension occurred in the Mount Scopus area when
Israeli police, despite UNTSO protests, began patrolling

up to the fringes of Issawiya and, by 19Skt had set
up a roadblock on the road between the village and
Jerusalem, and claimed sovereignty up to Issawiya ^^^
.

Jordanians also charged that the Israelis were

illegally smuggling into Mount Scopus armaments and
other prescribv3d materials

"^^^
.

Finally, Israel, calling

its area sovereign, only rarely permitted the movement

of U.N. observers in its sector to check on Jordanian
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charges of arms smuggling, or the construction
of

fortifications

Tension from the Israeli point of view stemmed

from an adamant Jordanian stand which denied free
access to and the normal functioning of the cultural
and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus, and

denied also free access to places holy to Judaism,

but in the Jordanian- held Old City, such as the

Wailing Wall, and the cemetery on the Mount of
Olives.

There were other neutral areas, demilitarized
zones, and no-man's lands in Jerusalem.

But none

except the area surrounding Government House, which
included UNTSO headquarters, was the subject of a

Security Council resolution.

In the suioner of 1957,

Israel sent v/orkers into this area which it claimed
to plant trees. ^

Jordan, fearing a precedent which

later might help allow an Israeli claim to this land,

protested to the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, who ruled that
Israel should temporarily cease work until the merits
of the case could be decided.

Israel refused, but

finally relented to Security Council Resolution 12?
(19i|.8).

This resolution called for suspension of all

work until

a

determination could be made of whether

or not Arab land was involved. "^^^
In 1950 about 3,500 bedouin Azazme tribesmen
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were expelled from the El Auja Demilitarized Zone.

Despite Security Council Resolution 89 of November
1?,
1950 which called upon Israel to permit the Azazme to

return to the area, the resolution has not yet been
fully implemented. '"^^^
On September 28, 1953, Israel established an

experimental agricultural kibbutz in the El Auja

Demilitarized Zone called Ketsiot.

Israel cited the

grounds that civil activity such as pioneer farming
did not violate the Armistice Agreement, since only

military restrictions had been placed upon the Zone.
Israel also claimed complete sovereignty over the
Zone in all but a military sense.
195^4-*

On September 30,

the Egyptian- Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission

found that Ketsiot was organized as and staffed by

a

unit of the Israeli armed forces, in direct breach of
the Armistice Agreement.

Inspections by U.N. Military

Observers and Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns himself,
then Chief of Staff, UNTSO, both commented upon the

apparent low ratio of agricultural work accomplished in

relation to the size of the kibbutz.
On September 21, 1955, following a problem over
the marking of the Zone's international frontier,

Israeli troops took sudden and complete military control
of the El Auja Demilitarized Zone, and constructed

fortifications and laid minefields,

Israeli military
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forces installed themselves pormanently here and
did

not withdraw, even after the 19S6 Sinai war.
Problems between Israel and Syria concerning the

Demilitarized Zone have been many and complex.

Tliey

include attempts to divert Jordan River waters, disputes

over Lake Tiberias, problems concerning policing the
Zones, and conflicts over the right to plow and harvest
the rich farmland.

Shooting occurred in 1951 when Israel began the

attempt to drain Lake Hula and the surrounding marshes
in the central demilitarized sector.

Not only v/ould

this have provided a good deal more land for cultivation, but the project would help substantially in

eliminating malaria from the area--a benefit to both
Israeli and Arab,

About seven acres of Arab- owned land

was crucial to the Israeli project.
to buy,

The Israelis tried

the Arab owners refused to sell this land,

Israel charged, because of personal threats they had

received from Syria,

The situation was complicated by

the fact that Israel, claiming sovereignty over the

area had not consulted with the Mixed Armistice Com-

mission before starting work, claimed a free hand in the
Zone, and put forward the Palestine Land Development

Company as a private concessionaire doing the work.
The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission rejected
the claim of sovereignty by Israel over this area, as
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well as the claim by Syria that this action would change
the military status quo of the Zone in violation of the

Armistice Agreement, and therefore that Syria's consent
was needed.

Instead, he ruled that the project would

be acceptable if it did not affect the Arab lands with-

out their consent, or if it did not interfere with the

normal resumption of civilian life in the Zone--a stand

supported by Security Council resolution 93 of May 18,

A far more serious dispute over water rights con-

cerned the diversion of the Jordan River.

On

September 2, 1953> Israel began to dig a canal to
divert Jordan River waters between Lake Hula and Lake
Tiberias.

Because the Jordan River ran through her

territory at that point, Israel claimed to be free to
dispose of the waters since she said her plans would
not affect any Arabs then using waters.

both Israeli points.
work; Israel refused.

Syria denied

UNTSO ordered Israel to stop
The Chief of Staff, UKTSC, told

the Security Council it was possible that Arab water

rights might be jeopardized, that the project could

upset the Zone's military status quo, and that, once
again, Israel did not consult with the Chairman of the

Mixed Armistice Commission befors starting work.

Israel

ceased work only when the United States terminated
economic aid to Israel, subject to resumption only with

the UNTSO decision.

^ ^^^^^ resolution offered by

the United States, Britain, and France
which directed
the Chief of Staff, UNTSO,

to reconcile these conflicts

was vetoed by the Soviet Union. "^^^

During this period of time, Eric Johnston, a

personal representative of President Eisenhower,

attempted to derive agreement among the Arab states
and Israel concerning the development and use of the

Jordan's waters.

The negotiations came extremely close

to technical and even,

to a lesser degree, political

agreement on the division of the waters.

However, the

negotiations foundered on the "obduracy of the Syrian
politicians.

They simply would not agree to anything

that would benefit Israel, even if the Arab states

would thereby achieve greater benefits . "-^^^
In early 1956, then, following the failure of

the Johnston mission,

Israel resumed work on the

project, but this time, proposing to draw water from
Lake Tiberias which Israel considered to be under her

own sovereignty,

Israeli work on the project progressed

until Ai'ab summit conferences in January end September,
196[|.,

determined to divert the headwater rivers of the

Jordan-- the Hasbani and Baniyas.

Incidents continued

to occur involving shots in both directions across the

armistice demarcation line until Israeli air action

against the diversion project on July

llj.,

1966 put an
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end to such efforts.
On January 19, 1956 the Security Council unan-

imously passed a resolution cosponsored by the United
Kingdom, France and the United States which condemned
Israel for a raid conducted against Syria north of
Lake Tiberias in which 56 Syrians were killed.

The

resolution was notable in that Israel for the first
time, was threatened with more severe measures in the

future if Charter obligations were not complied

with."''^^

Finally we come to the announced intention on
April

3,

1967 by the Israeli Government to plow certain

controversial lots in the Demilitarized Zone which
Syria claimed belonged to Arab farmers.

Syrians started

shooting with the appearance of the Israeli armored
tractors and the fighting escalated until six Syrian
jet fighters were shot down over Damascus in an incident

which helped lay the groundwork for the June war."^^^
Many legal problems stemmed from the Demilitarized
Zone between Israel and Syria.

The Israeli case claimed

that the General Armistice Agreement conferred sovereignty

over the entire Zone upon her.

The Israeli Government

claimed this territory as an area that was only occupied

by Syrian troops who later withdrew,

Abba Eban stated

before the Security Council:
The fact that parts of the demilitarized zone may at
one time have come under Syrian military occupation
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is of course quit© irrelevant, for military
occupation does not give rise to legal
sovereignty

Our view happens to be that since the
Armistice Agreement does not affect the previous
status of this area, except by demilitarizing it,
its Juridical status is the same as it was on the
day that the Mandate expired and Israel's independence was proclaimed. 158

Since the Demilitarized Zone was sovereign

Israeli territory, in Jerusalem's eyes, it followed
that Syria had no say in any matter concerning the
Zone.

Neither, in Israeli eyes, did any other body

except to a small degree the MAC Chairman.

Nor did

the General Armistice Agreement concern itself with

any matters except the purely military ones which
signified the only change in status which international
law recognizes in a Demilitarized Zone
tion.

— demilitariza-

So the civilian life, agriculture and police

would develop under Israeli control and guidance.
The Arab case disputed the Israeli claim to

sovereignty over the Zone and pointed out that the

General Armistice Agreement had left the "rights,
claims and positions of either Party hereto in the

ultimate peace settlement

""^^^^
.

Since the final peace

settlement, and not the Armistice Agreement would here
govern, neither Israel nor Syria could legitimately

claim to solely control civilian activity.

Israeli

activity might prejudice in Israel's favor claims to
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these lands Since title to
them would be decided
only
with a final peace agreement
The Arab or Syrian case
disputed the Israeli
claim to sovereignty and
pointed out that the General

Armistice Agreement, and even
more explicitly, acting
mediator, Ralph Bunche who
helped write it, said in
an Explanatory Note concerning
the Agreement:
"Questions
of permanent boundaries,
territorial sovereignty, customs
trade relations, and the like
must be dealt with in the
settlement and not in the armistice
agreement "^^l
.

^.ere

fore,

Israel had no right in claiming
the right to act
alone in decisions concerning
the various Zones.
This
being so in Arab eyes, the
Chairman of the Mixed
Armistice Commission was recognized
as having more
power by the Syrians, both in terms
of civilian life,

major changes in the Zone's status,
and interpreting
the Armistice Agreement.
Bunche 's interpretation of
the General Armistice Agreement
was looked upon by the
U.N. as authoritative; therefore, there
was a general

coalescence between the Arab and United
Nations positions
on this point.
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CHAPTER

III

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HOSTILITIES
The Security Council convened in an emergency

session on June 5 following the notification first by the

representative of Israel, then by that of the United Arab
Republic that the other side had engaged in an aggression.

Ambassador Gideon Rafael of Israel charged in session that:
Fighting has erupted on Israel's frontiers and that
the Israel defense forces are now repelling the
Egyptian Army and Air Force.
The Egyptian forces met with the immediate
response of the Israel defense forces, acting in
self-defense ,^

Ambassador Mohammed Awad El-Kony of the United Arab
Republic countercharged that "reports indicate that the

dimensions of the Israel attack are so wide that no one can

doubt the premeditated nature of this aggression.''

Reminding the Council of the "black days of 1956" when
Israel 't)lanned and engineered" another aggression "in

defiance of all noiTis of law and decency and in flagrant

contravention of the United Nations Charter,"^ El-Kony
concluded by stating that his country had no choice but
self-defense under Article pi of the United Nations

Charter.^

According to Arthur Lall, privately Israeli

diplomats admitted at this time that they had launched
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the massive military strike.^

Here, at the very beginning, the antithetical
and

complex nature of the dispute was highlighted.

Israel

claimed that the Arab closure of the Straits of Tiran was
illegal and a prior, precipitative act of aggression

against Israel;

further, that Cairo's withdrawal of its

consent to UNEF's presence, and movement of forces toward
Israel were further manifestations of aggressive intent.
So in Jerusalem's view, these "aggressive" acts justified

defensive actions by Israel under Charter article 51,

To

these Jerusalem added the persistent Arab and Egyptian

protestations of a state of war existing with Israel and
threats to Israel's independence and territorial integrity.
The Arab position and, in particular, that of the

U.A.R. looked upon its actions of blockading Tiran to

Israeli shipping and cargo, and requesting the withdrawal

of UNEF as within the realm of its domestic jurisdiction.

Cairo pointed out that Israel did not allow UNEF to cross
to its side of the cease-fire line despite U Thant's re-

quest, and that the U.A.R. moved troops into the Sinai,

and Gaza Strip, solely in response to Israeli troop concentrations against Syria.

Cairo also made clear its

numerous reiterations that it would not be and
first to launch a military attack.

i^as

not the

Sinularly to Jerusalem,

the Arab case claimed Israel to be the aggressor and its

own acts to be defensive actions under article ^1 of the
Charter.
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Since a cease-fire was finally established
without
condemnation or the branding of one party or
the other as
an aggressor under Charter provisions, no
definitive legal

opinion may be expressed as to which, if indeed
any party
had solely engaged in an aggression. Nor was
the claim
to self-defense validated for either party.

We do not

wish to fall into the miasmal pit of partisanly defining

what act was here "aggressive."

But what is commonly re-

ferred to as the Six-Day War began with an Israeli in-

vasion "claimed to have been in self-defense, but which,

although by no means unprovoked, did amount to

a first

use of force by Israel."'''

Finally, there is the strategic and moral case as
Israel perceived it.

Before June

i|,

I967 no spot in

Israel was more than twenty- five miles from an Arab

neighbor.

Both on land and in the air Jerusalem viewed

three fronts on which there was "no alternative" to

offensive operations which carried swiftly into enemy
territory; put simply, Israel possessed insufficient room
to retreat.

Moreover, there was an inequality of dangers

in Israeli eyes; a defeated Israel probably could not rise

again to fight, as the Arab governments had, because of
its limitations in space and population.

Therefore, in

the eyes, for example, of Yigal Allon:

Israel must regard any massive concentration of
offensive forces on her borders as an aggressive
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threat to which she was entitled to respond with force
before the enemy took the initiative against her.^

Allon's doctrine of "anticipatory counterattack,"
justified by a perceived threat to Israel's existence,
appears to help explain what happened in I967.

There

were six contingencies under which Israel would be

entitled to go to war in Allon's estimation:

(1)

A

concentration of military forces sufficient to be dangerous
to Israel;

(2)

being planned;

when a surprise enemy air attack is clearly
{3)

when air attacks were conducted against

atomic and scientific installations;

(i^j

when guerrilla

raids reached an unacceptable level;

(5)

upon Jordan's

conclusion of a military pact with another Arab country;
and (6) if Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran.

In Allon's

eyes, any one of these contingencies would constitute a

casus belli

.

Allen continues zo define the term

"anticipatory counter-attack" as an:
Israeli operational initiative taken against concentrations of enemy forces and the occupation on
enemy territory of targets having a vital security
significance, at a time when the enemy is mustering
his forces for an attack but before he has had time
actually to start his offensive.*^

An anticipatory counterattack would begin by

destroying enemy air forces on the ground.

According to

Allon, Israeli's territorial vulnerability and Arab

hostility gave Israel the mora] right to utilize this
strategy.

However, even Ben-Gurion thought it to be
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too similar to a preventi\'-e war.

However, the war did not spring. Medusa-like, into

existence on the morning of June 5, 196?.

The precedent

factors are decades old; the immediately precipitative
factors herein perceived were outlined in Chapter

I.

Damascus and especially Cairo certainly bear responsi-

bility in good measure for the provocation (witting or
unwitting) which we have reviewed as bringing about this

whole train of events.

These Arab contributions to the

outbreak of hostilities are contradictory especially to
the purposes and principles of the Charter which include

members refraining not only from the "use," but also from
the "threat" of force in their international relations.
It is extremely difficult in light of our analysis
to label one or another party as the sole and singular

contributor to the crisis under the terms of the Charter.
While the partisans to each side would certainly enjoy
the benefits flowing from the designation of the other

side as the "aggressor," this may not have been organiza-

tionally advisable, politically possible, or legally
correct.

It

may appear that some reciprocity was necessary

in the downward spiral to hostilities, just as it will be

necessary in the far more arduous upward spiral to peaceful
settlement.

In conclusion, however, one must recognize

that the Allonian doctrine of "anticipatory counterattack"

provides plenty of fodder for debate.
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Both parties possessed the will and
believed they
possessed the capacity to carry out the
conflict to a

conclusion favorable to themselves.

It was

this initial

intransigence of the parties to the conflict
both holding
hopes of victory^^ initially buttressed by the
Soviet
Union, for example, which tried to hold out for
a with-

drawal of all forces to their June

positions, which

paralyzed the Security Council at the start. "'•^
The will of the warring states and the flood of

events simply bowled over any attempts at changing the
course of what is now history.

The recess of the session

for consultations proved fruitless and the stalemated
Council adjourned until the evening of June 6.
While consultations went on during the next day
(June 6), it became more and more apparent that neither

Egypt nor Jordan could halt the Israeli juggernaut.

In

addition, emphasis on both withdrawal and disengagement

was dropped as the need to concentrate simply on a ceasefire became essential.

Forwarding the proposition that

Israel could not have launched its attack without U.S.

foreknowledge and consent, Moscow accused the United States
of hypocritically procrastinating in the Security Council
in the hope that additional time would permit further

Israeli advances, especially upon Sharm el- Sheikh and the
Sinai. ^3
On the evening of June 6, resolution 233 was
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unanimously passed by the Security Council.

In the

language of the resolution, the Security Council called

upon the various Governments to "take forthwith all
measures for an immediate cease-fire" and cessation of

military activities, and requested the Secretary General
keep it "promptly and currently informed on the situa-

tion."^^
Thereafter, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg of the United
States stated his country's consistent support of

a cease-

fire over the preceding thirty- six hours while expressing

his fervent hope that compliance would be complete and
immediate.

Lord Caradon, representative of the United

Kingdom, joined Mr. Goldberg in denying the involvement
of their aircraft in the hostilities."^^

also welcomed the resolution.

Lord Caradon

In a very characteristic

discourse he noted his Government's unchanging position
on the major is3ues--a personal constancy as well which

we shall describe and which was to be a wellspring of

great strength for him later on through the time when
resolution

2)42

was actually passed.

He also commented

on the current crisis in international authority which,
if not met, could "betray" world hopes for progress and

peace.

Surprisingly enough too, in the midst of war and

confusion, Caradon still spoke with foresight of the

Council's inescapable "responsibility to go forward, to
take the other steps now so urgently required."

It was
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also characteristic of him to recognize and remind Council

members that failure would result in more bloodshed and
suffering by innocents
We need not look farther than the Near East to see
evidence that when conflict comes it is always the
innocent who suffer most, and suffer worst. Id

Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics who followed Caradon condemned Israeli
aggression, called for a cease-fire and the immediate

withdrawal of aggressive forces "behind the truce line,"
reminded the United Nations of its "primary duty

.

.

.

[to] condemn the actions of Israel and take urgent

measures to restore peace in the Middle

East.""^*^

Joining

with Ambassador Milko Tarabanov of Bulgaria, the U.S.S.R.
stated that resolution 233 (196?) should be considered
only a minimum first step.

I-nmediate and unconditional

withdrawal by Israel behind the armistice lines should be
considered and adopted by the Council in light of this
flagrant violation of international law.

The Russian

position had eroded after reports were received of Israeli

battlefield successes.

18

Notable also was an early willingness to see the
Middle East problem through to a different solution which
was expressed by a number of representatives.

Ambassador

Lij Endalkachew Makonnen of Ethiopia called for "following

up our decision of today with concerted action which can
lead to the creation of fair and equitable conditions for
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a

just and lasting settlement "^9
.

Ambassador Jose Maria

Ruda of Argentina stated that the cease-fire
"should be

immediately followed by the most intensive efforts in
the
Middle East."^^

Mr. George Ignatieff of Canada concurred

in that "We cannot and we must not wait for another
ten

years, for another crisis which will

.

.

once more to the edge of catastrophe."^-^

bring us all

.

Even Ambassador

Moussa Leon Keita of Mali called for a "searching study"
of this question so that action will amount to more than

putting" a few more lines on another sheet of paper under
the illusion of having solved a problem that will soon

be confronting us again at the next crossroads "^^
.

To these appeals by these representatives to commence

the search for a more profound solution, three other

members

— China,

Japan and the United States

— joined

in

also urging that the next step be a concerted effort to

delineate a basic settlement to this profound problem-one which had evoked three area wars in two decades.

If

we add to this group the remark of Ambassador Roger

Seydoux of Gaullist France that once peace had returned
"we shall have to embark upon a lengthy process,"

the

breadth of support for a fundamental settlement, after
the cease-fire can be appreciated.

These calls, just as the conflict itself, marked a

new turn in the course of events.

Prior to June p, some

representatives, especially the American and British, had
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appealed for caution and restraint in their effort to
forestall actual hostilities as war clouds gathered.

A

chance always existed that the parties would not resort
to the grave alternative of war,

that the situational

relationship was still sufficiently viable to enable the
parties themselves to work out their grievances.

With the

advent of hostilities, the need for restraint to avoid

hostilities collapsed in face of the necessity to grapple

with the problems of hostilities themselves.

India, for

example, made a strong stand for a cease-fire coupled to

withdrawals to positions held on June

l\.

"based upon the

sound principle that the aggressor should not be permitted

by the international community to enjoy the fruits of

aggression

.

.

.

[as]

.

.

.

lasting peace can be built,

the only basis on which a

Meanwhile, the Iraqi

delegate termed the cease-fire resolution previously

adopted "a complete surrender to Israel,"

and the

Syrian representative, Georges Tomeh, called for the

condemnation of Israel as an aggressor and for sanctions

under the Charter.
a cease-fire,

To the calls for a withdrawal and

the Soviet Union added the condition of a

condemnation of Israel.

The United States upheld Israel's

point that any cease-fire must be unconditional.

This

opened the United States position to Soviet and Arab
charges that by refusing to link the cease-fire to
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withdrawal as the Indian position advocated, the U.S. was

hypocritically abetting its client, Israel, to enjoy the
added fruits of its aggression in direct violation of

international law.

The rush of events stripped away the

luxury of discussing how or in what manner a cease-fire

resolution should be passed by the Security Council.

Un-

questionably the early pre- June Soviet attitude changed
once an assessment of the incredibly successful Israeli

first strike against Arab military airports was available.

Further delay could only mean further losses in men,
territory and equipment.

This may be illustrated by a

consideration of the contrasting, hurried adjectives that

Ambassador Fedorenko used at this point "the first urgent
step

.

.

•

stop immediately

.

•

.

take urgent measures"

in the Security Council late on June 6 when stating it:

...

to be the bounden duty of the Security Council
to adopt without any further delay a decision con-

cerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal
of the forces of the aggressor behind the Armistice
lines. 27
Now, even the Soviet Union was forgetting its prior

specific demands for condemnation of Israel by the Security

Council in the interests of the nub of the matter- -a
cease- fire
It was in this sort of a setting that this wide-

spread, though not yet total international groundswell

for a more profound treatment and solution to this problem
surfaced.

But it remained the immediate problem of
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halting hostilities which transfixed the energies of the
Security Council.
The American remarks could only have been directed

at the prior positions of both Prussia and the United

Arab Republic in order to contrast Washington's official

constancy with Moscow and Cairo's erraticism on the record,
as well as to point out to the Security Council members

how important it was for them to act promptly and appropriately in matters such as these

<>

It is worthy to note

here that just as the Security Council on one level was
unable to act on the crisis in the period between
U Thant's return from Cairo on May 25 and the June

6

fighting, so too it was stymied in adopting a draft

cease-fire resolution from the early morning of June 5

until the passage of 233 (I967) late on June

6

because,

in Ambassador Goldberg's words, that "draft resolution
28
was not supported by other powers."

But fighting did not cease.

No state accepted the

call for a cease-fire in 233 {I967), so Resolution

2}^.

(1967) was adopted unanimously by the Security Council

on June 7 at its 1350th meeting.

There are a number of

differences between Resolution 233 of June
2314.

of June

7.

tion than 233.

Resolution

23I4.

6

and Resolution

was a much stronger resolu-

The June 6 resolution noted the ''oral

report of the Secretary- General" on the situation, v/hile
the June 7 resolution noted that "in spite of its appeal"
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to the Governments to prepare immediately "for an imme-

diate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military

activities

.

.

.

military activities are continuing."

Resolution 233 spoke of concern "at the outbreak of the

fighting and with the menacing situation" while

23!;

was

concerned that the continuation of fighting "may create
an even more menacing situation in the area."

mine

(Emphasis

.

The 1,314.9th meeting of the Security Council opened

on June 7 in response to the urgent request of the repre-

sentative of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Union had come a

long way since the month of May when it maintained that
to call the Security Council into session was pointless

since no grounds for convening it existed.

After stating

that Resolution 233 had had no effect and that the

aggressor was continuing in his aggression^ the Soviet
representative introduced a draft resolution which re-

affirmed the Council's call for a cease-fire.
20
Pedorenko then pressed for an immediate vote.^

Ambassador
Certainly

this reflected the intense pressure which both the Soviets

and the Arabs felt themselves to be under.

One indication

of this from an Arab state traditionally pro-Western was
the Secretary-General's announcement that Jordan had

accepted the Council's cease-fire Resolution 233 that

morning at 6:00 A.M.

30

Upon a request by Brazil for

a

very short recess so that we can at least become acquainted

12k

with the wording of the text before us, "31
the President
of the Council, Hans Tabor of Denmark,
recognized

Ambassador Goldberg.

The American Ambassador, in con-

tradiction to the sudden Soviet turnabout concerning

a

cease-fire pointed out:

My delegation has been conscious of the gravity of
this situation not since last night, but for three
weeks ... if certain powers had not objected and
had not deprecated our statements about the gravity
of the situation, a resolution would have been in
the hands of the council for effective action to
avert the outbreak of hostilities in the Near East. 32
V/hile

the earlier resolution (233) called for "an imme-

diate cease-fire and for a cessation of military activities,"
the latter one

{22k)

"

demanded " (emphasis mine) a cease-

fire "as a first step" and set

a

brief deadline for the

discontinuance of military activities.

But once again,

no mention was made of steps which would be taken if

compliance were not forthcoming 33
.

Following the vote Ambassador El-Kony repeated
charges which he and other Arab delegates had made about

British and American collusion with the Israeli attack
and commented upon the United States "policy of hypocrisy
and antagonism towards Arab nations which, while guaranteeing
the independence and territorial integrity of the States
in the Middle East, have tolerated one expansion of Israel

after another."

El-Kony then asked

a

pointed question:

"Is the United States assei'ting today, by deed or action,

that it will not allow Israel to annex an inch of Arab
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territory?"^^

It was

significant that while the represen-

tative from Egypt repeated the request for
Council condemnation of Israel, this was no longer echoed
by the

Soviet Union.

Still on June

7,

Foreign Minister Abba

Eban of Israel possessed of flawless Arabic and
perhaps
the most eloquent living command of the English
language
rebutted.

After dismissing the allegations of collusion

with the United States and United Kingdom as "absurd,"
Eban clearly stated the pith of the Israeli response to
the Arab charges of aggression:

The central theme of the Arab Israel conflict is
clear and simple. There are Member States that
desire to destroy another Member State. There are
those
v;ho both proclaim and at times carry
.
.
out, measures for the destruction of its independence and its integrity. There is neither any
historic basis nor moral justification nor juridical
foundation for that assertion. 35
.

Eban then turned to the question of attitudes toward
the cease-fire.

In contrast to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq

which had rejected the cease-fire resolution and Jordan
whose acceptance was clouded for Israel by her common
defense pact with the United Arab Republic, Eban proclaimed
of his Government:

"We welcome, we favour, we support,

we accept the resolution calling for immediate measures
to institute a "cease- fire . "^^

To this view on one level came a response on another

level.

The Bulgarian Ambassador Tarabanov pointed out that

while Foreign Minister Eban appeared to have agreed to

126

abide by Resolution

23]+

(I967),

"We have neither heard nor

seen anything to indicate that this is the case."^'^

Tarabanov was shortly answered by action, as Israel

announced her acceptance of the cease-fire, provided that

her Arab foes also agreed. 38

Following contributions by

other states, the Council adjourned for nearly one full
day.

Certainly in any case of diplomatic negotiations

between parties, the fundamental and mutual exclusion by
each of the other's starting premises almost forecloses
chances for the success of the effort.

In such a situa-

tion only greater powers which exert their own good offices

and influence can bring hope.

The non- policy of drift,

hesitancy and half-heartedness of the U.S. was consistent,
being in evidence both during the upswing toward hostilities
and during much of the fighting as Israel demonstrated its

ability to take care of itself. -^^

The Indian position

actually was quite close to the final United States
position of

195>o«

A rereading of General Assembly resolu-

tions during the fighting of that crisis indicated there
too a U.S. emphasis upon stopping the fighting, but coupled

with the call for withdrawal.

The U.S. stand thus had

departed from the form of its 1956 behavior in insisting
in 1967 that the most basic of the norms affecting conduct

between nations be dealt with first--a cease- fire--bef ore
questions affecting either condemnation or withdrawal be

12 7

dealt with.

It is inescapable, moreover, to
note the

Soviet contention that the American position,
by refusing
to link a cease-fire with withdrawal,
permitted
more

latitude for the Israelis to retain the fruits
of their
conquest than the Soviet position which linked a
cease-fire
to withdrawal.

Such talks without Israel's withdrawal

from occupied territory did best suit Israel.

This is

inescapable for it is precisely what happened.

The fact

that this norm of international law- -withdrawal from

territory occupied by force of arms--wa3 not injected at
this point, as it was in 1956, had an influence upon

events as they unfolded.

Of course, it was not the norm,

or its passage or nonpassage, but the U.S. choice to abide

by the norm in 1956 coupled to the will to see it through
which in part accounted for the difference.

Another

important consideration is that the war in 196 7 moved much

faster than the one in 1956.

Consequently, in 196? a

necessarily higher premium was placed on sinply halting
the fighting.

On June 8, the Council convened for the 1351st

meeting after notification by both Israel^^ and again
Jordan^"^ of their acceptance of the call for cease-fire

in Resolution 23k (I967).

Beth the U.S. and the Q.S.S.R.

had requested thi? aeasion,
the U.S.3.R. stated that

"'the

Ainbassador Fedcrenko of

extremist circles in
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Tel-Aviv obviously are drunk with their temporary successes
on Arab soil" and have "maliciously" laid down conditions

for their acceptance of the Council cease-fire Resolution

22k (1967) as have aggressors through history.^
Arabs are forced into defensive action.

The

The Soviet

Ambassador Fedorenko went on to state the necessity that
the Council safeguard the rights of the victims of such

aggression by approving a new draft resolution.

In it,

the Soviet Union stated that Israel had not only ignored

Resolutions 233 and

2314.

(1%7), but seized more territory

in the interim and that such defiance of the United Nations

continued.

The draft also asked that the Council "vigorously

condemns" Israel's violations of U.N. resolutions and principles while demanding an immediate halt to Israeli

military activity and their withdrawal "behind the
armistice lines. "^^

The Russian draft resolution may

have been on weaker grounds in its condemnatory mention

only of Israel concerning irdlitary activity, but on the

point of the continuing Israeli territorial advance was
on stronger grounds.

Yet, despite the undeniable validity

of this latter point, it is not altogether clear if
(1)

the Soviet draft was not too partisan to attract the

wide consensus sought at this time, and

(2)

whether or

not condemnation is a legitimate Charter approach to peace

inducement
The United States which also had requested the
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session submitted its own proposal
whose approach basically
diverged from that of the Russians. After
noting the
various resolutions and indications to
accept a ceasefire, the United States draft resolution
registered its

"deep concern" that no agreement to a cease-fire
had yet

been reached.

In addition,

it called for:

(1)

"scrupulous

compliance" by Israel and Jordan with the cease-fire
(2)

immediate compliance with the "Council's repeated

demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military
activity" as a first step toward peace in the area;
(3)

called for

discussions promptly thereafter among the
.
.
.
parties concerned, using such third party or
United Nations assistance, as they may wish,
looking toward the establishment of viable
arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and
disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the
maintenance of vital international rights and
the establishment of a stable and durable peace
in the Middle East;
(I4.)

requested steps by the President of the Security Council

and Secretary- General to secure compliance within twenty-

four hours

;

and

(5)

requested the Secretary-General to

"provide such assistance as may be requested in facilitating the discussions called for" in

upon the "essential" first step of

(3)

a

above.

^

Emphasis

cease-fire is clearly

evidenced in operative paragraphs one, two and four.
Jordan, Israel, and immediately after Goldberg concluded

speaking, the United Arab Republic announced acceptances
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of the cease-fire call as in 233 and

(I967) on the

22>li

condition that the other party/parties reciprocate.
No mention was made in the American draft of the
lines to which withdrawal should be made
June

I|.

or the Armistice lines.

ambiguous.

— those

of

The matter was left

Moreover, operative paragraph

(3)

of the

American draft, though admirable in intent and certainly
less blatantly one-sided than the Russian proposal,

remained perhaps just as incapable of adoption.

While

communication in some form should occur, at this moment
the war was still on, blood was still being spilled; this

was hardly the time to expend energy upon the basic

elements which would make for a "stable and durable
peace," admirable as that

may have been, whose very

definition and clearer focus envisaged prompt discussions.
The full extent of the victory/defeat were not yet known,

indeed were still in process.

No matter how valid the

content of the U.S. draft resolution would have been over
the long run, tactically it suffered because it advocated

far too much far too soon.

Both draft resolutions, then,

each in its own way was dissonant to the tasks at hand.
Into the breach of these widely disparate proposals

conciliatorily stepped Lord Caradon who spilled calming
oils upon the raging waters.

First he reminded the

Council members of his and his Government's "connected
and continuous" actions since early Monday morning-- leaving

131

unsaid the erratic and discontinuous actions of other
members.

Next, he spoke of the delay; not only that

of the prewar period
last month

...

(".

.

,

had there not been delay

we might even have been able to avert

and prevent the war altogether"), but of delay once

v;ar

broke out ("we remain of the strong opinion that the

Council should have acted twenty- four hours earlier
as we urgently advocated on Monday morning").^'''

.

.

.

While

he quietly criticised the early Soviet attitude that the

dangers of the situation were "overdramatized and the

urgency artificial,"^® he levelled an accusing finger
not at one party to the conflict, as did the Soviet
proposal, but at both in saying that they "have fallen

far short of readiness to respect and employ inter-

national authority" without distinction between them,^^
Similarly, Caradon ignored the sweeping U.S. proposals

and spoke instead more narrowly that the "next urgent
step must be to provide for the implementation of the
.

.

.

cease-fire

.

.

.

call,"

while speaking of the

coming work" which will urgently occupy us for a long
time to come"^" and concluded with the view that the

immediate United Nations' task should be more limited and

humanitarian while the more distant should be so vague
and ambiguous that no party could object to them:

...

to stop the fighting"- and w© pray that the
fighting may very soon be stopped; to ensure and
secure disengaganen t to bring relief and succour
;
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to the wounded and the homeless; and
to move on to
conciliation and the establish?^
J
ment of order
and justice.
These practical tasks
^ ^°^S ^i^^
to%oSey?2''^ *

Finally, Caradon appealed to the Members'
creative
vision and to the United Nations' role in the
crisis by
seeking "new means of establishing an effective
United

Nations presence "beyond the rear- guard of UNEF
while
setting the organization back on the "hard uphill
road to

international authority."

After observing that there

still existed an opportunity to demonstrate that there

was nothing wrong with the U.N. or its Charter "but

with those who refuse to use it," Caradon "earnestly and
sincerely" appealed to Council members

... to approach these tasks with a will to work
together to abandon old prejudices, to realize that
the world looks to us not to perpetuate animosities,
but to heal wounds and repair the damagre and give
to all the peoples of the Near East the security
they need and the security they long for, to make
their lives tolerable and their future not a future
of fear, but a future of hope.
In all these purposes we, round this table, have
an inescapable obligation.
I trust that we shall
show that we are determined to rise to it.3'3
,

Here, by means of an appeal to fulfill the general

norms for which the U.N. stands, here, by means of a general

appeal to the core of morality and concern for life which
is the basis both for international organization and inter-

— here

national law

Lord Caradon exhibited that presence

of mind and embodiment of principles by which men con-

sistently influence events.
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At 1:00 A.M.,

June 9,

the President of the Security

Council wa3 informed by the Secretary-General
of Syria's
acceptance of the Council's cease-fire
appeals contained
in the Council's resolutions of June 6
and

7

"provided

that the other party agrees upon the
cease-fire "^^
.

At 5:30 A.M.

the Israel representative reported heavy

Syrian shelling of 16 Israeli villages and at 6:00
A.M.
the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic,
George

Tomeh, requested an urgent meeting of the Security

Council.

The war on the Syrian front was on in earnest.

At 1:05 P.M.,

June 9, Resolution 235 (196?) was

adopted by the Security Council.

This marked the third

cease-fire resolution passed unanimously since June
Briefly, 235 (196?) (1) cited resolutions 233 and

6.

23I4.

(1967) concerning an immediate cease-fire and cessation

of military activity;
of hostilities;

(3)

(2)

demanded the forthwith cessation

requested the Secretary-General to

immediately contact the Governments of Israel and Syria
to arrange immediate compliance and to report back to the

Security Council within two hours; and

iU.)

noted that the

Governments of both Syria and Israel had announced their
acceptance of

a cease-fire.^''

It is worthy to note here that in Resolution 235 th-©

duty of the Secret a ry -General went beyond mere reporting
on the situation to the arrangement of coripliance
addition, not only was

a

.

In

time limit placed cn compliance,

but a time limit only of two hours.

Ambassador Goldberg's remarks after this vote may
have reflected the restraining of Lord Caradon.
spoke of

a

Goldberg

"lack of ability to concert our actions"^^ as

a consistent

failing point for the Council and then went

on in a less than oblique fashion to state:
I say this very plainly and very categorically.
My
Government is willing to concert its actions with
every member of this Council so that we can bring
the fighting to an end, so that we can start
consideration of all that we need to consider
we are ready at any time to do this, we are ready
under any circumstances.
.57
.

.

.

.

.

Clearly, the United States was prepared to offer

more flexibility than it had previously demonstrated.

When Ambassador Fedorenko spoke after this, his
remarks continued in the same vein as before with little

change in policy; again he insisted that Israel be punished

by an active Security Council, that it cease military
activities and withdraw its troops from Arab territories.
There was no question but that the Soviet Union intensely

desired withdrawal:

...

by what right does Israel refuse to withdraw
its troops from the territories which it has seized.
Or is it that Israel has decided to give birth
,
that it is
new
principles all by itsslf
to
possible and permissible to seize foreign territories
by armed force.
This situation brooks of no
58
delay.
.

.

.

.

The

l,353i'*cl

.

.

.

.

meeting of the Security Council opened

later on June 9 to a barrage of charges, denials end countercharges by the representatives of Syria, Israel, and Egypt.
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Each state claimed to have
accepted the cease-fire
vhUe
accusing the other state of
violating it anew. The increasing level or righting
between Israel and Syria
evoked
a new and stronger
response rrom ^^^b.ssador
Fedorenko.
Accusing the United States or
complicity
and Israel or

"unbounded" arrogance and hypocrisy,
in
accusation or violating international

a

broadside

law. treading

underroot the Charter and sabotaging
Security Council
resolutions, the Soviet delegate by
his vituperative
words indicated the increasing
urgency with which his
government viewed this latest or a
long-series

or armed
clashes all or which resulted in
marked Israeli successes.
The rirst avenue was through the
Security Council.
It

"...

should immediately take resolute end
errective
measures" to guarantee Israel's abidance
or Council
decisions; Vapt condemn" Israel's disregard
or its
resolutions; "must demand" that Israel cease
military
action at once and:

should warn Tel Aviv that non-compliance by
.
.
Israel
will have the gravest conseauences
for the Israeli State, and that the Security
Council will be compelled to use the powers which
are invested in it by the Charter or the United
Nations to deal with such situations .59
.

.

.

.

V/hatever their chance or passage in the world body,

these were certainly strong measures to advocate.

To ensure

full impact or its attitude, the Soviet delegate drew the

attention or the Council merabers to

e

communique issued che
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same day by the States of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany,

Poland, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

The

communique reviewed Israeli aggression and noncompliance,
imperialist collusion, illegal occupation of Arab territory
and, after declaring their full and complete "common

cause" with the Arab people "to repeal the aggression and

defend their national independence and territorial integrity," and asking for the condemnation of Israel, con-

eluded
If the Security Council does not take the proper
measures, great responsibility will rest on those
States which fail to fulfill their duty as members
of the Security Council. 61

In other words,

''while the

Western powers voted

in the Security Council for the cease-fire resolution, they

were not exerting the influence on Israel that the

Western powers called for."

62

A number of points need to be made here.

Perhaps

the paramount one is the mixed nature of Fedorenko's state-

ment and the communiquS.

While increasing their backing

of the Arabs from support to "assistance" in repelling

aggression and defending Arab national independence and
territorial integrity, thereby raising the stakes in the
game, at the same time, there was no talk threatening

Israel's national independence or territorial integrity.
This was significant.

It was also significant that though

there, both
the threat to widen the conflict was certainly
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Pedorenko's statements and the East European
communiqu6
will support the interpretation that this
was

only a last

resort measure, that first every U.N. channel
would be
explored and exhausted.
So a mixed bag of bellicosity,
reason, immoderation and caution resulted.

In any event,

the Middle Eastern nations were at loggerheads
and Russia

obviously was floundering toward extremism against her
will due to the nature of the situation's evolution and
the U.N.'s inability to affect the same evolution.

Into this situation stepped Ambassador Goldberg of
the United States with a statement on the "full authority"
of his Government:

hewing close to the consistent prin-

ciple "that the Security Council's resolutions shall be

complied with in letter and spirit by Israel and the Arab
countries involved, "^^

he went on to remind the Council

of the continuing U.S. commitment to halt hostilities and

bloodletting in the area and to get on to

a

final settle-

ment of the outstanding questions between the parties.

He

reviewed official U.S. policy which we might excerpt to
be:

(1)

a

firm commitment to "the political independence

and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area";
(2)

"the United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone

in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine";

(3) "the

United States has consistently sought to have good relations

with all the States of the Near East"; and

while this

has not always been so, U.S. differences with and between
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area States "must be worked out peacefully and in accordance

with accepted international practice. "^^

Going on to appeal

to "every fair minded person"^^ Ambassador Goldberg pro-

posed an impartial investigation by the Secretary-General
of all allegations of cease-fire violations as well as

the creation of adequate machinery to implement the cease-

fire resolutions adopted by the Security Council.

This

was done in order to ascertain exactly what the situation
was so that the appropriate steps can be taken.

Following this, Ambassador El-Parra of Jordan
called his state the victim of

a

war crime-aggression by

Israel--and expressed his regret that the United States
chose to ignore this aggression and the need, in Jordan's

eyes to condemn it and all for an Israeli withdrawal.

Ambassador Tarabanov of Bulgaria attempted to whiplash
the U.S. on its stands concerning respect for area state

territorial integrity and political independence now that
Israel military units were advancing on Arab soil.

In

addition, Tarabanov called it time for the Security Council
to find out just what the situation was in the Middle East
so that the Council could act.

Now that representatives of both blocs had requested
it,

Ambassador Tomeh of the Syrian Arab Republic "cate-

gorically" declared his Government's readiness to facilitate
such

a

U.N. investigation.

found himself

".

.

Ambassador Rafael of Israel

.in singular agreement with

the
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representative of Syria" on this

matter.^'''

Then, both

Tomeh and Rafael were urging and seconding motions

to

contact U.N. observers on the spot to assess real developments in the area.
move.

Certainly the logjam was beginning to

There followed

a

report by the Secretary-General

concerning just what facilities would be helpful and how
area states could be cooperative with U.N. observers.

Following the U.S.S.P.'s support of both the
Secretary -General

'

s

requests and the Syrian suggestion.

Lord Caradon suggested that since the Council was dealing

with rumor and hearsay, it made sense to adjourn and permit
the Secretary-General time to gather information from U.N.

observers on the spot.

Following a further refinement by

the French representative, Caradon pushed snd led the

Council (not against its will) to find

q

way out of the

miasma of charge and counter-charge.^^
Shortly thereafter Security Council President Tabor
was able to present

a

formula acceptable to all camps--

that cooperation be extended, Government House in Jerusalem
be restored and freedom of movement be facilitated for

United Nations observers in the area.
Council adjourned.

Thereafter, the
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Lord Caradon'

s

feat was no mean one.

According to

Arthur Lall, it was he who was the prime mover behind the
entire successful process.

Developments both in the area

and in the Council moved with such rapidity that obviously

114-0

he could not have received any instructions from his

Government.

Caradon's contribution, acting on his own,

enabled him to find that "slender piece of middle ground"

which permitted movement toward

resolution.*'''^

The Security Council next convened at

a

pre-dawn

emergency special session on June 10 called at the request
of the Syrian Government in response to the deterioration

along her Israeli front.

The representative of the Syrian

Arab Republic stated that Israeli forces had occupied the

town of Kuneitra and were proceeding toward Damascus,

An

oral report by the Secretary -General was not able to

validate the Syrian charges due to the fragmentary nature
of U.N. observer assessments in the area whose freedom of

movement was still restricted.

Ambassador Tcmeh told the

Council that the Israeli representative was deliberately

misleading the Council in stating his country's acceptance
of the cease-fire and requested that this body apply

sanctions to Israel in view of its disregard for unanimous

Council resolutions.
Representative Fedorenko continued along this line
in stating that the Ambassador from Israel had attempted to

"mislead and deceive the Council by using casuistical
subterfuges and ambiguous reservations, the real purpose of

which was to conceal the attack by the Israeli aggressors
against the Syrian Arab Republic

."^"^

"The U.S.3.R. continued

to request the condemnation of Israel for its criminal

bandit activity against Syria.

""^^

The representative from

India joined in with the denunciations of Israel's defiance
of the U.N.

The Soviet representative charged that it was

absolutely plain that Israel was continuing to advance on
Syria and that condemnation was called for.

This was

buttressed by similar statements from the representatives
of Bulgaria, Mali and India calling for immediate measures

to halt this aggression.

The representative of Israel denied these charges
and stated that Israeli forces were in Syria only to silence

Syrian gun emplacements which had continued to bombard
Israel in direct violation of the Security Council cease-

fire resolutions.

Ambassador Goldberg insisted on awaiting the report
of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Super-

vision Organization (UNTSO), General Odd Bull, on whether
or not Kuneitra was in the hands of the Syrians or the

Israelis.

"When we get that information the Council will

know what to do."

Goldberg stated that his Government

believed that both sides had an obligation to comply with
the cease-fire.

But it was not appropriate to pass

judgment merely on en allegation by one of the aggrieved

parties

Then

a

communication from the U.N. machinery in the

area reported air attacks on Damascus. ^

Despite taunts

Ik2

from the Soviet and Bulgarian representatives, Ambassador

Goldberg insisted this was not

a

"comprehensive report on

what is going on the whole area."^^
Later, contradictory reports of both Israeli and
Syrian action from General Bull stated:

"there have been

and are Israeli aircraft in the vicinity of Damascus; they
are there as protective cover for the Israeli forces in

the area" as well as indications of the Syrian shelling of
76
Israel which Gideon Rafael had complained.

Certainly this meeting pointed up the vital role of
U.N. machinery in an area of conflict and the near-total

dependence of the U.N. upon such machinery if they are to
deal promptly and appropriately with dangerous cases of
conflict.

Reconvening shortly after eight that same morning
(June 10), the meeting began with another oral report by

U Thant on developments in the area.

The message read

that air attacks were reported to the north of Damascus

and in the area of its airport.

Fedorenko Jumped to the

attack exclaiming:
The perpetration of the crime is proved. Nevertheless, in spite of this we are compelled to note
the inexplicable position adopted by certain members
of the Security Council, especially the represeni^ative
We have heard his explanation.
of the United States.
We are forced to reject the attempt of the representative of the United States to confuse a clear
situation. We cannot attribute objectively to
J'^
him.
,

,

^^ain Caradon moved the Council off

a

stalemated

dead-center by speaking very deliberately, succinctly and
incisively to the crisis of the day.

Reminding both Syria

and the Soviet Union of their not-hours-old commitment to
U.N. machinery and authentic, verified information, Caradon

went on to meld their criticism and get the Council back
on

ttie

track it belonged:

We should condemn in the strongest terms any breach
of our call for a cease-fire.
We should condemn
in the strongest terms every breach of our call for
a cease-fire.
I vould like to repeat that.
We should condemn any and every breach of the ceasefire, without exception.'''"
.

.

.

Certainly no nation which subscribed to the Charter
could help but agree to this.
able.

The stand was irreproach-

Moreover, Caradon had the knack of lifting the

scales from members' eyes:

We must not at this time lose sight ... of our first
and overriding purpose, the purpose on which we have
all agreed and on which we have three times voted
unanimously. Our first and overriding purpose is to
That is the
stop the fighting and stop it at once.
purpose we have had from the start, and I believe
that we shall concentrate, without diversion and
without delay, all our effort on that main purpose.

Immediately after this, Thant reported that General
Odd Bull had been asked to meet Israeli Defense Minister

General Moshe Dayan to discuss an effective cease-fire.

Tomeh of Syria described additional Israeli aggressions,
Keita of Mali called for the condemnation of Israel and
Fedorenko of Russia threatened, with other peace-loving
aggressions
states to apply sanctions bo Israel unless the

ceased.

The Ambassador of Canada, George Ignatieff, pro-

posed the strengthening of UNTSO (already suggested

officially by both the U.S. and India) and the sending of

a

special representative of the Secretary -General to the area
(first suggested by India).

The Council adjourned on the

news from the Secretary-General that real progress was

being made toward implementing
and Syria.

a

cease-fire between Israel

Nonetheless, the U.S. was suspect in many eyes

of hypocritically and quietly favoring its client-victor
at this point.
At 9:00 P.M. that same evening (June 10) the Security

Council met again at the request of the Soviet Union whose

representative charged that Damascus was under air attack
and that ground fighting had resumed.

Again the problem

was fragmentary reporting from the area from U.N. machinery
due to limitations of size and less-than-complete freedom
of movement.

Again the same paradox presented itself:

to act on this basis?

Kuneitra had changed hands.

how

Military

activity was continuing long after both states ostensibly
had accepted the cease-fire.

Should the Council consider

condemnation, should it strengthen the U.N. presence, should
it await further information, or pass another resolution?

Ambassador Goldberg countered the Soviet demands for
condemnation and withdrawal with a draft resolution conand
demning "any and all violations of the cease-fire"

investigati
requesting that the Secretary-General order full

1U5

of all reports cf cease-fire violations and report to the

Security Council.

It also called

upon the Governments con-

cerned to issue "categoric instructions" to cease fire and

military activities.
felt.
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Lord Caradon's presence may be

Fedorenko then accused Goldberg of "some discomfort

as he was facing the obvious fact of the flagrant violation
81
by Tel Aviv of the cease-fire."
He went on to ask the

U.S. representative:

Damascus?

"Does he condemn the bombing of

Does he condemn the fact that the representative

of Israel has been cynically misleading the Security
Op
Council"
before offering to yield the floor for a

response.

Ambassador Goldberg responded by citing his

draft resolution which condemned all cease-fire resolutions
and with a question of his own for Fedorenko:

"Is he pre-

pared to condemn all the violations of the cease-fire con-

firmed by the Security Council in his report? "^^

While

Fedorenko offered to answer Goldberg's query, in fact, he
never did for there had been earlier breaches by Syria.
Later, there arrived a report from General Bull:

"No

The Council adjourned

Arab breaches of the cease-fire."®^

just before 3:00 A.M. the next morning.

Late Sunday evening the Council gathered for its
1»

357th meeting in response to a Syrian charge of Israeli

advances aimed at the Yarmuk River,
the Jordan.

a

large tributary of

General Odd Bull reported movement of Israeli

tanks south of Rafid,

While the Syrian representative

11+6

claimed Israeli military operations after the cease-fire

had gone into effect, the Israeli representative retorted
that there had been movement by military vehicles within
the new truce lines, but no advance beyond them and that

there was no fighting anywhere along the front lines.

The Soviet representative accused Rafael of stalling
for time and

"...

trying by any means, with the support

of Washington and certain others, to enable the Israeli

army to take as much territory as possible. "^^

Pedorenko

again asked for quick and decisive Council action, for
the cessation of hostilities, the unconditional withdrawal
of troops ("the Security Council cannot permit Israel to

enjoy the fruits of its aggression"),
for Israel.
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and condemnation

Israel continues to defy the United Nations

and Security Council resolutions, stated Fedorenko.

Its

aggressions and violations deserve condemnation as the
Soviet draft resolution recommends and upon which the

Soviets wanted

a

sovereignty and legitimate rights of
stake.

The independence,

vote, he continued.
a

member State are at

The Council should act energetically and without

delay, concluded Fedorenko.

Again Caradon threw himaelf into the breach, but with

typical discretion and accuity.

Aftar stating his under-

standing of the importance of this matter to the Syrian

representative, Caradon said:

We have worked for a week for a cease-fire. We hope
that we have achieved it.
Anything which jeopardized
that cease-fire would be a matter of the utmost
gravity. ...
I suggest that what we can do, what we* should
do'
and what we must do is to make absolutely clear,
tonight, now, that we insist that there should be no
breach whatsoever, of the cease-fire and
that
we in the Security Council would take the most
serious and grave view of a breach of any kind.
.

•

•

.

.

•

Lord Caradon then suggested that since it would be

dawn soon in the Middle East, the Council take
recess to await fresh reports.

a

short

Before the recess, the

representatives of Mali, Egypt, and Bulgaria again

demanded the condemnation of Israel and the immediate
withdrawal of its armed forces.

The representative of

India repeated his earlier proposal for an immediate

withdrawal to the positions occupied on June

i^.

The United

States representative also voiced his support of the thrust
of Caradon 's argument.

After

a

brief recess, the Security Council at

3:00 A.M. unanimously adopted Resolution 236 (196?) of
June 12, 1967.

Here again Ambassador Tabor, President of

the Security Council, was most instrumental, as usual, in
the unanimous vote.

In addition, Tabor introduced the

draft resolution.
Briefly, the resolution:

(1)

condemned any and all

cease-fire violations in keeping with Lord Ceradon's
earlier formulation; (2) requested the Secretary-General

1U8

to continue and report his investigations
to the Council
as rapidly as possible;

(3)

cease-fire and specifically

affirmed the demand for
a

a

prohibition of any forward

military movements after the cease-fire;

(I4.)

called for

the prompt return to cease-fire positions of any troops

who may have moved forward subsequent to I630 GMT, June
10,
1967; and (5) called for full cooperation with the Chief
of Staff and observers of UNTSO specifically mentioning

freedom of movement and adequate communications.^'''
The resolution was narrowly tailored to fit the

broadest possible ground of the moment.

No condemnation

and no withdrawal were included, but then,

a

firm and un-

violated cease-fire was essential before consideration of
any other steps.

The Syrian front was, for the most part,

quiet thereafter.

The U.S.S.R. requested and was the first to speak at
the 1,358th session of the Security Council convening on

June 13.

In a long position statement, Ambassador

Fedorenko wove together

a

fabric which included strands

of power politics, ideology, support for clients and the

invocation of international law.

"The aggression by IsraeV'

said Fedorenko, "was aimed at changing the so-called

balance of power in the Near-East."

Ideologically, its

purpose was to attempt to "undermine the national liberation

movements of the Arab people and to weaken th6 progressive
regimes in the United Arab Republic, Syria and other Arab

1I;9

countries,"
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The Israel aggression in Soviet eyes,

"was the result of a conspiracy of certain imperialistic

forces primarily the United States, against the Arab
89
states."
Occupation of Arab soil by Israeli military

forces is "illegal, criminal, contrary to the United

Nations Charter and the elementary principles of con-

temporary international law."

The position of the Soviet

Union, the Arab States, India, Mali and others "is based

upon the well-known principle of international law that
the aggressor should not be permitted to enjoy the fruits
of his aggression."

90

The most elemental principle of

international law should be respected, Pedorenko continued, and Israel should be condemned; her military

forces should withdraw immediately and unconditionally

behind the General Armistice lines in accordance with
draft resolution which Fedorenko presented.

a

After quoting

statements by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkcl and
General Moshe Dayan of Israel which hinted at "expansionist

plans," Fedorenko quoted a statement of Ambassador Goldberg

concerning the firm U.S. commitment "to the support of the
91
political independence and territorial integrity"^ of all

nations in the area and then asked

...

if that statement of the representative of the
United States is still valid, and if so, is the
United States prepared to affirm that it is against
the territorial claims of Tel Aviv?^^-

Ambassador Goldberg's response was lengthy in turn.

150

He reviewed official United States efforts to solve the

various components which go to make up the Arab-Israeli
problem, reviewed the depth of U.S. commitment in 1956 and
the "even-handed" approach toward recent border problems

which included the Security Council call for the Government
of Syria to restrain raids launched from its territory and

the U.S. vote approving the unanimous Council censure of

Israel for the Es-Samu raid.

He also reminded the Council

of the Soviet Union's foot-dragging and charged over-

dramatization in terms of the gravity of the early situation while the U.S. was calling "for urgent action by this

council."

93

between May

The inability of the Security Council to act
21).

and June 5 and the incapacity of the Council

to pass a simple cease-fire resolution during the first two

days of hostilities were laid at the feet of "Soviet obstruc

Goldberg then compared the Soviet proposal to

tion."^^
running

a

film "backwards through the machine to that point

in the early morning of June 5 when hostilities had broken

out," with troops back on either side of
the buffer or a U.N. presence.
a

95

a

border without

Rather, foundations for

broad new peace must be created in the Middle East;

solutions must not be thought of as impossible, because
"for many years, they have not been tried really seriously."
The Council had a responsibility and a chance to get at the

deep-seatod ce.uses of 5ll the three wars in the Near E%3t:
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It is necessary to begin to move, not some day but
now, promptly while the memory of these tragic
events are still vivid in our minds, toward a full
settlement of all outstanding questions--'I again
repeat "all outstanding questions.
.97
.

.

Goldberg's hope was all-encompassing:
There are legitimate grievances on all sides of this
bitter conflict, and a full settlement should deal
equitably with all legitimate grievances and all
outstanding questions from whatever side they are
raised.
In short, a new foundation for peace must
be built in the Middle East. 93

Goldberg also foresaw

a

continuing role for the

Security Council:
agreements between the parties on these
profoundly contentious matters will take a long
time, but the United Nations, speaking, through
this Council, has an urgent obligation to facilitate
them and to help build an atmosphere in which
fruitful discussions will be possible. 99
.

.

.

The United States proposal was comprehensive,

sweeping, dramatic and perhaps too quick for those reasons
as have been pointed out earlier.

The Soviet resolution

was narrower and more open in its favoritism of one party.

Both apparently were difficult for the Council to accept.
The representative of Israel present at the meeting,
Reginald Kidron, rejected the anti-Zionist speeches of the

representatives of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and rejected
the Soviet draft resolution as "negative and one-sided.

"-'•^

The Ambassador from Morocco, Ahmed Taibi Benhima, provided
an insight into the depth of the Arab feeling towards

Zionism which is

a

part of the problem, and Mohammed

El-Kony, after castigating the U.S. for its alleged
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involvement in the attack, urged the Council to pass the

American draft. ^^"^

Shortly thereafter the Council adjourned

after rejecting a Soviet bid that its proposal be voted on
immediately.
At the convening of the l,360th Council session on

June

Lord Caradon attempted to lend some balance to

ll^.,

thinking.

members'

While recognizing representatives'

responsibilities to express national policies and defend
national interests, Caradon reminded them that they also
"are charged with a much heavier obligation."

People of

the world look to this august body to

make an effort to understand, to find common
.
ground, to harmonize the actions of nations
to seek just and honorable solutions, to establish
and keep a peace firmly based on international
authority. 102
.

.

.

Caradon asked for

a

.

.

"further supreme effort to work

together" and asked diplomatically that faces be turned

forward than backward:

"In the hope that we can set out

on the second phase of our work in a better spirit, I shall
103
Then Caradon
not go back over the past three weeks."

characteristically began to outline the specific rather
than broad or condemnatory steps to be taken:

(1)

the

area U.N. machinery should be strengthened; (2) Govern-

ment House in Jerusalem with its records and communications
staff
equipment should be returned to General Bull and his
and of new
by Israel; (3) the problem of civilian suffering
be alleviated and a
and larger numbers of refugees should

15

U.N. investigation should be undertaken concerning Arab

charges of Israeli pressure to coerce Arab civilians to
leave their homes; and

depute

that the Secretary-General

personal representative to help in restoring

a

peaceful conditions, and that the Security Council should
appoint

a

mediator to

.

.

undertake discussions with

the Governments concerned so that an immediate start can
be made in setting the foundations for
peace, "^^^

a

just and lasting

Throughout his speech, Lord Caradon never

wavered in his own faith and constantly sought to replenish the faith of those who might have wavered in the
ability of the United Nations to effectively discharge
its obligations in trust.

Caradon'

s

proposals were not acted upon.

While

surely they could not have been accepted except after

deliberation and harmonization of views, there was little
in them by themselves which could have caused rejection.
Had they been accepted, possibly the unfolding process

which culminated in resolution

2l]2

(196?) might have

been concluded more quickly.
Despite Roger Seydoux's statement as representative
of France that "conquest by force of arms cannot confer

the right to occupy a territory," France later abstained

from voting on the Soviet draft on the basis that "we
should work together to facilitate talks when the time
comes which could lead to agreements acceptable to all

parties.

"^^^

(Emphasis mine.)

But immediately thereafter, the Soviet Union draft

resolution postponed from the last session, was put to
the vote.

Voting occurred by operative paragraphs.

Con-

cerning the key points--condemnation and wi thdr8wal--only
four members out of the fifteen Council members-Bulgaria, India, Mali and the U.S.S.R. voted for the first
point, while the original four states were joined only by

Ethiopia and Nigeria on the second point of withdrawal.
No negative votes were cast.

abstained.

Instead, all other members

This may be taken to indicate

interpretations:

a

variety of

the Soviet resolution was too un-

yielding and too closed to compromise; Council members

had decided that Israel was not guilty of acts deserving
condemnation; or, that though Israel deserved condemnation such an act was dissonant with the search for

a just

and lasting peace in the Middle East--a search which de-

pended upon attitudes and the manner in which proposals

resonated as upon anything else.
Soviet intention to

.

.

Against

a

crystal-clear

oppose the United States draft

resolution and vote against it"^^^ because of its alleged
accommodation to Israeli violations of the Charter, Council
resolutions and international law, Ambassador Goldberg made

clear his nation's "desire to accommodate our views to that
of other members of the Council in the effort to find

common approach to the solution of

a

grave problem." 1 07
Tt

r.his
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One can hardly be surprised that the effort was unsuccessful

since the U.S. refused to compromise on the points either
of condemnation or unconditional withdrawal behind General

Armistice lines--points on which Moscow would not compromise
either.

No other resolutions were then put to the vote.

Hours later, the Council reconvened and quickly and

unanimously adopted Resolution 237 (196?) on June

ll|.

Resolution 237 stressed the urgent need to spare the

civilian population and prisoners of war in the Middle East

from further suffering while considering that inalienable

human rights are to be respected even during war and that
the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war should

be respected:

(1)

to ensure the safety, welfare and

security of inhabitants of areas where hostilities occurred
and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had

fled since their outbreak; (2) recommended to all concerned

Governments scrupulous respect of prisoners of war and
civilians relative to the Geneva Convention of
(3) requested the

1914-9;

and

Secretary-General to effectively implement

the resolution and report back to the Security Council.

1 03

Mutual exclusivisity is an analytical term of haunting

appropriateness here on certain of the major Soviet and

United States points:

unconditional versus conditional

withdrawal by Israel troops is an example.

Perhaps this is

what led the representative of the Soviet Union to announce

examination
"the Security Council has in fact concluded its
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of this problem at the present stage.

"-^^^

The Council adjourned amidst wide rumors that the

Soviet Union was about to request an emergency session of
the General Assembly to continue the press for fulfillment
of its goals.

There should be no misunderstanding by this time of
our view concerning the Soviet Union's behavior during
this period; certainly it was erratic when one compares
the delaying behavior of May with the sense of urgency

depicted in June.

But we have not commented in great

detail upon the behavior of the United States other
than to describe it.

At this point it may be instruc-

tive to examine briefly U.S. behavior during the 1956

Suez crisis to see what points emerge.

During the actual fighting in 1956, the United States
submitted two draft resolutions, one to the Security
Council and one to the first emergency special session
of the General Assembly.

U.N. Document S/3710,

October 30, 1956 noted "that the armed forces of Israel

have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation
of the General Armistice Agreement

..."

and expressed its

grave concern at this, but, most importantly to our

examination, called upon "Israel immediately to withdraw
its armed forces behind the established armistice lines."

Similarly, on November

1

11

the United States submitted a

draft resolution to the first emergency special sossion of
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the General Assembly {A/3256) which subsequently was adopted

by the Assembly and became Resolution 997 (ES-I) on
November 2, 1956.

After expressing grave concern over "the

disregard on many occasions by parties to the terms of the
Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 191+9," the French and

British military operations in Egypt, and the interruption
of the Suez Canal to traffic, urged "an immediate cease-

fire" and an end to the movement of military forces and
arms into the area.

Again, most important to our purposes,

A/3256 and 997 (ES-I) identically continued:

"urges the

parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw
all forces behind the armistice lines.

..."

In introducing A/3256 on November 1, United States

Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, cited the many
"expressions of hostility" by the Egyptian Government
toward the Israel Government and reviewed the "somewhat
laggard, somewhat impotent" U.N. action toward "the many

injustices inherent in the Middle Eastern situation."

But

then he went on:
If, however, we were to agree that the existence in
the world of injustices which this Organization has
so far been unable to cure means that the principle
of the renunciation of force should no longer be
respected, that whenever a nation feels that it has
been subjected to injustice it should have the right
to resort to force in an attempt to correct that
injustice, then I fear that we should be tearing this
Charter into shreds, that the world would again be a
world of anarchy.

We need only contrast these resolutions and words
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delivered during the U.N. proceedings in 1956 with the

documentation provided above to witness that U.S. formal,
official behavior in 196? was radically different from
that of 1956.

Certainly we should note that the 1956

situation involved something of

a

betrayal of French, but

especially British word and confidence to Dulles and

especially President Dwight D. Eisenhower

the

.

1967 war was "cleaner" in the sense of Israeli involvement

only and incredibly blundering Arab provocation including
the Syria-based commando activity, Nasser's request for

UNEF withdrawal (acted upon albeit too hastily by Thant

)

and his closure of the Straits of Tiran which lent to the

Israeli claim of self-defense

shallow case of 1956.

a

sounder ring than the truly

Whether because of fear of another

Viet Nam-type involvement, domestic pressures, previous

commitments, the nature of the Russian involvement and

consequent further polarization of the Middle East, or
other unknown factors--we can only speculate--President

Lyndon

B.

Johnson refused to direct U.S. policy to act

in conformance with norms of international law previously

espoused by the U.S. Government and applied to
situation of invasion following provocation.

a

similar

The United

States had the chance to deviate from the legal norm con-

cerning withdrawal in 1956 and it did not.

It had a similar

opportunity to deviate in 196? and it did.

president

Johnson, unlike President Eisenhower, chose not to exert
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influence upon Israel while it swiftly and decisively
seized the territory of an Arab state.
Israel had gone this route once before in 1956 and,
in the conflict between abidance with the U.N, resolutions

or serving her perceived national interest chose, in 196?,
the latter route.

No longer would it be possible to fire

shots into Israeli Jerusalem or possible to shell the

suburbs of Tel-Aviv, to place aircraft, or possibly

missiles in the Sinai closer to Jerusalem, more distant

from Cairo; no longer would Syrian army units look down
into Israel from the Golan Heights.
Israeli defense needs would be served as they had
not been fcr nineteen years.

Resolution 233 passed on

June 6 was not acceptable to the Arabs because it did not
label Israel as the aggressor nor call for her withdrawal.

This, despite the Soviet Union's vote for the cease-fire

adoption.

On June 7, cease-fire Resolution 22k was passed

unanimously.
Quickly, Jordan and Israel agreed to a cease-fire
113
"provided that the other parties accept" ^ in the case of

Israel and "except in self -def ense""^-^^*- in the case of
Jordan.

Egypt accepted the cease-fire on June

the same proviso for reciprocity.

Since June

8
7

troops had been rushing to the northeast front.

Ggain with
Israel

Fears that

to stop the
the Security Council might successfully attempt

attack and cause needless casualties and of Russian
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intervention restrained Moshe Dgyan from giving the
final
go-ahead until:
7:00 A.M. of June 9 ... the go-ahead thus came
nearly four hours after the representatives of Syria
and Israel in the Security Council had formally kccepted
a cease-fire injunction.
.

.

.

Syrian shelling of Israel had occurred in the prior
days of the war and was reported on June 9 also.

However,

given the extent of the Israeli gains--the road to Damascus
beyond Kuneitra, the Golan Heights and the headwaters of
the Banyas and Dan Rivers^^^--it is difficult to resist

the conclusion that in this instance Israel deliberately

did not heed the cease-fire resolutions of the Security

Council
Adherence to international law is not deemed to imply

jeopardizing the existence of the state; in this delineated
instance Israel deemed this area to be one of vital interest
and proceeded to take it, especially in light of the

commando activities of 1966-67.

On the other hand, Charter

Nations are not to employ the use of force in settling disputes among nations, nor are they to decide themselves that

compliance with U.N. resolutions is to occur only after the

desired goals of war are achieved.

The tension here concern-

ing the timing and taking of the Golan Heights between self-

interest and international law is an old and tragic one.
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ABSTRACT
The treatment of this topic is designed to show how
the United Nations was employed in a situation of crisis

and to trace the interactions of states, international law
and organization v/hich culminated in the passage of Resolution
2l\2,

Our three foci of investigatory interest are political,

legal and organizational.

We have sought to allow each

approach its position in accordance with their salient or
secondary natures at different junctures in the institutional
playing-out of this crisis.
A realistic study of the relationship between these

factors would begin with

a

review of the policies and

behavior of the area and superpower states which were
parties to the crisis.

Our particular concentration here is

upon the upswing toward war.
political.

Our framed reference is chiefly

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one whose elements

are of long standing.

The next section treats each issue

2

of this conflict in its legal form and explores
the case

which each of the direct parties makes, and whose
conflicting
tension is reflected in the United Nations and its
resolutions.
The third section traces the activities which occurred in the

United Nations from the period prior to the outbreak of war
through November 22, 196?.

Here we are concerned with the

relationships between states, international law and organization in the unfolding interplay which led up to the adoption
of Resolution 2[;2.

The concluding section expectedly sum-

marizes and draws judgements upon the points presented
earlier.

Our central view is of the United Nations as

a

vehicle

or instrument of political conflict or its resolution.

though the United Nations has been used as

a

Al-

vehicle or tool

of great power policy in the past to manage or contain

crises, this was one case in which the situation slipped
out from under great power control and posed an obstreperous

life of its own before the passage of Resolution

suggested the general outlines for
ment

.

a

21^2

which

potential peace settle-
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CHAPTER

IV

THE FIFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION
OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
A

letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
for

the U.SS.R. to the Secretary -General on
June 13, 196?

requested the prompt convening of an emergency
session
of the General Assembly.

The grounds stated were that

Israel had seized additional Arab territory despite
the

resolutions of the Security Council calling for
fire.

a

cease-

Therefore, under Article 11 of the Charter, the

General Assembly should convene to consider the situation
and to act to liquidate the fruits of "aggression" and
to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the

Armistice lines.
The fifth emergency special session of the General

Assembly convened on June 17, but actually did not get
down to business until June 19.
1967, 25 meetings were called and

put before the Assembly.

Between then and July 5,
7

Of these,

draft resolutions were
two were adopted and

were concerned with humanitarian assistance and refugees,
and with unilateral Israeli changes in the status of

Jerusalem.

All but one of the remaining five draft

resolutions were voted upon and rejected.

Between July 5
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and July 12, the General Assembly
recessed and the Security
Council met to hear mutual cross-charges
by Israel and the
United Arab Republic concerning violations
of the cease-fire

resolutions

When the General Assembly reconvened
on July 12 further discussion of the noncompliance of
Israel with the
previous Assembly resolution was discussed
and another,

stronger resolution relating to the status of
Jerusalem
passed.

Further discussions proved sterile and on July
21,
by Resolution 2256 (ES-V), the body decided to
temporarily

adjourn the special session and to request the Secretary-

General to forward Assembly records to the Security Council
so as to facilitate resumption by the Council as an urgent

matter.

The Assembly then adjourned until it reconvened

on September 18, 196? when it adopted Resolution 225?
(ES-V) expressing concern over the Middle East situation
and placing the matter on the agenda of the twenty-second

regular session as

a

matter of high priority.

As befits the superpower which sought the emergency

session attended by many Heads of Government and Ministers
for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the Soviet Union, Alexei Kosygin, on June 19 led off the

speakers.

Chairman Kosygin began by explaining that the

Middle East could explode again so long as Israeli troops

occupied conquered Arab lands and urgent measures were not
taken to eliminate the cor^seouences of aggression.

It is up
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to the Assembly to adopt those decisions
which might open

the way to peace in that area.

Speaking to the small

nations which comprise the bulk of the voting
members of
the Assembly, Kosygin noted:

there are many regions of the world where there
are bound to be those eager to seize foreign territories, where the principles of territorial integrity
and respect for the sovereignty of States are far
from being honoured.
If Israel's claims do not
receive a rebuff today, tomorrow a new aggressor, big
or small, may attempt to overrun the lands of other
peaceful countries
whether the United Nations
will be able to give a due rebuff to the aggressor
gives rise to anxiety on the part of many
States from the point of view of their own
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

security .2

This smooth blending of law, self-interest, the role
of the United Nations and the age-old fear of the small,

born of their vulnerability certainly found resonances

with some smaller nations.

Kosygin also tried to broaden

and polemicize the point by stating that Israel did not
act alone; that the aggression was aimed at toppling the

national independence regimes of the U.A.R. and Syria

which "evoke the hatred of the imperialists."-^
Chairman Kosygin repeated in

a

legal form the main

points of the Just-ended Security Council debates:
The Arab States, which fell victim to aggression,
are entitled to expect that their sovereignty,
territorial integrity, legitimate rights and interests which have been violated by an armed
attack, will be reconstituted in full and without
del ay. ^
In keeping with its general line of Security Council

days, the draft resolution which the Soviet Union introduced-
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called for the

vigorous condemnation of "Israel's
aggressive activities" and continuing
occupation of Arab
lands which constituted "an act
of recognized aggression";
(2) demanded that Israel "should
immediately and unconditionally withdraw ... its forces
behind the
armistice demarcation lines ... and
should respect the
status of the demilitarized zones, as
prescribed in the
(1)

.

Armistice Agreements;

(3)

.

.

in a new point, demanded full

and rapid restitution by Israel for its
aggression against
the aggrieved Arab States and their nationals
and "should

return to them all seized property and other
material
assets"; and {k) in a surprising point appealed
for con-

tinued use of the Security Council to "take

.

.

.

immediate

effective measures in order to eliminate all consequences
of the aggression committed by Israel."^

The last two points were novel and while (3) might
be dismissed as an upset over $2 billion loss of Soviet

military equipment in the Sinai alone,
tion as a hopeful indicator.

(I4.)

merited atten-

The Soviet Union apparently

had not totally excluded the Security Council as an appropriate and useful channel for possible action in the future.
If we add to

(k.)

another statement of Kosygin's that should

the General Assembly:

find itself incapable of reaching a decision in
the iniierests of peace, this would deal a heavy blow
to the expectations of mankind regarding the possibility
of settling major international problems by peaceful
means, by diplomatic contacts and negotiations. No
.

.

.
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state which genuinely cares for the
future of its
people can fail to take this into consideration.
The peoples should rest assured that the
United
capable of achieving the aims proclaimed
?^
in Its Charter, the aims of safeguarding
peace on
©arth
•

Coming at the very conclusion of Kosygin's speech
before
the General Assembly, this was no mistake; Soviet
com-

mitment to the United Nations was remaining in this affair.
This was

a

welcome sign.

Another such sign was the

Soviet awareness of the dangers of civilizational con-

flagration:
The problem concerns war and peace period.
In the
present tense international situation, hours or
minutes can settle the fate of the world. Unless
the dangerous developments in the Middle East
are curbed, if conflicts are permitted to spread,
the only possible outcome today or tomorrow would be
a big, world war.
And no single State would be able
to remain on the sidelines.^
.

.

.

On top of this conscious restraint on the world-

wide level came a statement of restraint on the area level

concerning recognition and enunciation of Israel's right
to exist:

"every people enjoys the right to establish

an independent national State of its own.

This constitutes

one of the fundamental principles of the policy of the

Soviet Union. "9
A final positive note was sounded when Kosygin noted:

Much depends on the efforts of the big Powers.
It
would be good if thoir delegations as well found a
common language in order to reach decisions meeting
the interests of peace in the Middle East and the
interests cf universal peace. ^0
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The Russian view here was based on the
primacy of

Israeli aggression.

Working off of this condemnation,

withdrawal and even restitution were requisite in
Russian
eyes in terras of international law if only the
"use of

force" according to Article 2 is accepted.

The fact that

Kosygin did not rule out further use of the channel of the

United Nations and indicated

a

willingness to find a

"common language" with the U.S. was

a

hopeful sign.

How-

ever, the case was not so clear, for the Charter also

rules out "threats" to use force.

And the Arab states

themselves had ruled out their total exoneration on this
count by their many threats against Israel prior to the
actual outbreak of fighting.

On June

a live speech broadcast domestically,

Israelis:

I4.,

for example, in

Nasser told the

"we are facing you in the battle and are burning

with the desire for it to start, in order to get revenge
for the 1956 treachery.

"-^-^

The Russian case here may be perceived on three
levels:

(1)

a

selective appeal to the precepts of inter-

national law to eliminate the reward of aggression; (2)

a

supportive commitment to the position of Arab states with
which, as we shall see, the Russian position was not

exactly consonant; and

(3)

a

shielded indication of the

U.S.S.R.'s willingness to seek an accommodation of some
sort on a superpower level built upon a continued com-

mitment to the existence of the state of Isirael.

What
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appears to emerge from this position

commitment to international law as

is not

a desire

so much a

to satisfy the

Arab states while avoiding the escalation
into worldwide

holocaust which was so much evident in Kosygin's
statement.
As the vote on it ultimately demonstrated,
the Russian

draft resolution was too partisan to gather
the required
two-thirds vote.
The Yugoslav draft resolution was delivered to the

Assembly by that country's Prime Minister, Mika Spiljak.
As a communist, albeit independent state and a firm friend

especially of the U.A.R.'s Gamal

/ibdul

Nasser, the Yugoslav

resolution called for Israel's immediate and unconditional
withdrawal on the basis that:
Any other approach would actually be tantamount to a
rewarding of the aggression and a sanctioning of
attempts aimed at solving disputes among States by
force ^'^
.

This was justified on the grounds that:
One cannot tolerate the realization of territorial
and other pretensions through the use of force, nor
is it permissible to employ this expedient to impose
political solutions violating the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and independence of States.
Solutions founded on coercion
.
are not
.
even durable.
In this case, too, such solutions
would give rise to general indignation, hatred and
resistance, which inevitably leads to new and more
serious conflicts, and is fraught with dangers to
world peace. 13
.

.

.

.

Israeli indemnification too was called for, but

only in bhe speech, not the draft itself.

This provides

an insight into the attitude of one of the drafters.
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responslbiU?v If
a?tac^!?l,^"''

^"^''""^"^.^tion atoms from the

compensation to the viotimro?^?hei on
r

Similarly to the Soviet position,
and in contradistinction to that of the
oue Axaos,
Arabs tha
t
line Vi,o.^
Yugoslav
view recognized the existence of Israel: "we
had maintained, until
the recent events, normal relations
with Israel, whose
existence we have never questioned."!^
But where
it was

in conformity with the Soviet and
Arab view of unilateral

Israeli recourse to aggression, in contrast
to these views,
the Yugoslav draft at least mentioned
negotiations:

There can be no negotiations prior to
execution of
the withdrawal, nor can there be any search
for
arrangements that would otherwise be necesssry
for
the long-term stabilization in the Near
East and
securing of the independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region, as long
as
the forces of the aggressor are not withdrawn
from
the occupied territory. 16

The original version of the draft resolution introduced
on June 28 was sponsored by Afghanistan, Guinea, India,

Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Somalia, Tanzania

and Zambia in addition to Yugoslavia.

Revised texts were

introduced on June 30, July

3

1 and

July

with Senegal and

Cambodia having joined the list of sponsors.
In its final version, what came to be termed as the

17-Power or Nonsligned draft called for:

(1)

Israel's imme-

diate withdrawal of its forces to the positions they held

prior to June 5> 1967;

(2)

requested the Secretary-General

to ensure compliance with the resolution and to secure, with
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the aid of the Security Council-established
UNTSO, the strict

observance by all parties with the General
Armistice Agreements; (3) further requested that the
Secretary-General
designate

a

personal representative to assist him in com-

pliance with this resolution and to be in contact
with the
concerned parties; (I;) called upon all States to
assist the

Secretary-General in every way possible in implementing
this Resolution in accordance with the United Nations

Charter;

(5)

requested the Secretary-General to urgently

report on compliance with this resolution to the General

Assembly and Security Council; and

(6)

requested that the

Security Council consider all of the Middle East situation
and seek peaceful solutions of all the problems--legal

political and humanitarian--through appropriate channels
guided by those principles contained in Articles

2

and 33

of the Charter.-^'''

This appeared to have

than the Soviet resolution.

a

better chance of passage
The sheer fact of sponsorship

alone was significant; the center of voting gravity had

shifted in the United Nations toward this bloc of third-

world States which were the principal sponsors.

The resolu-

tion coupled immediate and unconditional withdrawal with
more openness toward

a

negotiated settlement of long-standing

grievances; it spoke of intermediately utilizing UNTSO and
a

personal representative of the Secretary -General (in

accordance with the suggestion made earlier by India) to
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begin contact with the parties;
condemnation was not required in the actual draft resolution
itself.

In this and

its other provisions, this was more
proximate to the Arab
goals and case, though less partisan
than the Soviet

proposal.

Finally, the strong emphasis on immediate
and
unconditional withdrawal assuaged and appealed
to

the

national interests of small and vulnerable
new nations
while being in exact accordance with a strict
definition
of international law and certainly the principles
embodied
in the Charter.

The Arab position, like the Israeli one to be

examined below, was unto itself and though certainly

related to the Soviet position, was not an exact identity.

Condemnation and

a call for the

immediate and unconditional

withdrawal of Israeli troops were accompanied by an uncompromising stand against negotiations with Israel of any
sort--direct or indirect--an element of inflexibility

missing at least in kind from the Soviet position which
spoke gradually of negotiations on

a

big power level and

the 17-Power draft which ruled out negotiations, but only

until withdrawal occurred.

Jamil Baroody, Ambassador to

the United Nations from Saudi Arabia, in many points, one
of Washington's best Arab friends, underlined this in his

remark that;
The Arab world cannot accommodate Zionism in our
midst.
It is not a question of thousands of official
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statements. ... If our leaders did not reflect
the
mood of the Arab people, they would not remain
leaders,
ihls IS something which should be noted by all
countries, especially the Western countries which
were instrumental in creating Israel. They have
forgotten that this artificial State has destroyed
the indigenous people of Palestine. 18
Dr. Noureddin Atassi, Chief of State of the Syrian

Arab Republic dug this unrelenting position even deeper.

After noting that:

when Syria and Israel agreed to the cease-fire
.
ordered by the Security Council, the Israeli forces
of aggression had not yet occupied one iota of Syrian
territory.
It was after we informed Secretary-General
U Thant that we had ceased fire as from I63O GMT,
10 June, that the Israeli invasion of our territory
began. i9
.

.

Atassi then sought to broaden his appeal both by

referring to the imperialists who wish "to seize the raw

material [oil] of our homeland" and by calling up images
of the "law of the jungle" to smaller nations.

pointed out that:

would be that

ive

Atassi

"if we accept that logic, the result

admit the right of the stronger to con-

quer the lands of the weaker and retain them by force."
Atassi concluded with

a

pi

blending of self-interest, the

compatible self-interest of others, and an appeal to international law, and organization:
The problem does not belong to the Arabs alone, but to
every individual in the international community whose
country may one day be the victim of an invasion. To
condemn, therefore, the aggression, to liquidate its
fruit and to punish the aggressors not only is a
victory for the Arab people, who are the direct
victims, but it is a victory for International
Organization, for the principles of the United
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Nations and for all great and noble human values.

Despite this attitude which shall be of major
import
later, Dr. Atassi supported the Soviet draft
resolution.

Moreover, there certainly was no recognition of
Israel's
right to exist, as Kosygin had spoken of it.
This general stand was reiterated, though in more

cautious and moderate tones by the experienced and able

Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier of the United Arab Republic.
The Prime Minister of Sudan, M. A. Mahgoub, specifically

spoke to the Israeli claim to right of passage through
the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba.

He pointed out

that if Israel could calim the legitimate exercise of her

right to belligerency, in June, 1967, Egypt also had

a

right to a belligerent act--to close the Straits of Tiran
to enemy ships and cargo.

He too noted the Israeli

occupation of Elath about one month following the General
Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Mahgoub

went on to point out that Israel's massive attack was not

within the intent of the U.N. Charter's Article $1, since
Israel had not in point of fact been subjected to armed

attack.

He too pressed for immediate Israeli withdrawal,

but appeared more to favor the Soviet leaning toward com-

promise than to the Syrian view, for example, of no compromise with Israel.
Thus the Arab position seemed to be comprised of full
and unconditional withdrawal, condemnation of Israel and
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restitution— in full agreement with the Soviet Union.

But

the Arabs diverged from the Soviet Union by taking
a much

harder stand in general against negotiations stemming,
one
expects, from their deep feelings of betrayal and injustice
of repeated and decades standing.

Even Habib Bourguiba, Jr.

of Tunisia, a nation hardly noted for its inflexibility

toward this problem, clearly stated:

Although we continue to believe that war can offer no
solution for any problem, we likewise believe that it
is dangerous to drive a people to despair, to force
them to consider the problem of their survival and
their freedom only in terms of violence.
Some may consider that they have won the war.
They are mistaken. Violence is but a provocation to
violence, and the pernicious logic of war can be
demolished only by redress of the injustice.^iiIf one reads these carefully, one can apply these

remarks to the Israeli as well as the Arab side,

a

tregic

commentary on the reciprocity of the situation, though this

may not have been intended.

Bourguiba continued:

It is only a return to the status quo ante bellum that
will make possible an examination of tae chances for a
That solution cannot possibly be a part of
solution.
the booty of war or the consequences of a diktat
The evacuation of the occupied territories is a cgndition sine qua non of any prospect for a peace.
.

Bourguiba, Jr., then went down the line on the points
of condemnation, and repatriation, but imnediately tempered
it by his hope that:

being equally responsible for both the origins
and the subsequent development of a situation that has
constantly deteriorated ... is it possible to hope
that the great powers may concert their efforts today
.

.

.
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P^^Pose of opening up new prospects for a
restoration of the
ril^ht nf"f;o*p^r''!.^^^®^
'° '^^^^ ^onel.n6. and
thfir dLSty!?^'"''^'"^

A?Z

King Hussein of Jordan in the cadence of
his prose
was perhaps more qualified to speak of the
plight
of the

Palestinian people than any other official national
representative permitted to speak before the Assembly.

Hussein

not only ended, but began with the sense of injustice
felt

by the Arabs and Palestinians:

Today's war is not a new war, but part of the old war,
which will go on for scores of years if the moral and
physical wrong done to the Arabs is not righted. 27
This brave monarch spoke not of legal niceties, or

national interests, but certainly from his own heart and
those of many of his people when he stated to the Assembly:
If there is one military lesson to be learned from the
recent battle, it is that victory goes to the one who
strikes first. This is a particularly ironic and
dangerous lesson to be established. But one way of
establishing it is to reward the aggressor with the
fruits of his aggression. The members of this Assembly
should ponder well this point, or they will surely risk
setting a precedent which will haunt these halls and
the world for decades to come. 28

Or again:
Should this aggression not be condemned and should the
return of all our lands be delayed any further
Jordan will still survive. Ground down by sorrow for
the moment, we will rise again.
And with us will arise
the Arab Nations.
It is apparent that we have not yet
learned well enough how to use weapons of modern warThe battle which
fare.
But we shall if we have to.
a battle in
become
only
then
began on June 5th will
political
state of David
what will be a long war. The
That of the crusaders
and Solomon lasted only 70 years.
It might be well for Israel to re-read
just under 100.
its history. 29
.

.

.
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The Arab position was similar to

a

montage in some

respects by the very division of the
Arab world into disparate, sovereign parts.
From the unrelenting stand of
Syria to the more conciliatory one
of Tunisia, variation
was in evidence.
But if there were then unities to
the
total position, they lay in the Arab
demand for condemnation and withdrawal of Israel and a unanimity
on the necessity to recognize the injustice committed and
continually

perpetrated upon the Arab people of Palestine.

The Yugoslav

resolution not only had a good chance of passage,
but in-

corporated the key Arab demand:
withdrawal.

immediate and unconditional

This was necessary before any other aspect of

the issue could be examined.

If,

said Arab representatives,

the aggressor is permitted to keep these fruits of aggression, this would encourage other states to strike first,
to use force, to expand at will and endanger the terri-

torial integrity and political existence of neighboring

states--contrary to the very basis of international law.
The foundation not only of international law, but organization would then be violated and endangered.

There was a

legal and United Nations precedent for withdrawal, but this

was not being insisted upon in 196? as it was in 1956.
Sadly, while they railed against the illegality of
the Israeli use of force, there was no mention of the Arab

threats to use f orce--equally illegal under Charter

Article

2.

Reciprocity is also fundamental to law.

Whether
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one believes that Nasser deviously meant to attack Israel
in league with

a

malicious Moscow, sought to use the

presence of force to gain

a

diplomatic victory but still

was confident to test Arab armed forces against those of

Israel if it came to that, or as a character in search of
a role,

this time stumbled upon an improvisational

,

un-

written scenario whose major content was bluff than
actuality and whose outcome was hoped to be more peaceful
than warlike

— whatever

line one's attitude leads him to

selectively accept or reject, the reality of Arab threats-by act and word--to force and to the peace cannot be
denied.

30

One can plead that they meant what one said or

that Arab rhetoric should be kept in context, but if one
is to apply a strict interpretation to use of force, the

same is only fair for threats.

Here politics truly intrudes upon the legal milieu.

Arabs saw the war as merely another in
immoral expansions by

a

a

long series of

state never welcomed into the area

whose creation to house refugees to right the immemorial

wrong of European anti-semitism, especially after World

War II, committed

a

wrong against the right of immemorial

inhabitants of Palestine by not permitting them to return
and thus creating new refugees;

exclusivist and alien

a

state whose ideology was

to the Middle East; whose support b

the imperialist powers was proof of a desire to perpetuate
its
and extend imperialism by new means; and which now, by
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actions threatened the territorial
integrity of neighboring
states in a manner which violated
international
law and

flouted respect for the United Nations.
itself was

The State of Israel

bitter fruit to the Arabs, a
construction whose
essence and creation was a denial and
derogation
a

of the

rights of others.
In this context the threat and use
of force was felt

Justified by Arabs in the effort to reestablish
the
legitimate state in Palestine.

But this does not help to

establish or reestablish the rule of law in this region
concerning this problem.

Perhaps this is both the strength

and flaw of international law in this si tuation--that
it

cannot, but is being used to legitimate two different outcomes to

a

single problem.

On the more specific point,

however, it was not the principle of withdrawal which was
at issue at this time, but whether it should be conditional

or unconditional and to which territorial point it should
occur.

The next position to be examined is that of the United
States.

The American position essentially was based upon the

"five principles" of President Lyndon Johnson:

Our country is commit ted- -and we here reiterate that
commitment today--to a peace that is based on five
principles
First, the recognized right of national life.
Second, justice for the refugees.
Third, innocent maritime passage.
Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms
race.
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And fifth, political independence and territorial
integrity for all. 31
Like the Soviet representative, Ambassador Arthur

Goldberg basically recapitulated his Security Council
position.

Recounting that the basic reason for the past

decades of crisis in the Middle East was the failure of
the parties to deal with the underlying causes of tension,

Goldberg asked that these causes finally be grappled with
and a permanent, not "band-aid" type solution be sought.

Recounting the United States view of how the current
crisis unfolded, Goldberg spoke of how the "major in-

sulator" for peace in the Middle East, UNE?, "was stripped
away";-^

how peace, then held by

thread as the Secretary-

a

General journeyed to Cairo and the Security Council vapidly
debated, was stymied.

Concerning the start of the war,

Ambassador Goldberg said only:
of peace was broken,

"-^^

"Early on June 5 the thread

and then went on to deny charges

that the United States obstructed the activity of the

Security Council and countered by referring to his country's

willingness to accept

a

cease-fire without debate and with-

out delay right up through the fighting on the Syrian

front.

Other states obstructed, bickered and falsely accused

the United States of military intervention on the side of

Israel.

The previous day the Soviet Union had introduced

before the General Assembly

a

"essentially the same as that

draft resolution which was
.

.

.

which the overwhelming
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majority of the Council refused to accept. u3k

The repre-

sentative of the United States then repeated his earlier
simile about how under the Soviet proposal:

"the film is

to be run backwards through the projector" such that all

the tinder which had previously caused war shall be present
in the same places again. 35

This, said Ambassador Goldberg,

was not the way to get at the grievances which had caused
three wars in nineteen years.

The United States proposed

its own draft resolution toward the striving for real

Hopefully this would prove the basis for real peace

peace.

rather than just renewed hostilities.
The United States draft resolution bore in mind the

previous cease-fire resolutions and invoked regard for the

purpose of the United Nations--to harmonize the actions of
nations.

Substantive paragraphs:

(1)

endorsed previous

cease-fire and called for their scnipulous respect;

(2)

set

the objective of the General Assembly as a "stable and

durable peace";

(3)

considered that this should be achieved

by means of "negotiated arrangements with appropriate
third-party assistance" based on:

(a)

"mutual recognition

of the political independence and territorial integrity of
all area countries" to include those steps that will give

them security against terror, destruction and war

"disengagement and withdrawal of forces,
innocent passage," (c)

a

(b)

freedom of

"just and equitable solution of

18?

the refugee problem,"
(d) "reeigtr«i-^
registration and limitation"
of
arms shipments to
the Middle East
m
^
«nH
^""^
®) "recognition" of
the right of all
sovereign nations "to
^° exist
^xist in peace and
iL
"^°
security.

m

The nnited states
p.opo.al regained as
long-te™ and
b-ad ae ever and even „o.e
so with the addition
or area
a™s-li„itations. While inclusion
was .ade or the alternative third-party
assistance in negotiations,
there was no
mention or specirio
itci^o ^j
iiio steps
to _
y
reduce
tensions or to help
^.ring the concerned
parties to that stage.
„ost importantly,
while disengagement and
withdrawal was c ailed ror,
there
was no mention of the
point to which the parties
should
withdraw and no call for
unconditional withdrawal:
the

Israel Government would still
be free unier the United
States formulation to link
withdrawal to other conditionsto use fruits of their
conquest to extract peace terms
favorable to itself as the Arab
states.
It is worth quoting the
operative paragraph 3(a) of

the draft resolution itself:

i

:pL^nrdfs-g^i:i;n?

^^-^

:r?^f:
that will give them security against
-lerror?
destruction and war.jJ?

^

*

We should note that this is quite aexpansion upon
President Johnson's original statement of
June 19 which
simply read "... fifth, political indep-ndence
and

188

territorial integrity for all."
Finally, it appeared that the
formula for negotiations
called for in the U.S. draft
resolution placed too much
implicit stress upon potential
face-to-face negotiations
to be acceptable to the Arabs.
Moreover, it was premature
to call for them at this early
stage.
The United States
formulation remained as broad in its
long-term orientation
as the Soviet proposal remained
narrow in its short-term
orientation.

While full of long-term goals which were
worthy of
ultimate realization, the United States
position was devoid
of those shorter-stepped, nearer goals
which help get to

the more distant ones.

unlike

a

In addition, this administration,

previous one, more highly respected Israel's

perception of her vital interests in that complex interplay of legal principle, national interests and pragmatic

reality termed decision-making.
Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel,

pleaded the Israeli case with his usual eloquence.
case began with the de facto and de
State of Israel

—a

Arab Governments.

.jure

His

existence of the

fundamental point of denial by the

Foreign Minister Eban found the single

and "true origin of the tension which torments the Middle

East "to lie in the fact that:
Israel's right to peace, to security, to sovereignty,
to economic development, to maritime freedom indeed,

—
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its very right to exist— hag been
forcibly aeniea
denied
and aggressively attacked. 38

^

After

a

long outline of Arab-Israel relations
since

Eban reviewed the chronology of events
in May- June,
1967 denying the charge of troop concentrations,^"^
191|8,

severely criticizing U Thanfs accession
to Cairo's request
for the withdrawal of UNEF and citing numerous
instances
of the verbalized Arab intent to destroy Israel.

Of UNEF

itself and similar international peace-keeping forces,

Eban said:
Israel's attitude to the peace-keeping functions of
the United Nations has been traumatically affected by
this experience.
What is the use of a fire brigade
which vanishes from the scene as soon as the first
smoke and flames appear?
Is it surprising that we
are resolved never again to allow a vital security to
rest on such a fragile f oundation?^0

Turning to the question of the Straits of Tiran, Eban
stated:

The blockade is by definition an act of war
never in history have blockade and peace existed
side by side.
From May 21; onward, the question of
who started the war or who fired the first shot
became momentously irrelevant. There is no difference in civil law between murdering a man by
slow strangulation or killing him by a shot in the
head. From the moment the blockade was imposed,
active hostilities had commenced and Israel owed
Egypt nothing of her Charter rights. ^i
.

.

.

This certainly was a rejection of the three-power draft

which called for the parties' compliance with the General
Armistice Agreements and of Kosygin's charge of aggression.
Eban noted:
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morning of 5 June, when Egyptian
rL^o movedfateful
forces
by air and land against Israel 3 western
coast and southern territory, our country's
choice
was plain
our nation rose in self -defense 1+2
•

.

.

.

.

Forcefully accusing the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan
of aggression, Abba Eban then turned to the
Soviet Union.

After detailing the Soviet's contribution to the area arms
race and charging Russia with an alarmist, then obstructive
role in the latest crisis, Eban reviewed the Security

Council use of the Soviet veto in the interest of the
Arab states and concluded that:

The Council has become a one-way street.
The
consequences of the Soviet policy have been to deny
Israel the possibility of just and equitable treatment in the Security Council, and very largely to
nullify the Council as the constructive factor that
it should be in the affairs of the Middle East. 4-3
.

.

.

After accusing the Arab states of shattering the
whole "fabric and texture" of post-1958 interstate relations,

including Armistice Agreements, UNTSO and the MAC's, and
the old demarcation lines, Eban urged that the concerned

states look not backward, but forward.

withdraw from acts of belligerency and
advance toward

a

He urged that they
a

state of war, and

negotiated peace of recognition, agreed

frontiers and security arrangements.

He called for a final

peace, and promised "durable and just solutions "^^ but
,

then returned to the terms always unacceptable to the

Arabs of face-to-face negotiations, Arab recognition of
Israel and

a

broad hint that the Old City of Jerusalem
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would not be returned to Jordan,
given
Further, Eban asked the Great Powers

peace settlement>^

a

to "remove our

tomented

region from the scope of global
rivalries," advised other
small nation-members of the Assembly
that "experience
teaches us that small communities can
best secure their
interests by maximal self-reliance"^^ and
asked even the
United Nations "to respect our independent
quest for the
peace and security which are the Charter's
higher ends."^"^
.

In apposition to the Arab's denial of
recognition,

Eban asserted Israel's right to exist.

As a member of the

United Nations and of the community of nations, Israel
had
a right,

asserted Foreign Minister Eban, to exist and to act

to ensure the lives and security of its citizens, especially
in this Charter age.

Certainly this is

a

basic right

accorded recognized States in international law.

blockade was set in

a

The

legal context and termed not another

aspect of belligerency, but

a

provocatory act of war aimed

at a vital interest which Justified a military operation of

self-defense.

Israeli distrust of international peace-keeping

forces and of the Security Council core of the United
Nations' peace-keeping was described.

As students of this

crises we note that these bodies, because they possess no
will or strength of their own, except insofar as others

allow them, had not served the interests either of peace

or equity exactly for either side.

Eban rejected the

Soviet draft resolution, and instead proposed direct
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negotiation, recognition of Israel and

a

bright dream of

progress, cooperation and growth for the entire area once
a

settlement was reached in accordance with Israel's out-

lines.

However, direct negotiations, as important as they

will be, for clarity of understanding between the parties

when and if

a

settlement is ever reached, was anathema

especially at this early juncture to the Arabs and probably
sensed as so by the Assembly membership.

Arab stubborn-

ness on these issues matched that of Israel on withdrawal.
In point of fact, the Israeli position said nothing to the

issue of withdrawal.

And as one astute observer of the

United Nations points out:
In light of the Charter of the United Nations, to

which Israel is a party, a matter such as withdrawal
falls within the clear directions of the law of the
United Nations. It is not one that can be left to
negotiation unless those negotiations are circumscribed within the framework of the accepted legal
position, which, of course, would take care also of
Israel's legitimate rights and interests. Would it
not have been wiser for Israel at this juncture to
make specific its adherence to the principles and
injunctions of the Charter and to pledge itself to
act accordingly? A plea for negotiations within
this framework would have had much more impact on the
General Assembly. M-O
Israel rejected the 17 -Power proposal which called

for unconditional withdrawal.

Israel had withdrawn in

19^7 on the basis of an "understanding" with Washington.

This was

a

grave error in the Israeli view as the with-

drawal of UNEF and closure of the Straits proved.

If

Israel evacuates the occupied territories before the
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Arabs agree to make peace,

a

similar situation could easily

spring up again, as Israel saw it.

demonstrated

Since the U.N. had not

a

competence to protect Israel's vital
interests, Israel felt justified in
holding out for a conditional withdrawal-conditional
upon a peace agreement
in line with Eban's outline.
This matter, said Eban, was
not one which can be settled under
U.N. or even great
power auspices as well as it can be settled
by direct

negotiations between the parties themselves,
independent
of all other States or organizations.

This is a stand

of hard state self-interest so typical of
that prime

characteristic of Israeli foreign relations— the very

intensity of its conduct and policy.
Throughout the early Assembly proceedings, very little
was heard from the Latin American States.

Distant from

the scene of conflict, but interested in its outcome for

reasons of world peace, the Latin American delegation in

their speeches and in the draft resolution they introduced

injected

a

strong emphasis on juridical and especially

Charter principles into the proceedings.

Moreover, this

reliance on principles was leavened with

a

strong dose of

pragmatism and specific, practical steps which were possible
and homologous with international law.

Not only legal

theory, but practical action was stressed.

We wish to

extract the flavor of some of the many speeches delivered,

for to this single resolution can be attributed

a

great

191^-

deal that was vital to the passage of

21^2

(196?).

Nicamor Coste Mendez, Foreign Minister of Argentina,
set the tone by referring to both the Arab and
Jewish
cotnmunities peacefully resident in Argentina and to
"the

need for

a

scrupulous respect for the legal principles

that govern relations among States. "^^

He spoke of his

faith in the Security Council as having both "sufficient
authority and ability to handle the issue," and to provide adequate machinery to lastingly solve the problem.

Four times, one after another, he repeated in almost
identical language his hope:
that this Assembly will not take a purely
political stand. We do expect and hope
that
its objective will not be vitiated and it will
not be diverted from its true mission: to bring
peace to the Middle East as soon as possible. 5l
.

.

.

.

.

.

Pointing out that his Government would no more vote
for

a

condemnation of Israel than for the Arab States, he

went on to speak of the individuality of the state of

belligerency
the state of belligerency could not be invoked
only in order to accept part of the logical consequences
flowing from the principles governing such a state.
If it be invoked in order to give legal justification
to certain circumstantial and specific limitations of
some general principles, then all its other consequences must also be admitted. 52
,

.

.

Finally, Costa Mendez powerfully called for
to the Charter principles found in Articles

1

a

return

and 2.

Ambassador Julio Caesar Turbay Ayala of Columbia
perhaps best verbalized the basis upon which the Latin
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American States sought to make their contributions:
Our strength emanates from our unauestioned
impartiality concerning this problem. Columbia,
well as other American States, is not committed as
to
any of the parties to the military confrontation.
Our only commitments are those born of respect for
the rule of law, for our international obligations,
and our duty as a Member of the United Nations and
of the American regional system. 53

With great understanding and insight into the psychological dynamics of the problem, Turbay Ayala continued:
One of the many distortions that war produces is that
each belligerent believes himself to be the sole
possessor of trust and Justice. We know of no case
in which those who have gone to the extreme of a
military confrontation have ever recognized in their
opponents the slightest degree of reason. When
situations become critical belligerents do not display toward neutral parties the understanding and
tolerance that they so fervently clairc for their own
cause.
Because of these special considerations, we
venture to presume that neither Arabs nor Jews will
be satisfied with our statement, since combatants
consider only their allies as friends. And we, in all
truth, are not their allies, but are certainly their
friends.SM-

Positing the unoriginal, but welcome view that "the
paths of understanding do not lie at the extremes, that

they lie rather along the middle of law, reason and
justice, "^^

Turbay Ayala, along with the other Latin

American representatives injected that note of juridicality,
responsibility and ominouaness perhaps most eloquently
expressed by Ambassador Don Leopold Benito of Ecuador when
he asked the Assembly:
to bear in mind the cri-?is of the League of
,
.
Nations which led to the most ghastly holocaust of
history, and that it was born of the abandonment of
,
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the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of S?f?es
'^'^^^
o/peace?ul se^t?;.
^
ment nr'^r' 't^^'^ disputes.
On
this principle
r«^^ ^hi""''^''^^"^
existence of the international communi?v and,
«nd
munity
therefore, of the United Nations. 56
In keeping with this approach.
Foreign Minister

Nicanor Costa Mendez of Argentina said:

.in the present circumstances the simple withdrawal of forces would not bring with it a
return
to peace.
We believe that withdrawal must be a condition concomitant with a cessation of the state
of
belligerency if it is to have a truly logical meaning
and juricical basis. Thus, once free from
compulsion,
the parties themselves could seek solutions and
voluntarily abide by the commitments assumed. 57
.

.

In keeping with the above, the first operative

paragraph of A/L. 523, June 30, 196?, the Latin American
draft resolution, urgently requested the withdrawal by
Israel from occupied territories conditional with the

ending of the state of belligerency by the parties in
conflict, to establish "conditions of coexistence based on

good neighborliness" and to have recourse to Charter
channels for a peaceful settlement in all cases.

Turbay Ayala of Columbia stated:
conquest through the use of force, whatever
.
.
.
its background cannot be legitimized.
Therefore,
Columbia could not endorse a recommendation by
an international organization which would impose
a modification of the territorial boundaries of
Member States v.'ithcut the voluntary consent of
those States. 58
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In conformity, the second operative
paragraph of the

Latin American draft resolution reaffirmed
its conviction
that "no stable international order
can be based on the
threat or use of force" while denying
recognition
to the

valid occupation or acquisition of territories
brought
about by such means.
The beginning of the third operative paragraph
of
A/L. 523 (1967) requested the Security Council
to continue

examination of the Middle East situation.

As Foreign

Minister Costa Mendez, led up to it:
the Security Council should then, with strict
.
and wise determination, undertake the analysis of the
present situation and its immediate and remote origins,
which we consider indispensable as a foundation for
peace .59
.

.

Operative paragraph 3(a) of the Latin American draft
called for the Security Council to carry out operative
paragraphs (a) and (b) which provided for Israeli withdrawal
and a termination of the state of belligerency.

Just as

Ambassador Enrique Garcia Sayan of Peru unequivocally
called for:

affirmation and recognition of the right of
.
Israel to free transit of its ships through the
Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of
.

.

Aqaba.°0
So, operative paragraph 3(c) called for the

"guarantee [of]

.

.

.

freedom of transit on the inter-

national waterways in the region."

Foreign Minister Jos6 de Magalhaes Pinto of Brazil
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spoke on the need of

.

.a fomal

guarantee on the part

of the Government of Israel to
settle the problem of the
refugees on equitable and permanent
bases" in addition to:
^'''^
settlement of all pending?
;r»;Ki\'^®^°!'^^?^?'?^
problems,
including, on the basis of mutual
consen?
establishment of demilitarized zones b^
l^l ^""t^'^T^
solution envisaged in ?he
Sr^'"^''^
Charter

^

.

Accordingly, operative paragraph 3(c) of
A/L. 523,
June 30, 196? coupled an appropriate and
complete solution
to the refugees'

problem with guarantees of territorial

inviolability, and political independence and the
estab-

lishment of demilitarized zones.
Similarly, de Magalhaes Pinto spoke of his hope for:
the placing of Jerusalem under perm.anent international administration, with special guarantees for
the protection of the Holy Places with a " corpun
separatum " in accordance with the spirit of the United
Nations General Assembly resolution of 29 November
.

.

.

19i;7.°2

So, operative paragraph

I4.

of the Latin American

resolution reaffirmed the desirability of an international
regime for Jerusalem to be considered at the twenty-second

session of the General Assembly.
It is not easy to try to assess the significance of

the Latin American resolution.

There were reports that

because it coupled withdrawal with the termination of

belligerency, the United States supported this resolution
in an effort to defeat the draft resolution originally

put forward by Belgrade. ^-^

Had there been only one
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resolution favoring withdrawal and given
the Assembly
sentiment in its favor, a two-thirds
majority for the
Yugoslav resolution might have been within
closer reach.
But two such resolutions split the vote
too broadly.
While
Israel predictably rejected the Yugoslav
resolution which
she perceived as only slightly less partisan
than
the

Soviet Union's, Jerusalem was only lukewarm about
the Latin

American proposal.

While it provided

a

quid pro quo on

the question of withdrawal (even allowing for its
emphasis
on territorial changes without the voluntary consent
of the

involved states), it did not provide for direct negotiations
while

a

larger role for the United Nations was provided

than Israel desired in her independent quest for peace.

The Arab states in the full realization of the slim
chances for passage by the Soviet draft resolution fell

back on the draft of the 17-powers, for

provided for the

it

unconditional, immediate withdrawal by Israel which the
Arabs saw as a sine qua non before movement was possible.
A diktat by Israel was intolerable and another war was

likely unless Israel withdrew.

Expectedly, the Latin

American resolution did not arouse enthusiasm among the
Arab states due to the conditional nature of the envisaged

withdrawal
It was the constancy, conviction and concert with

which the Latin American states--Argentina

,

Bolivia, Brazil,

Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El-Salvador,
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Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Venezuela-

presented their views both formally and
behind the scenes
which may have comprised their greatest
impact.

And, of

course, that impact was wrapped around
the Latins' reliance

upon the juridical approach and the
institutions of the
United Nations and its Charter principles.
Throughout,
their speeches, reasoning and proposals were
filled with
reliance upon and citation of sound legal
principles.
Not seeking to favor one party over another, aware
of the

political, psychological, historical and legal
complications
in the matter and seeking the broadest sort
of consensus,
the Latin American efforts and draft resolution,
while

not totally dissimilar to all preceding resolutions, was

sufficiently distinguishable in its constant thrust to
impress a distinctive and necessary juridical awareness

upon the milieu which had not been present, unfortunately,
in the same manner before their concerted activity.

Outside of the actual combatants, member support and

criticism of the various draft resolutions was varied.
Ambassador Goldberg objected to the Yugoslav text on
number of grounds.

a

The very first criticism was very

important

Operative paragraph 1 concerning withdrawal, could net
be more clear and definite.
Operative paragraph 6,
concerning "all aspects of the situation," is vague
in the extreme.
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There was, then, no connection between withdrawal
and
the claims of belligerency— "claims which are
among the

leading causes of all the troubles in the past."^^

on the

other hand, the Latin American texc--"recognizes that we

face

a

situation the two aspects of which are interdepen-

dent--that neither aspect can be solved in isolation from
the other."

66

The American Ambassador went on to praise

the "concrete guidelines" and recognition of "just

grievances on both sides" found in the Latin American
text;

"unfortunately neither of these claims can be made

for the Yugoslav

text."^'''

The representative of the United

States cited the refugee problem, international maritime

passage and the status of Jerusalem as three such areas.
It is interesting to note the divorce between the U.S.

and Israel on the questions of refugees and the status of

Jerusalem herein recorded.

Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister

of the Soviet Union, responded.

Playing to the non-aligned

sponsors of the 17-Power draft resolution "the majority of

which have recently become free from imperialist oppression
and know full well what aggression and what foreign occupa-

tion is,"

Gromyko then went on to state:

This draft resolution qui^e correctly puts into the
first place the question of the withdrawal of Israeli
Only
troops from the territories they now occupy.
of
normalization
the
this decision can bring about
aggressor
the situation in the Middle East. The
cannot be allowed to wait for a prize. This is a
question of principle. ^'^
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Similarly to the U.S., the Soviet
Union too demonstrated the space between its stand
and that of the Arabs
when Gromyko continued:
discussions and conversations between
representativ^^ of various countries, a
sentatives
quently expressed to try even now towish was very frebridge th7gap
^'^^^ questions delating to
th^
M?H^ East. The draft resolution
the Middle
presented by
the non-aligned countries also meets
this wish
the troops must be withdrawn immediately,
and theA
there will be a much more peaceful
atmosphere than
now in order to achieve progress in all
the other
questions--I emphasize the word "all" questions-which have accumulated on the sidelines. Then
there
would be revealed those possibilities which
have
been provided for in the draft resolution of
the nonaligned countries. '0
*

Clearly the positions of the great powers were
less

frozen in than those of the actual combatants who
felt
their vital existence to be more threatened, and
were

deeply committed to psychological orientations, one
toward the other, which precluded the trust so essential
to endeavors such as these.

Britain and Prance, with minor

modifications of the relevant texts, lined up behind the
Latin American and Non-aligned draft resolutions, respectively.'^'^

Abba Eban of Israel described the Yugoslav proposal
as

"one sided, backward-looking and totally indulgent to

the continuation of belligerency."'^^

Eban saw only

a

return

to the dangers of the past with the Sinai "a springboard

for renewed aggression," the Golan Heights where "Syrian
guns would again threaten," Tiran where "blockades would
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be reinstated.
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Certainly, all of these were security

considerations par excellence.

Eban went on to describe

the veto-bound discussion of the Security Council
prior to
the outbreak of war when:

not only that the Security Council could not act,
but that it could not even speak, could not even utter
a single word in a resolution against the growing
.threat to Israel's existence
the deadly design
of politicide--the murder of a State. 714.

.

.

.

.

.

Describing "how slender, how fragile" is the present
mood and structure of great power relationships on which
Israel is being asked to rely, Foreign Minister Eban cited
the present Arab refusal to recognize Israel "as

within the terms of the Charter

.

.

.

a

state

with which it is

their will and intention to live together in peace as

good neighbors."

7^
-"^

Eban rejected the Yugoslav resolution.

Turning to

the Latin American draft, Eban stated Israel's principles:
(1)

a

linkage of withdrawal with "the establishment of

peace";

(2) that in a peace settlement,

"vital security

interests" must be taken account of; (3) "total and

permanent elimination of the Aqaban and Suez Canal
blockade;

(i;)

that "sovereign States have the right and

duty to fix their permanent frontiers by mutual agreement
amongst themselves"; and (5) to provide and preserve the

complete unity and peace of Jerusalem and access to all its

Holy Places" consonant with Israel's unchanging views on
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tectorial intem.tionali.ation. ^6

ciea.ly. Israel was

unsatisfiod with the Latin
American d.aft .esclution.
also Should note the gap
with the American
position.

We

The representative of
India. Ambassador
Parthasarathi
probably gave the clearest
and most succinct formulation
of
the core of both the Arab
and non-aligned positions:
^^^ftl^e latin American
dr;fi fanrshorrof^he'.o
j.axj.a aaort oi the
accepted Drini-i-nio oi-,^
primary objective which I
men^ioned e-rUer
^^--^-^-^e^it
couples withdrawals with l-h«
issues, and thus it leToJs a
^^^g^^ning
from a position of strength by rl^^^^^^
l^ael
is that it would lead to\
deLlocTb;c;u;e\rLir"
not give primacy to the central
issue of iLil- J
withdrawal.
No State Member of the Un?fpH r?-^^®
particularly no small stat^^ could
ever ^^reeio"''
negotiate so long as alien armed
forces rfmain on if,
soil and it is subjected to duress???
.

A more lucid exposition of
the clash between the

parties and between the right both
sides claimed can be
imagined. Here too the tragedy is
as if isolated for our
examination of its components: divergent
rights claimed
and Justified to the same issue and
land at once, both
sets isolated, with no points of connection
or mutuality,
both stands intense and adamant. Here too,
the superpowers presented stands divergent from those
of the

conflicting parties, but were unable or unwilling
to exert
the influence necessary to resolve the situation
to which

both had contributed so mightily for so loog.

Foreign Minister Sharfuddin Pirzada insightfully expressed perhaps the key factor in the Arab stand:
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^^^^ Israel's aggression has
inflicted It
the deepest physical and psychological
wounds.
How can it be expected that after such
a traumatic shock, the two sides will
begin to
negotiate the terms of a just and lasting peace,
unless withdrawal of Israeli forces are first
carried out
.

On July

1;,

'

votes were taken on the non-aligned,

Soviet and Latin American draft resolutions unfortunately

before the former and latter groups had had more time to

work toward

.

a

possible compromise

'''^

The vote on the

non-aligned draft resolution was 53-i;6-20--( affirmativenegative-abstention) --a majority, but not the two-thirds
required.

The Soviet proposal was voted upon by separate

operative paragraphs:
57-36-23;

(2)

(1)

relative to condemnation failed

which urged immediate and unconditional with-

drawal was rejected

i|8-i;5-22;

concerning restitution

(3)

by Israel was turned down by a vote of
operative paragraph

(Ii.)

5l|--3ll.-28

;

and

which appealed for continued

use of the Security Council to eliminate the "conse-

quences" of Israeli "aggression" was voted down by
5i4--36-26.

No vote was taken on the draft in its entirety.

The Latin American draft resolution also failed to get the

necessary two-thirds majority by

a

margin of 57-^4-3-20.

We must note that an Albanian draft resolution which
was more severe than the Soviet draft in its insistence on

condemning Israel failed by
should also note that

a

a vote of

22-71-27.

81

We

Cuban amendment to the Non-aligned

draft which called for the condemnation of Israeli
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aggression and its "principal instigator the imperialist

Government of the United States of America" against the
Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces

went down to defeat by

a

roll-call vote of 20-78-22.

Finally, an Albanian amendment to the draft introduced

by Yugoslavia which urged the strong condemnation of
Israeli aggression was defeated by a margin of 32-66-20.®^
It would be instructive to briefly review the com-

position of the various voting blocs.

The Non-aligned

draft resolution attracted the votes, of course, of every

Arab and Communist state, most Asian and African countries
and even the assent of France, Greece, Spain and Turkey in

addition to the U.S.S.R.

Negative votes were cast by the

Latin American group, the remaining NATO and West European
states, the white Commonwealth countries, some African

countries, China, Ireland, Israel, Phillipines, United

Kingdom and the United States.

Naturally, positions were

reversed in the case of the Latin American draft, except

for the abstentions of both France and Israel.
A few conclusions can be drawn from this.

First, the

Assembly obviously was not in favor of condemning any party
Not only was the Assembly

to the conflict for aggression.

unwilling to assay guilt, but

a

move such as this, whatever

the situation, would not be conducive to encouraging the
two parties to draw together in

a

mutually agreeable, just

and lasting peace settlement within a United Nations
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framework.

The Assembly was not as
interested in condemning past actions as in its
responsibility toward the
future.
Next, there obviously was
extremely strong
sentiment for Israeli withdrawal.
Both the Non-aligned
and the Latin American draft
resolutions drew 53-57
affirmations. This may be interpreted
many ways, but
whether it be the political
interpretation of assisting
the Arabs toward negotiating in
an honorable fashion;
the self-interested fear by the
smaller, newer states of

their own future occupation of territory;
the simple fact
of standing by old friends-the U.A.R.
and Syria especially;
or the adherence to the basic norms of
international law
in the Charter

age-that the fruits of aggression should

not be retained,

that the use of force and violation of

territorial integrity and threats to political
sovereignty
shall not be tolerated— whatever the motivations,
support

was broad and deep on this point of withdrawal.
As is always to be expected, beyond the mere stating
of the principle, divergences occur.

The Arabs and their

friends sought an unconditional withdrawal by Israel for
reasons of cultural psychology, to avert the situation

whereby territorial blackmail could distort the voluntary
and lasting nature of any eventual settlement and, finally,

because the land was theirs by right in an age when the

Charter outlaws the seizure and acquisition of land by
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force.

To an Arab and certainly
to

a

Palestinian it
might appear that he had
suffered too .uch at the
hands of
so-called international
organization and international
law.
The former had created
and the latter perpetuated
an alien,
expansionist, repulsive state
in their rnidst which
had torn
from them their most elemental
rights-their homes and lands
To have the most elemental
precept of international law
violated and unenforceable in
the halls of the United
Nations must have seemed the
crowning hypocrisy

indeed.
The Latin Americans, the United
States and Israel
sought a conditional withdrawal.
it is irrefutable that
while the Government of Israel
actually used force, the

Government of the United Arab Republic,
and especially the
Syrian Arab Republic, threatened the

use of force and acted

in a most provocative manner, whatever
their real intention
was.
The Charter prescribes both the threat
and use of
force.
It also calls for "friendly
relations" and recog-

nition of the "sovereign equality" of
nations.

Within this

context, this call for an Israeli withdrawal
linked to
the ending of belligerency, encouragement
of coexistence
and good-neighborliness, and recourse to the
provisions for

peaceful settlement contained in the draft was
firmly based
upon Charter and other legal principles.
(Unfortunately,
it also would have had the political
side-effect of per-

mitting Israeli troops to remain while any negotiations
were going on, thus to prejudice the free and voluntary
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nature of the negotiations.)

The Latin American draft

resolution tried to balance within
itself the issues
outstanding and to appeal for their
discussion and resolution based upon juridical principles.
The Latin American
draft resolution was the only one voted
upon which did not
have the backing of at least one of the
direct parties to
the conflict.

Israel voted against the Yugoslav-introduced

draft and abstained on the Latin American
proposal.

To

see why, we need merely review certain key
principles

enumerated by Israel's Abba Eban:

two of them were that

any peace settlement must take account of
Israel's vital

security interests and then, that sovereign states
alone
(no international organization) need become
involved in

the fixing of mutual borders.

Clearly, views of this nature

which only lifted the after-phase of war from the hands
of the U.N. had little in common with any of the draft

resolutions proposed.

Any settlement arrived at under

such conditions could only be influenced by the use of

force which the Charter outlaws.

This is why Israel sup-

ported neither of the drafts.
But for Israel too international law and international

organization were cause for suspicion, not settlement.

Inter-

national law could take away from Isrsel the territory which
was felt to be the only reliable guarantee of state and

citizen security.

The withdrawal in 1957 from the Sinai
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was not as of ten years ago in the
Israeli mind, but as of
yesterday. What sort of law was it
the Israeli Government
might ask which deprived a state of
fruits it had taken
only in consequence of another's
aggression?
And the U.N.

which had not protected Israel in

19i;8

,

which had been the

instrument of Israel's withdrawal in
1957 and which had
stood by, mute and impotent during the
ominous upswing

toward war in 196? had thrice proven that
its actions were
not in conformity with Israel's perceived
security interests
While this sense of gentile "standing aside" as
Jews faced

their peril, while this betrayal was nothing new
in Jewish
history, unfortunately, the two senses of betrayal, Arab
and Israeli did tend to balance off each other, but in

a

monstrously symmetrical emotionally taut and distrust-laden
relationship
International law here conflicted with an interest
Israel deemed vital; her existence's right to strong peace
terms favorable to Israel before withdrawal to positions

deemed in Israel's security.

There would be no return to

1956.

We hold that it was this intense interplay of interest
and laws, either uninfluenced or underinf luenced by big

powers which caused the deadlock at this level.

If peace

ia ever to come and be lasting, it must flow from the

parties' mutual willingness to approach peace.

It is the

big powers, as arms suppliers if nothing else, which must
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exercise mediatory roles and
responsibilities here.
At least one attempt in this
direction was made by
the superpowers.
After the July k voting, the emergency
session was extended until July 21 for
a number of reasons.
First, Resolution 2251; (ES-V) was passed
on July li| by a

roll-call vote of 99-0-18.

This resolution regretted the

"non-compliance" by Israel with Resolution
2253 (ES-V),
which had been passed earlier by a margin of
99-0-20.

Resolution 2253 (ES-V) considered the changes by
Israel
concerning the status of Jerusalem as invalid,
called for
Israel to rescind them and to desist from any such
actions
in the future.

"failure

...

Resolution

2251;

(ES-V)

"deplores" Israel's

to implement" 2253 (ES-V),

"reiterates"

its call to Israel "to rescind" such measures already
taken

and "to desist forthwith" from future actions altering the

status of Jerusalem and requested the Secretary-General to
report to the Security Council and General Assembly regarding the resolution's implementation.

The United States

abstained on both measures while Israel announced that it
chose not to participate in the vote on the grounds that
to return to a divided Jerusalem would result in a return

to religious discrimination.

Debate and consideration of

this measure served to help extend the duration of the

emergency session.

During this time negotiations were being conducted
between the Non-aligned and Latin American blocs in the
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hopes of a possible compromise
resolution,
a compromise
did come, but neither from the
parties nor direction
expected.
On July 18 and 19, Anatoly
Dobrynin and Andrei
Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the
United States and
Foreign Minister, respectively, visited
with Arthur
Goldberg at the United States' United
Nations Mission in
New York.
The result, reportedly, was a draft
resolution
which both superpowers felt was acceptable.
Consisting
only of two operative paragraphs, the first
was concerned
with the issues of withdrawal and the second
paragraph with
the termination of belligerency,

i^ile the exact text

has never been released, Ambassador Goldberg did
describe
the content in a speech:
It provided that the withdrswal of Israel's
troops
would be linked with the acknowledgement by every
member of the U.N. in the area that each enjoys the
right to maintain an independent national state of
Its own and to live in renunciation of all claims
and acts inconsistent therewith.
.8^
.

.

Certainly while not spelled out as such,

a

claim to

belligerency was inconsistent with this second proposal.
This reworking, narrowing and possible rewording of the

Latin American draft, returned their land to the Arabs,
and so, salved the psychological wound while it provided,

by U.N. resolution, support for the Arab states against
an expansionist Israel together with support for Israel

against an irredentist Arab cause.

While we have no word

on the Israeli reaction, we do know that the Arab caucus
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rejected the draft on July 21 led by
Syria and Algeria.
Whether the compromise draft was born of
Soviet weakness
in the attempt to gain a withdrawal for
the Arab states,

or whether it died of Arab intransigence-the
compromise
came about so rapidly that there was little
time to convey
the new Soviet initiative and attitude in a
persuasive
85
sense.
In any event, an opening toward movement, as fine
as
it was

unexpected, slipped by.

regrettable and

a

Certainly this was deeply

major point which we should note.

But

since our objective here is not polemicism, praise or

condemnation, but understanding, let us pass on as we have
before, quietly, but not forgetting the basic issues.
On July 21, also, the Assembly, its patience at an

end after repeated extensions approved the temporary

adjournment of the emergency session, authorized the

President of General Assembly to reconvene it as and when

necessary and requested the Secretary-General to forward
the records of the emergency Special Session to the Security

Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the
Council, as

a

matter of urgency of its consideration of

the tense situation in the Middle East.

The fifth Emergency

Special Session of the General Assembly having no further

substantial achievements to its credit, met and voted
itself out of existence on September 18, 1967.
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CHAPTER

V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
DRIVE TO

RESOLUTION

2i|2

On the first of July fighting
broke out in the Suez
Canal sector and escalated to
include tanks, artillery and
aircraft.
On July 8, the representatives
of both Israel
and the United Arab Republic
requested an urgent Security
Council session to deal with the fighting
each charged the
other had started. The only immediately
notable contribution which resulted from the July 8
session was U Thant's
announcement of his initiative in broaching
with the representatives of both Israel and Egypt the
possibility of

stationing observers on both sides of the
Canal.
paragraphs two of both Resolutions 233 and

23i^

Operative

had requested

the Secretary-General "to keep the Council
promptly and

currently informed on the situation."

Certainly Thant could

not accomplish this without machinery, especially
since

Israel had withdrawn recognition from UNTSO and the
various

Mixed Armistice Commissions.

^

While Lord Caradon and Ambassador Goldberg supported
this concrete step at the next meeting, on July
9, Ambassador

Fedorenko threatened to invoke sanctions against the
aggressor in Russian eyes, Israel, as Chapter VII of the
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Charter provides.

Fortunately, the nonper^a.ent
„e„bers of
the security Council
were able to arrange a
compromise.

Although not

formal resolution, the
following
statement by the President
was accepted by Council
members
as a "consensus" of their
views without dissent or
a fomal
vote
a

Security Council
^ITlli""^
and 236 and emphasizing the resolutions 233 23ii
need for all pirtie:

P^cr

to

"^^-^^
request the
Chief nf qfoTf ^f-\-u
tt
°^
United
Nations
Truce
Supervision
nltli^
organization in Palestine, General
Odd Bull, to work
Governments of the United Arab
Republic
and j\l
Israel, as speedily as possible,
the necessary
arrangements to station United Nations
mi?i?a?y^
^'""^^
^"^^^
C^i^^
Sta^rUN^SO?!'""'

J ^

Cease-fire observers were in place by
July 1? and the
fighting soon subsided.

During the Summer and before the Security
Council
resumed meetings in the Fall a number of
developments
occurred which should be reported.

First, there was the

slow hardening of Israeli claims to occupied territory.

After the original Israel disclaimers of territory, it
came
to pass that Jerusalem especially, the Gaza Strip, Golan

Heights and certain areas of the West Bank could be
Justifiably retained in Israeli eyes.

Gradually, as the

Summer passed, high Israeli officials began to talk of the
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most "natural" of frontiers for Israel-the
Jordan River
and Suez Canal. ^ Second, there was an
important Arab
Summit Conference at Khartoum in late August.
At Khartoum
the serious Egyptian and Jordanian financial
plight was

alleviated by pledges totaling $378 million
annually from
Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia.^ In addition, a
compromise
agreement was reached, at least on the Heads of State
level, concerning the Yemeni war between the U.A.R.'s

Nasser and Saudi Arabia's monarch, Peisal.

Finally,

while popular sentiment was appeased by the reiteration
of such slogans as the "three no's"--no recognition,
no negotiation, no peace--there were growing signs of

private moderation among attending states, especially
Egypt.

By October, there was even

a

more pronounced private

willingness to accommodation and flexibility by the Arabs
provided that an acceptable channel were provided whereby
the problems could be dealt with without a loss of face.^

The United Nations Security Council was, of course, ideal

for such

a

function.

Among the many factors which affected

this, unquestionably the facts of the relative strategic

positions helped mold policy stands here.

Nevertheless,

King Hussein's swing through V/estern Europe and Washington
in early November served

as a

platform to underline the

new Arab willingness to consider compromise and to move

fron the intransigent rejection
of any sort of erosion of
principle. 6 Next, there were intense
behind-the-scenes
negotiations which were conducted by
both permanent and
nonpermanent members of the Security
Council. The irreplaceable Lord Garadon spoke to this
when he stated on
October 21;:
We all know that members of this
Council have been
working with increasing urgency, particularly
in the
establish and declare the principle
SSf.V
J!
which should
govern a settlement, and to take the
first practical steps on the hard road to
peace,
we know that they have set themselves the
task
preparing a fair and balanced draft resolution of
that IS the over-riding purpose; that is
the prize.'
a durable peace.
It cannot be won without justice
and equal recognition of equal obligations
on both
sides.
It cannot be won without a real sense
of the
utmost urgency.

This was buttressed by the revelation by

a

non-

permanent Council member, Ambassador

S.

Nigeria who, on October 25, stated:

"Action began to be

0.

Adebo of

taken by members of the Security Council as long as two
three weeks ago."^

Or again, when he revealed that:

The permanent members of the Security Council
about a week ago
let it be known to the
President that they would welcome any initiative
which the non-permanent members of the Council
might take to help to resolve the whole of the
Middle East situation.
.

.

,

.

.

.

Clearly, the drive for a resolution was intense.

Finally, the events which provided the "urgency" Caradon
apoke of also helped provide the impetus for the Council
to reach a final agreement.

On October 21, the Israeli

o
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destroyer Eilat was sun.
by ndssiles n.ed r.c.
Egyptian
naval vessels.
On October 21,, Israeli
artillery and aircraft attacked the Egyptian
city of Suez, drove out
hundreds of thousands of
civilian residents and
destroyed
much of Egypt's oil refining
capacity.lO ^he Security
Council convened on that

same day in response to a
request

from both Israel and the
United Arab Republic.
if nothing
more, these events were a
reminder to the Security Council
of how explosive the situation
remained.

Despite the fact that the
representative of the
U.S.S.R. joined those representatives
who had spoken before
him, from the United Kingdom,
Canada, Denmark and Ethiopia,
in the realization "that it is
necessary to bring about a
political settlement in the Near East,"^l
Ambassador
Fedorenko proceeded to introduce a draft
resolution which:
(1) strongly condemned Israel for its act
of aggression
committed in the area of the city of Suez;
(2) demanded
compensation by Israel to the United Arab
Hepublic for the
damage caused by this act of aggression;
and (3) urgently
called upon Israel to strictly observe the
cease-fire
and

cessations of military activity called for in
Security
Council Resolutions 233 and 231^.^^

Ambassador Goldberg prefaced the United States draft

resolution by emphasizing how this latest flare-up merely
emphasized the need to move toward

a

just settlement of all

the questions outstanding between the parties to the
conflict
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He then introduced a
draft resolution which:
(1) condemned
"any and all violations"
of the cease-fire;
(2) insisted
that the united Nations
member states concerned
"scrupulously

respect the cease-fire" contained
in Council Resolutions
233, 23I+, 235, and 236 in addition to
the consensus of
July 10 and cooperate fully with
area U.N. machinery

including the Chief of Staff of
UNTSO and other military
observers in the discharge of their
duties and (3) called
upon the concerned Governments to
"issue categoric instructions to all military forces to
refrain from all firing,"
as these resolutions required.
Following a general appeal
by members of the Council for more
information on the incidents before passing judgment on the
responsibilities,
the session was adjourned until the
next day, October 25.
It is notable that especially beneath
the Soviet rhetoric

an underlying theme to the statements of
non-Middle Eastern
or Superpower states was the felt-need for
a fair and

balanced resolution based on fundamental principles.
After consultations the next day, Resolution
2k0 (196?)
was unanimously adopted. This resolution was in
keeping with
the sentiment expressed above in that it did not indict

either party, but tended more toward an insistence that all
parties concerned meet the norms of law and the principles

expressed in previous Security Council resolutions.

In so

doing it reflected more the United States than Soviet draft.
Briefly, the operative paragraphs of Resolution

214.0:

2214.

(1)

condemned the cease-fire violations;
(2) regretted

the resultant casualties and loss of property;

(3)

re-

affirmed the necessity that the cease-fire resolutions
be strictly observed;

(i;)

and demanded the immediate

ceaseing of all prohibited military activities in the
area and the full and prompt cooperation with UNTSO by

area Member States."'"^

The representatives of both the

Soviet Union and the United States both stated that there

was no need to put their drafts to a vote; Fedorenko

cited the interest of Council members in unanimity, and

Goldberg the refusal by the Security Council to deal with
the situation in a one-sided manner and the balanced nature
of Resolution

that:

2I4.O.

After reiterating the eld, vital point

"as long as the Israeli forces of aggression con-

tinue to occupy the territory of Arab States there can be
no peace in the Middle East," Fedorenko went on to say

that

The Security Council is in duty bound .
seriously
to ponder the need for an immediate political settlement of the situation in the Near East, ... At the
same time, it has to be noted that the majority of
Council members indicated in their statements that the
situation in the Near East was extremely tense and
that it was high time to bend every effort to restore
peace and a normal state of affairs.
It flows therefrom that there is an almost unanimous feeling that
consultations must be speeded up to work out a decision
leading to a political settlement in The Near East. 15
.

.

The representative of the other superpower. Ambassador

Goldberg, immediately joined with these remarks in voicing
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the attitude that:

"...

what the Near East needs is net

Just a cease-fire, essential though
it is, but new steps

towards

durable, permanent and Just peace

a

.

.

.

thus

Council must begin promptly to help
move towards a Just
settlement of all the outstanding questions
between the
parties.
And we believe that
there is the framework
by which such a settlement can be concluded."
.

.

.

During the remainder of the Security Council
sessions,
the chronology of major events was as follows:
November 7,
the U.A.R. requested the convening of the
Security Council-the three-Power, and the American draft resolutions
also

were submitted on that day; on November 16, The
United

Kingdom delegate, Lord Caradon, submitted the draft resolution which was later adopted as Resolution

November 20, the Soviet Union submitted
of its own;

and on November 22,

2[(.2;

on

a surprise draft

the final vote occurred.

Intense consultations continued through the beginning
of November, especially among the nonpermanent members of

the Council.

reaching

a

Slowed by the desirability and difficulty of

broad agreement, but spurred on by the U.A.R.

's

increasing flexibility given her need to cope with 300,000
new civilian refugees from the Suez area, progress was

frustratingly slow.

On November 7, the United Arab Republic

in a letter to the President requested the convening of an

urgent session of The Security Council:
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dangerous situation prevailing
Ar.\^^
Z-A^'^^'^i^'^
in The Middle
East as a result of the persistence
of Israel not to withdraw its armed forces
from all
the territories it occupied as a result
of the
Israel aggression committed on 5 June 196?
against
the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria. 17

Concurrently, when the Council convened on November
9,
Ambassador Parthasarathi of India orally presented to the
Council

a

three-Power draft resolution sponsored by India,

Mali and Nigeria.

Although Parthasarathi viewed the fifth

emergency special session of the General Assembly as inconclusive, nevertheless he felt that the session "revealed

certain fundamental areas of agreement which could pave the
way towards finding definitive solutions "^^
.

The repre-

sentative of India isolated these as--withdrawal by Israel
of occupied territory, settlement of the refugee problem

and freedom of navigation through international waterways.

None of these was surprising.

addition of such points as

a

What was surprising was the

termination to the state of

belligerency, the right of all states to live in peace and
security free from threats or acts of war, and the respect

by all states for all states' political independence and
territorial integrity.

In addition, words such as "con-

demnation" did not appear in the text while phrases
descriptive of the draft itself such as "to ensure equality
of obligations" and "fair and balanced formulation" were

noteworthy for their presence

.

-^^^

Parthasarathi described

how over the past month the Afro-Asian's and Latin American'
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delegates to the Security Council "have been engaged in intensive and extensive consultations in regard to the most

appropriate course to be followed by the Security Council. "^^

After examining the totality of varied proposals, the threePower draft used "the Latin American draft as the basic

document of reference "^-^ and went so far in certain areas
as to use "language identical, word for word,

Latin American draft."

to the

.

.

.
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What exactly did this draft resolution propose?

2^

Within the first operative paragraph it affirmed the necessity to reach peace within the Charter's framework.

subparagraph

(1)

a basic

In

point of the Latin American text

was rephrased in the three-Power text to state:

"Occupation

or acquisition of territory by military conquest is in-

admissable" under the Charter and that the armed forces of
Israel "should withdraw from all territories occupied as

result of the recent conflict. "^^

a

Linked with this in

subparagraph (11) there was the crucial statement in the

three-Power draft that:
every state has the right to live in peace and
complete security free from threats or acts of war
and consequently all states in the area should
terminate the state or claim of belligerency and
settle their international disputes by peaceful
means
.

.

.

Here the three-Pcwer draft went further and was more

comprehensive than the Latin American text upon which it
was based.

Moreover, if subparagraph (1) had been
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offensive previously to Israel, subparagraph

objectionable to the Arab Governments.
of the Arabs'

(1)

It was

had been

an admission

difficulties and of their recent willingness

to be flexible that their friends should link these
prin-

ciples together and submit them.

Subparagraph (111) of operative paragraph

1

clearly

stated
every state of the area has the right to
within its borders and it is obligatory on all
States of the area to respect the sovereignty,
torial integrity and political independence of
.

.

.

be secure

Member
terrione

another.

There was

a

more comprehensive formulation than the

Latin American draft.

While it provided

a

legal solution

to the raids by Palestinians which have plagued Israel, the

phrase "within its borders" provided consolation for Arabs

fearful of an expansionist Israel.
The second operative paragraph was divided into two

subparagraphs.

The first affirmed

question of Palestine refugees."

affimed

a

a

"just settlement of the

The second subparagraph

"guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance

with international law through international waterways in
the area."

Pathasarathi noted his realization that the

reference "in accordance with international law" might
obfuscate the issue and prolong potential litigation.

The Indian representative recognized this and stated his

delegation's readiness "to examine very carefully any
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arguments that might be advanced in the Council in
respect
of the words 'in accordance with International
Law.'"^^

Operative paragraph three was as old chronologically
as the call for withdrawal.

Indeed, India had been the

first state to suggest that the Secretary -General dispatch
a special representative to the area "who would contact
the

states concerned in order to coordinate efforts to achieve
the purposes of this resolution" as the three-Power text

put it.

Indeed, Lord Caradon, who later made this point one

of the foremost in his own proposal, followed India's lead

on this.

The submission of the three-Power draft was

a

hopeful

sign of the momentum building up for the adoption of

resolution by the Security Council.

a

The fact that friends

of the Arab states had submitted this text which called for

an end to belligerency and freedom of navigation in addition
to recognition of Israel's statehood could only be taken as
a sign of tacit acceptance by the Arabs of these and the

rest of its provisions.

We should note, however, that this

was tacitly accepted only in return for the withdrawal of

Israeli forces to positions occupied on June

i^..

The

American resolution, to be discussed next was fairly close
to the three-Power formulation in most areas except the

point of clarity on withdrawal.

It was

certainly

a

land-

mark, for India, Mali and Nigeria--all states which had
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voted in favor of and even, in the case of the
first two
nations, vehemently supported the Yugoslav draft--had
now

submitted

a

new draft which, by their own admission, drew

most heavily upon the Latin American text.

There was

little that was homologous in the three-Power draft with

either the original Israeli or Arab position3--and in-

tentionally so.

The Israelis sought no withdrawal except

as a result of bilateral negotiations while the Arabs

sought no negotiations until after unconditional with-

drawal.

To the heavy juridical influence of the Latin

Americans had been added the utilitarian short step of
the personal representative of the Secretary-General--all

under Chapter VI of the Charter--Pacif ic Settlement of
Disputes.

This was

a

deliberate attempt by Council

members to give effective meaning to

a

potential resolution

by seeking unanimous rather than merely sufficient Council
support.

An American draft resolution was submitted to the

Security Council on the same day as the three-Power draft.
As Ambassador Goldberg stated before the Council, the

presentation of the American draft was somewhat more

hurried than had been anticipated:
The process of consultations we had initiated had
not run its course when the request for the convening of the Council made it necessary to circulate
the product of our efforts on 7 November ... we
would have preferred to hold back our draft resolution
until the final results of our consultations were in.'^^
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Ambassador Goldberg affirmed that
the draft resolution
was "guided by certain axioms of
negotiation"^? which flowed
from the view that the Council should
act under Chapter VI
of the Charter.

First, that "only the parties
themselves,

through mutual accommodation, compromise
end peaceful means
of their own choice, can make peace and
impose peace."
Peace, said the United States representative,
cannot be

imposed by one side or the other or imposed on
both by an
outside authority, for such a peace "cannot endure."
Second, that Council members individually, combined
and
"by virtue of the Council's responsibility under the

Charter, can and must assist the process of accommodation."
Third, consonant with the preceding, any formula cannot

"prejudice the known positions of the parties
.

.

.

.

.

.

[or]

preclude the acceptance by either side of the

assistance, encouragement, help and guidance the United

Nations can properly offer."

Fourth and last, consultations

to achieve this formulation will be invaluable with both

the parties involved and Council members.

In keeping

with these axioms. Chapter VI of the Charter and President
Lyndon Johnson's five principles of June 19, 1967, Ambassador

Goldberg offered the following draft.

29

The draft began by reminding member states of their

commitment to Article 2 of the United Nations Charter,
Operative paragraph (1) of the American draft was expansive
and cumbersome.

In fulfillment of Charter Article 2, it
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called for:

.withdrawal of armed forces from occupied
.
territories, termination of claims of
belligerence
or state of belligerence,
mutual recognition
and respect for the right of every state
in the
area to sovereign existence, territorial
integrity,
political maependence, secure and recognized
boundaries and freedom from the threat or use
of
force.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Operative paragraph (2) further affirmed the necessity
of "guaranteeing freedom of navigation" through
area inter-

national waterways, "achieving

a

limitation" to the area

arms race and "guaranteeing the territorial inviolability

and political independence" of every area state through

measures including demilitarized zones.
paragraphs (3) and

designate

a

(ij.)

Operative

requested that the Secretary-General

Special Representative who would maintain con-

tacts with the concerned states "with a view to assisting

them in the working out of solutions in accordance with
the purposes of this resolution" while requesting a progress

report to the Security Council as soon as possible.

To this U.S. draft resolution, the Soviet Deputy

Foreign Minister,

Kuznetsov, focused upon what he

V. V.

termed "the most important aspect

.

.

how the draft

attempts to solve the problem of the withdrnwal of troops.

Kuznetsov continued his frontal assault:
We must say quite frankly that in the American draft
this key provision is formulated in a very ambiguous
It is lost somewhere in the midst of
diluted manner.
.^^
other questions.
.

.

"-^^
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... in the United States draft Israel is not
mentioned at all. There is no mention of the
withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the
territories occupied as a result of the recent
conflict, whose troops, where should they be
withdrawn from--these are fundamental questions
to which the United States draft contains no
clear-cut answer. 32
There was no mention, as in the three-Power Security

Council draft that "Israel's armed forces should withdraw

from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent
conflict."^-'

Nor was this an advance over the Latin

American text which called for "Israel to withdraw imme-

diately all its forces to the positions they held prior to
5 June 1967."

While the American formulation may not

have "prejudiced" the known position of Israel, it certainly

retreated from the chief issue which seemed to grip the

majority of the U.N. membership both in the General Assembly
and Security Council as well.

It was this single issue of

withdrawal which was perceived by them to

"be

the greatest

single threat to international law, the United Nations and
to their own survival as well.

Ambassador Goldberg met this objection by stating that
the United States saw the draft as:

...

an effort to do what can be done now, to set in
motion a diplomatic effort within the United Nations
and within the framework of the Gh^irter and to establish guidelines and objectives for such a peacekeeping effort. ... In all candour, we do not
conceive that such a mandate could be stated in terms
entirely satisfactory either to the Arab states or to
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J»™:';>,J'^!!!^°r!:

have attempted to state it in
eg

takes

on,

iiimpnasis mine.)
It should be noted that,

in comparison with the

American draft submitted to the emergency
session of the
General Assembly, the new resolution
"required" withdrawal.
However, the intent of the United
States to lay
down general "guidelines and objectives"
toward and within
which negotiations could occur is orthodox
diplomatic
technique.

And the American concern to phrase the
draft

in such a manner as to avoid prejudicing
"the positions or

the vital interests of the states involved'' makes
good

sense if the voluntary consent of the concerned states
to

work out and abide by
sought.

a

mutually acceptable agreement is

But the plain and simple fact of the matter is

that on this precise point the U.S. was insensitive and out
of step with the thinking of the overwhelming majority of

the United Nations membership.

The proof lies in the Non-

aligned and Latin American drafts voted upon in the General

Assembly in which withdrawal was

Resolution
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a

primary point and in

itself, adopted scant days later by

unanimous vote of the Council.

a

Operative paragraph

1,

subparagraph (ii) of the United Kingdom draft resolution

both cited "Israel" and required withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conf lict

.

"-^^

This was

a
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vital point of law deemed paramount
by the membership.
The three-Power and American
text were close together
on the point of a special representative
and just settlement
of the Palestine refugee problem-one
as

old as the State of

Israel itself.

There was a point of difference
on the

question of area international waterways
since the U.S.
text contained no complicating phrase
such as "in accordance
with international law" as did that of India,
Mali
and

Nigeria.

The proof that there was agreement here
stems not

only from textual analysis of the drafts
themselves, but
once again, a comparative analysis with Resolution

itself.

It is

2i;2

intriguing, but in November the three

Non-aligned states which had supported the Yugoslav draft
were urging

a

principle on withdrawal forwarded by the

Latin Americans in the General Assembly while the United
States which had voted for the Latin American draft in

July moved away from its basic point on withdrawal in early
November.

Certainly there was room for movement and com-

promise for the parties to come to an agreement on this
vital point at issue.

Beyond his Government's commitment to
stage approach--f irst

,

a

stage-by-

on principles, and then, on applica-

tion--the representative of the U.S. repeated his Govern-

ment's policy that what the Middle East needs

is

a

"non-

prejudicial mandate embracing the essential elements of

a
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Just, dignified and durable peace-that
has been the very

cornerstone of the United States policy
during the entire
consideration of this grave matter by the
United Nations. "^"^
In the drive toward adoption of a
resolution,

Ambassador Goldberg asked for

a

truce on old charges and

recrimination:
Let there be no more attempts to pervert the
Council,
this instrument of peace, into a centre of
defamation
and incendiary charges.
For such abuse of the United
Nations instrumentalities simply compounds the
difficulties of the peace-making process which are
already formidable enough. 3o

The only state Goldberg named in this respect, and
in his defense of United States consistency in behavior

and adherence to international law was Syria.

Israel's final position prior to the vote on

November 22 was roughly as follows as Abba Sban gave it:
Our policy is that we shall maintain and respect the
cease-fire situation until it is replaced by peace
treaties ending the state of war, determining the
agreed national frontiers of states, and ensuring
a stable and mutually guaranteed security.
We cannot
return to the shattered armistice regisie or to the
fragile demarcation lines, or to any system of
relations other than permanent, contractually-binding
peace.
agreement on secure and recognized
boundaries is absolutely essential to a just and
lasting peace; and we believe that any constructive
resolution should emphasize the duties of the states
themselves--the states of the Middle East--to work
out the conditions of their own peace in direct
negotiations 39
.

.

Eban led up to this position with

a

spirited effort

which admirably wove together two constant, but paradoxical
strands in the behavior of every state in its relationship
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with international law:

that while "Israel is not in a

position of juridical defense,

her "vital interests

should not be--cannot be--detertnined outside
her

consent

"'^^
.

To attempt to depict the tension more clearly,
while
Israel would determine her own interests without resort
to

Juridical def ensiveness--what Israel was proposing was consistent with international law.

The representative of

Israel characterized the relationship between the Arabs

and Israel as
duration.

a

war not of six days', but nineteen years'

A withdrawal without bilateral negotiations

leading to a contractually binding treaty of peace which

would end the state of war and recognize national
boundaries, therefore, was unthinkable.
this.

Security compelled

Law led to this.

Two abstract pairings unify and grant insight into
the Israeli position.

The first might be termed that of

continuation-termination; Israel did not wish this to be

merely an interval before the next round in this already
endless struggle.

A conclusive, permanent and contractually

binding peace treaty was therefore sought to put an end to
the state of war.

At the same time, a second pairing, that

of ambiguity-clarity was operative.
to land.

All of this was related

Land was the answer to the early Zionist

pioneer-dream, the felt-vulnerability since then, and
serves as that basic element of any state.

Land and its
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clear division was the answer here too as Abba Eban made
clear:

Now this is really the very heart of the Arab-Israel
problem.
The central issue to be negotiated in a peace
settlement is the establishment of permanent boundaries .^^
Armistice demarcation lines had been "ambiguous,
provisional, precarious, unresolved," while territorial

boundaries would be "secure, recognized, respected and
acknowledged.

For nineteen years there have been demarcation lines
based, according to the 1914-9 agreements, "on military
considerations alone." Nothing has been regarded as
permanent. Everything has been unresolved. 55
A demarcation line means vulnerability.
A negotiated
boundary means stability.
A demarcation line means the
maintenance of reciprocal territorial claims. A boundary
implies their mutual and final renunc iat ion.U^^

Negotiation was the key to solve this and other problems in Israeli eyes.

Eban was clear on

thiis:

"I have

never heard of any substantive agreement on any subject
ever having been achieved by Governments that do not set
eyes on each other."

Eban also reviewed statements

concerning the India-Pakistan dispute in which the representative of India stressed the need for direct negotiations

between the parties directly involved free of external
pressure.

Eban continued:

No delegation has allowed this fetal concept to appear
The idea of
in any text that we have been shown.
negotiation has been converted from a Charter prin[if]
ciple into an Israeli eccentricity
negotiations
have
to
"unrealistic"
it would be
.

.

.

.

.
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without withdrawal. I only invite the Council to
believe that it is unrealistic to believe that there
can be withdrawal without negotiation.
Foreign Minister Eban certainly was not on weak
grounds in the basis for his charges.

At some point,

if

the solution to this conflict is to be peaceful, negotia-

tions will have to occur.

But to insist on this while

occupying territory was not consistent with international
Arabs claimed it was more consistent with blackmail,

law.

while Israelis considered impossible the probability of the
victor negotiating with the vanquished in

a

territorial

situation precisely similar to the one prior to the outbreak
of hostilities.

So do international politics and law

commingle

Eban injected

a

strong juridical tone into his

speech.

He pointed out that by the Egyptian interpreta-

tion the

I9I4.9

General Armistice Agreement did not end the

state of war between Israel and the U.A.R., a state con-

sistent with "non-recognition of sovereignty" and "un-

resolved territorial claims."

Eban continued:

We are tired of contesting the United Arab Republic's
interpretations. We accept them; we accept that the
Arab Republic
1914.9 agreement signifies what the United
of peace,
absence
the
mean:
to
it
has always interpreted
war
total
ultimate
to
prelude
maritime blockade, and a
ago
long
exploded
agreement
that is why that
do with it
... we can, accordingly, have nothing tosimilar
any
or with any of its apparatus or with
situation of juridical anarchy. The only judicial
peace.
possibility now available is full, formal
4-9
Everything else has been tried.
.
.

.

.

.

.
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Finally, in commenting upon the draft
texts before
the Council, Abba Eban stated:
"our standard of Judgement
is whether or not they prejudice our
negotiating position
in advance.
On this overriding basis, Israel rejected
the three-Power draft "unreservedly" on
the primary grounds

that

The suggestion that Israel should move from the ceasefire lines without a peace-treaty defining permanent
and secure frontiers is unacceptable. 51

Criticism was also levelled at the maritime freedom
passage of the three-Power draft.

Eban termed the Soviet

draft (which we discuss below) "a backward-looking resolution.

It seeks to restore the Judicial ambiguity and the

territorial vulnerability of the shattered armistice
regime."

Eban did not convincingly elaborate on this.

Moreover, if one reviews the Soviet draft, and especially
operative paragraphs 2(b), and 3(a) and (b) (see page

251;

below). Foreign Minister Eban's statement appears too
strong.

A studied silence, by and large, met the United

Kingdom draft after it was introduced.

Israel preferred

more to reiterate its own position.

Eban argued on

a

Judicial basis with telling effect.

By accepting the Arab stance that a state of war continued

between them, he laid the groundwork for his Government's
call for a contractual peace settlement.

But while in

one sense, this could be considered a reversal of policy,
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to accept the Arab case, in another, it
evidences the

continuity of the Israeli effort to legally
end the state
of war.

A similar remark is applicable to the
Israeli

concern for territory.

A state of war is more consistent

with nonrecognition of sovereignty, unresolved
territorial
claims and unrecognized boundaries than that which
would
flow from a state of peace.

Eban too, stood on ultimately

firm ground in his insistence on negotiation.

Negotiations

are necessary to the peaceful conclusion of the many, many,

disputes which go to make up this conflict.
to this.

The U.N. agreed

But to shoulder out the U.N. while perched atop

Arab territory and demanding bilateral negotiations

apparently struck an unresponsive chord among the U.N.
membership.
issue.

The fruit of vie tory--territory--clouded the

And the high stakes of world peace, coupled to the

immense complexities of the problem and the political, if
not physical, suicide for an Arab leader to do this pre-

cluded such an ultimate step at this time.

To defuse the

crisis, to get the parties talking, if only through
party, it appears, was envisioned as the first step.

a third

Not

only international law, but diplomacy, negotiations and
sheer practicality intruded here.
The Arab position at this time, and especially that
of the Syrian Arab Republic, demonstrated the tragic

clich^ in this situation; that for the Arabs and Israelis
it has not been so much a case of talking to as talking
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past each other when it is a case of talking at all.

Just

treaty
as Eban ignored the refugees, and spoke of a peace
treaties
and recognized boundaries, so the Syrians ignored

and boundaries to talk of the refugees.

The words of Ambassador Adib Daoudy convey perhaps
view of the
the most economical insight into the Syrian

Palestinian refugees:
•

are not
The right of the Arab people of Palestine
bargaining.
of
and can never become the subject
Those who
Those Arab rights are inalienable.
what
recognize
to
continuously pressure the Arabs
when
wrong
the
in
are
they call the rights of Israel
obligathe
and
they ignore the rights of the Arabs
tions of Israel toward those rights.
vein when
Ambassador George Tomeh continued in this
.

.

.

on the United Kingdom
he observed just prior to the vote
around the Council table:
draft resolution that as he looked
the Arab people of
The party directly concerned,
be the f^^st
themselves
Palestine, who should
never ceded
have
they
sneakers to be heard, since
fo^^eited
nor
anybody
the?r Inalienable rights to
picture.^'^
the
them, are totally absent from
is made of the
No reference, except "belatedly"
refugee problem, Tomeh pointed
refugees as constituting the
Declaration of Human
The Charter, the Universal
out.
Assembly resolutions since
Rights, and eighteen General
Ambassador Tomeh,
were not meant, stated
191V

(III)

(m8)

selftheir inalienable rights to
to "deprive people of

and their right to their
determination in their own lands
lived for over two thousand
homeland in which they had

years. "^^
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Tomeh accused Israel of nineteen
years of aggression,
topped by the invasion of Syria
after the acceptance by
Damascus of the cease-fire was conveyed
to the Security
Council:
"the momentum of
[Israeli]
.

.

.

.

.

.

pre-

meditation was so strong that the fact
that the Security
Council was just at that time considering
the very problem
involved did not deflect it from its
course. "^^ The
U.K.

draft was criticized by Tomeh because it
contained no time
limit or specified modus operandi for
ensuring Israeli
withdrawal, because it was silent on the
General Assembly
resolutions concerning the status of Jerusalem
and postJune 5 refugees and for other reasons:
It is inconceivable to Syria that this draft
resolution
be accepted because it ignores the roots of
the problem,
the various resolutions adopted by the United
Nations
on the Palestine Question and the right of the
Palestinian people to self-determination
it
crowns all those failures by offering to the aggressors
solid recognition of the illegitimate truths of their
wanton aggression when it speaks of "secure and recog-

nized boundaries

.

I

Rather than withdrawing, Israel is consolidating its

grip on the occupied territories, said Tomeh.
Israel is the actual aggressor, the real belligerent-it is not an Arab state, but Israel which has annexed land

and displaced people, turning them into refugees, the

Syrian representative stated.

Tomeh recalled Security

Council Resolution 228 (1966) in which Israel was censured

for the Es-Samu raid.

Ambassador Tomeh concluded that his

Government's "non-acceptance" was based upon

a

"real, true

2kh.

and legal context" and finished:

Peace and security, while being
the
every society, would only mean^ew cherished coal of
were to be emptied of their basic oppression frlhel
tenet,
justice.
History has taught us all thai which is
tSe seeds of
'"""^ "^J^^^
imposed by
force"'"!A lasting peace cannot be
force.
imposed by force
One does not open the way for it by
seizing another
property and demanding certain
concessions\e?ore
given back to its legal, lawful owner.
<^hnn?r^?;
Should
the principle of putting on an equal
footing
^""^
^^'^^"^
approved,
thus
offering
^^Sotf^'T^?;
rewards to the aggressor, no safeguard
would remain in
the world to prevent one power from overwhelming
another
and extracting concessions therefrom. 58
'

While some certainly would call this uncompromising,
the legal principles herein espoused are so
basic that to

permit their violation is to erode the very foundation
of

international order.

Foreign Minister Mon'im El-Rifa'i of

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan focused on the single

question he too felt was one of principle and lies at the
very roots of the United Nations and international law:
is occupation or acquisition of territory by
military conquest admissible under the Charter of the
United Nations and international order.
If the
answer is negative, then the basic foundations of
peace will be established and the United Nations will
emerge as the centre for harmonizing the actions of
nations in the attainment of the principles and purposes of its Charter.
But, if the answer is in the
affirmative, then I must ask in all fairness what good
.^^
purpose this organization serves.
.

.

.

.

.

We need but recall the downward spiral for the League

of Nations which began with the military conquests of

Manchuria and Ethiopia to witness what can occur when
international organization cannot or does not answer

similar question negatively.

Rifa'i, as Tomeh, made

a

special reference to the threat posed to
small and weake r
states.
He told the Council that if the
U.N. could not
effect Israel withdrawal:

We shall have to return to our people and
explain
to them that they have no other course
but to
mobilize their own efforts, to use their own
resources and to organize themselves in order
to
liquidate the Israeli aggression, no matter what
the price and sacrifice might be.oO
The initial statements of Mahmoud Riad, Foreign

Minipter of the United Arab Republic on November 9 appear
correlative in content with the introduction of the threePower draft by the representative of India.

This was high-

lighted in his words describing the decision taken at

Khartoum as

:

...

a decision for peace, but not surrender.
It was
decision for a political solution to the crisis, and
not a decision for national suicide in the name of a
political solution.
a

Riad went further in stating:

The peoples of our part of the world can in no way
benefit from a state of war, belligerency
the Palestine question
can be adjusted only
by peaceful and appropriate application of the
Charter. "2
.

.

.

.

.

.

There is little chance of mistaking the desire for a
settlement sought by the United Arab Republic.

Perhaps

this is why the U.A.R. contributed so little in the verbal

or formal sense to the proceedings.

However, this is not

to say that Riad was diluting his Government's stand on

withdrawal
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""^^^"^

cS^;ro:i3e'oT?^^rp:?nt"Lr^?

the_ Security
Council?
against the Charter,
and

Republic

J"<^eemeat: should
a^^res,?"""

thffefore°?he°'
that aggression have
to be -uli^fi* ? consequences of
ance with the Charter. 63
eliminated in accord^

^

The U...

H.

delegate also called
Tor self-determination
ror the people of
Palestine and condemned
IsraeLs policy
Of expansionism and
afft?res«?ion
q ^
aggression.
Sober
in the
views he pre-

aented and seeding to do
so on a legal plane.
Hiad exposed
the Plight of the Arab
position and the need in
the Arab
view to act promptly.
He as.ed for Charter
enforcement
measures if Israel did not
comply „ith the minimum
measure
Which the council should
advocate, in Egypfa

eyes-immediate

withdrawal to the positions
of June
The legal and moral case

1;.

of the refugees, and
the

legal proposition -no fz^its
of conquest" and the
grave
threat its passive acceptance
would pose to the orders of
both law, nations and
international organization were
emphasized by the Arab representatives.
But here, as if
in relief, was highlighted
the legal problem in
grappling
with this problem. Israel began
with the premise of its
existence and constructed both
a legal defense and
Justification thereupon. The Arab states
began with the premise that
the existence of the Israeli
state itself was illegal
and

immoral as was the birth and
continuance of the refugee
status for the Palestinian people.
Some basis of commonality, some slight sharing of norms
or accepted standards

is requisite for parties to a
conflict to accept the jus-

tifiability and applicability of law to
their quarrel.
because of the nature in which they have
played their
political hands, those perennial enforcers
of common
standards--or at best, inducements, at worst

And

penalties-

the big powers, had been unable and/or
unwilling to

actualize this role.

So law in the framework in

which

it had operated had provided no final settlement
thus far.

The concatenation of norms, diplomacy and fine
negotiating
skills, personified by Lord Caradon, was able to
provide

a

formally agreed-upon framework for discussions, but
this
was all.

This was a great deal, of course, but after

nineteen years--in domestic law there

is

a final degree

of coerciveness such that even the most obstinate parties

must accept a decision, once it is handed down from the
highest level.

But in international law,

there is no

final degree of coerciveness, no enforcement of decision
and no "highest" level.

But if some problems do not get

solved, perhaps they can be ameliorated.
Into this breach stepped the esteemed and ameliorative

Lord Caradon.

Upon hearing both the three-Power and American

drafts he wisely avoided specific comments on the drafts and
bided for time.

The representatives of both the United

States and India had indicated their willingness to pass

resolution.

Once again, Caradon early put the situation

into perspective, and lent balance to the proceedings:

a
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It IS not my purpose to deal at this
stage with the
detail of draft resolutions which have been
Nor is it a question of seeking victories in circulated.
the
We want not victories in the vote. We want not vote.
victories but a success.
It is a question of what
resolution we can adopt with the prospect of early
effective action.
Consequently I would earnestly put to the Council
the suggestion that when we have heard, the opening
statements in this debate, we should allow a short
period for further urgent consultations among ourselves.
There is, I am sure, such a measure of agreement and
common ground among us that I cannot believe that such
consultations will fail.oM-

On November 15, Caradon evolved that "common ground."

After reminding the delegates that time was of the essence
and that the obligation for the Council was not to partisanship, but to the discharge of responsibility which will set
the peoples of the Middle East either "on
a

a

road of hope or

road of despair, "^^ Caradon outlined that area in terms

of the direct participants toward which the resolutions were

directed
The Arab countries insist that we must direct our
special attention to the recovery and restoration of
their territory. The issue of withdrawal is to them
of top priority.
The Arabs want not charity but
They
seek
a just settlement to end the long
Justice.
and bitter suffering of the refugees. There is a
recognition on all sides that a new, comprehensive,
imaginative plan, as we have advocated, to deal with
this desperately urgent problem is vitsl.
The Israelis tell us that withdrawal must never
be to the old precarious truce; that it must be to a
permanent peace, to secure boundaries, to a new era
of freedom from the use or the threat or the fear of
hostility and force.
Both are right. The aims of the two sides do not
They converge. They supplement and they
conflict.
support each other. To imagine that one can be secured
without the other is a delusion. They are of equal
validity and equal necessity. The recent consultations

2k9

that have been going forward so energetically
and
continuously reinforce strongly my conviction
that
we in tnis Council now have a supreme
opportunity
to serve the interests of all those concerned.
Justice and peace are not in conflict; they are
as inseparable as they are indispensable,
and one
must go hand in hand with the other. 66
.

.

.

Lord Caradon requested another period of consultations
during
which:
We should make a final and supreme and successful
effort to set aside all differences, many of which
are in wording and not in substance, and concentrate
on the common ground of agreed purpose and principle.

Then Caradon envisaged the members taking

"...

perhaps the most important decision which the United Nations
has ever taken."

68

Caradon again stressed the goal he saw:

We must pass a resolution.
I hope we can do so
unanimously. That will be the best way to discharge
our responsibility and to do so in such a way that
action is effective in the interests of all the people
concerned. 69

Caradon had not criticized either the three-Power or
American resolutions.

He did not advocate the satisfaction

of one party over the other.

Rather, he appealed to the

members to exercise their responsibility according to the

highest norms of both international law and organization.
His was a search both for common ground and action on

which

a

start toward settlement could be made.

said on November 20, his draft

"...

As he

was prepared with the

greatest care after listening long and patiently to the
views put to us by those directly concerned

and respect their intense feelings

""^^
.

...

we know

In so keeping, he
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wanted "to work with others to devise

a

resolution which

would take full account of the essential
interests of both
sides as they have stated them. ""^^ The aim
always

was agree-

ment to permit forward progress in the Middle East
on the
issues themselves.

In consciously seeking this, he sought

out not just the direct parties, or the Council
membership,

he heeded not Just the resolutions of the Security Council

or General Assembly, but sought that:

This resolution which stands in our name is the work of
us all.
It draws on the ideas and formulations of
others.
It seeks to bring them all together in a
balanced whole.
It represents, above all, an endeavor
to be fair, to be just and to be impartial. 72

What was the nature of this draft resolution?

After

expressing continuing concern with the grave situation in
the Middle East, the opening paragraphs of what ultimately

became Resolution

2l|.2

emphasized "the inadmissibility of

the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work

for

a

just and lasting peace in which every state in the

area can live in security."

This was coupled with the

statement in the resolution that the establishment of

a

"just and lasting peace" in the Middle East should include

application of the principle of:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict.
This was

a

denial of the validity of the Israeli claim

to withdraw only after bilateral negotiations with the Arab

states
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The Latin American resolution submitted to the General
Assembly had urgently requested in operative paragraph 1(a):
Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the
territories occupied by it as a result of the
recent conflict. '3
The Latin American draft also had reaffirmed its con-

viction in operative paragraph 2:
that no stable international order can be based
.
on the threat or use of force and declares that the
validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories
brought about by such means should not be recognized.Tij.
.

.

The three-Power draft had linked, reversed and re-

phrased this to read in operative paragraph 1(1):
Occupation of acquisition of territory by military
conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the
United Nations and consequently Israel's armed forces
should withdr aw from all the territories occupied as a
result of the recent conflict. 75
The three-Power draft certainly was closer to Caradon's

than to the U.S. draft which had merely affirmed "withdrawal
of anned forces from occupied territory" in operative

paragraph

1.

While the United Kingdom, three-Power and

Latin American drafts specifically mentioned and linked
Israel and its armed forces to withdrawal, the United

States resolution did not.

In addition,

such withdrawal was

identically called for "from all the territories occupied"
76
while the
in the Latin American and three-Power drafts,'

United Kingdom compromise called instead for withdrawal
"from territories occupied."

Conceivably application of

the United Kingdom formulation could permit border
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modifications as

a

result of negotiations of the sort Israel

envisioned for secure borders.
of the U.K.

occup^s,"
import.

The translated French version

text reads, however, withdrawal "des territoires
a

phrasing with somewhat more specificity and

Naturally, the Arab governments claimed the French

version as paramount.

Consequently, after its approval,

Abba Eban stated before the Security Council:
I am communicating to my Government for its consideration nothing except the original English text of the
[United Kingdom]
draft resolution as presented by the original sponsor on 16 November. 77
.

.

.

.

.

.

Operative paragraph 1(11) of the United Kingdom draft

affirmed application of the principles:

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of
every state in the area and their right to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from
threats or acts of force.
Once again, an early formulation belongs to the Latin

American text which, in operative paragraph 1(b) requested:
The parties in conflict to end the state of
belligerency, to endeavor to establish conditions of
coexistence based on good neighborliness and to have
recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful
settlement indicated in the Charter of the United
Nations. 2^
As noted above, operative paragraph 2 of the Latin

American draft also stated "no stable international order
can be based on the threat or use of force.

..."

The United States draft resolution presented to, but

never voted upon by the emergency session of the General
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Assembly in operative paragraph 3(A) had
called for:
political independence and
t«r^^to^;f^°^^^^^°''-2^
territorial integrity of all countries
in the area,
encompassing recognized boundaries and other
arrangements
that will give them security against
*
terror, destruction and war. 79
.

.

.

Since the Latin American draft was not
introduced

until ten days after that of the United States,
ten days
in which the Latin American delegates sat and
listened,
it is entirely possible that the American draft
was an

antecedent here.
The three-Power text contained much of this though

more a progeny of the Latin American text.

Operative

paragraph 1(11) and (III) of the three-Power draft stated:
Likewise, every state has the right to live in peace
and complete security free from threats or acts of
war and consequently all states in the area should
terminate the state or claim of belligerency and
settle their international disputes by peaceful
means
Likewise, every state of the area has the right to
be secure within its borders and it is obligatory on
all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of one
,oO
another.
.

.

But certainly the November U.S. draft to the Security

Council came very nearly closest in words and phraseology to
the United Kingdom draft.

The November 7 United States

draft affirmed in operative paragraph 1:

termination of claims or states of belligerency,
and mutual recognition and respect for the right of
every State in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity, political independence, secure and
recognized boundaries and freedom from the threat or
use of force. 8l
.

.

.

2Sk

The remainder of the United Kingdom draft replicated

exactly the United States draft of just nine days earlier.
Operative paragraph

2 of

both the U.S. and U.K. drafts read:

Affirms further the necessity
(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the
area
(b) for achieving a just settlement of the
refugee problem;
(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every
state in the area, through measures including
the establishment of demilitarized zones.

2.

.

.

.

The three-Power draft had carried clauses very similar
to these in operative paragraphs l(III), and 2(1) and (II)--

with the additional phrase "in accordance with international
Op

law" concerning freedom of navigation.

In the United

States emergency session draft, both freedom of navigation
and a just solution of the refugee problem were included. ^-^

But it was the Latin American draft, once again, which more

than embryonically stated in operative paragraph 3(c) the

precedent text closest to both the U.S. and U.K. drafts.
guarantee the territorial inviolability and
political independence of the states of the region,
through measures including the establishment of
demilitarized zones.
.

.

.

Operative paragraph

3 of

the United Kingdom draft

read as follows:
Requests the Secretary-General to designate
a special representative to proceed to the
Middle E?3t to establish and maintain contacts
with the states concerned in order to promote
agreement and assist efforts to achieve a
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance
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with the provisions and principles in
this
resolution.
The fourth and last operative paragraph
requested

a

progress report to the Security Council by the
Secretary-

General as soon as possible.
On November 20, eleven days after the three-Power
and

United States draft resolutions had been submitted to
the
Security Council and four days following Lord Caradon's sub-

mission of the ultimately successful United Kingdom text,
the Soviet Union put forward a draft resolution of its
own.

Although it was entered too late to be of any con-

sequence in the finely balanced and negotiated consultations which resulted in ultimate formal success, it is

worth reviewing this draft for the view it provides us of
the evolving Soviet position just before the crucial vote.

There were four operative paragraphs to this surprising
^
resolution. 85

Operative paragraph

1

declared that the

Charter of the United Nations provided the framework to

achieving peace and

a

final solution to this problem.

The

second operative paragraph was divided into two subparagraphs
(a) urged withdrawal of armed forces by "parties to the

conflict" to positions "held prior to June 5" in keeping

with the principle "that the seizure of territory by means
of war is inadmissible";

(b)

urged that area member states

immediately recognize that each has the right to
exist as an independent national State and to live in
peace and security and should immediately renounce all
claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the
foregoing
.

.

.
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Operative paragraph

3

deemed it "necessary" to con-

tinue Council consideration of the Middle East
situation

by "working directly with the parties concerned
and making
use of the presence of the United Nations
"with

a

view toward

achieving" an appropriate and just solution of all
aspects
of the problem" on the basis of four principles:

(a)

"the

use or threat of force in relations between States is in-

compatible" with the United Nations Charter; (b) every
area State "must respect the political independence and

territorial integrity of all other
(c)

"there must be

a

Palestine refugees."

.

.

.

area

.

.

.

States;

just settlement of the question of the
(d) 'Innocent passage

through inter-

national waterways in the area in accordance with international agreements."

Oierative paragraph

i;

considered

that the area states "should put an end to the state of

belligerency, attempt to limit the arms race, and discharge

their Charter and other international agreements.
Of course, the key Soviet motive was to seek an Israeli

withdrawal "to the positions of 5 June" so that the "fruits
of aggression" would not be enjoyed.

withdrawal, had

a

The linkage of 2(b),

precedent in the July 19 agreement between

the United States and the Soviet Union.

The fact that the

key Arab demand for withdrawal was linked to the principles
of 2(b) and that Kuznetsov himself early in his statement

said "on the part of the Arab states there has been

a
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clear-cut manifestation of interest in

a

political settlement

and of readiness to seek ways and means for
the establishment

of a lasting peace in the Middle Eas t"^^-meant
that compromise

by the Arabs had already occurred.

The key point still was

formulated by the Russians as "the aggressor has come into
foreign lands:

the aggressor must leave those lands."®'''

This was not quite the formulation the Security Council
sought.

While this point certainly would be considered

prejudicial by Israel, there were two key aspects of the

earlier Soviet General ^issembly position which had been
dropped:

the calls for condemnation and compensation.

It

is noteworthy that the Soviet draft now linked withdrawal

to a "principle."

November

9,

It is noteworthy also that

as late as

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov was describing

these points as the "essence" of Soviet policy before con-

tradictorily stating next:
However, although the Soviet delegation would have
preferred a more radical solution it will be ready
to support the draft resolution of India, Mali and
Nigeria, if the Arab countries the victims of
aggression, do not oppose it.°8
The draft's position on the incompatibility of the
threat or use of force with the Charter and the call for

respect of the political independence and territorial

integrity of states was novel and welcome from fhissia.
The subparagraph concerning innocent passage used the

three-Power phrasing "in accordance with international
agreements" which India already had offered to delete as
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causing possibly too much ambiguity.

Novel too for the

Soviet State were the calls to end
the state of belligerency,
the arms race and for area states
to fulfill their Charter
and other international obligations.
It was indeed
encouraging to see both superpowers calling
for an end to the
arms race, but sad to see both anomalously
arming state

parties to the conflict according to their
separate justifications.
There was no mention of the point of arms
limitation
in Resolution 2i|2.

This draft contained elements of

flexibility, but came toe late and contained too many
features

objectionable to Israel and the growing Council consensus
to permit its acceptance.

The actual voting was suspense-ridden.

The resolution

had been so carefully constructed, word-by-word, the compromise was so delicate and tenuous, the Russian draft was
so late and unexpected, there were so many probabilities

any one of which were it to become a reality could hobble
the unanimous vote sought by Lord Caradon and those whom

he had encouraged, cajoled, pushed and led to the discharge
of their own and the United Nations' higher responsibility.

Israel was unhappy with the portion on withdrawal and the

inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war.

The

Arab states were not gratified by the acknowledgement of
Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political
independence, and secure and recognized boundaries.

And

the Soviet Union was embarrassed at not having obtained

259

Israel's condemnation.
At the request of the sponsors, neither the three-

Power nor the American draft was put to vote.

The United

Kingdom draft was next, followed by the Soviet draft.

United Kingdom draft was brought up for the vote.

The

The vot

was unanimous and the Soviet delegate withdrew his Government's draft.
was theirs.
begin.

Finally, success, as Caradon would put it,

Now the struggle of implementation would
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS
Law and organizations in any setting
are not tested in
moments of calm and quiet.
it is in those tumultuous times
of violence and crisis that the trial
comes.
As international
law and international organization have
unfolded, they have
been accorded great inherent strength by
few observers.
The
bisection of their evolution by the "Middle
East conflict"
was a test indeed.
For this conflict is a£ once acute,

episodic and chronic.

Acute because it regains overall the

single flash point most laden with the tinder of
conflagration.

Episodic because, as Chapter

I

indicates, the

proximate sources of crisis tend to be each time somewhat
novel and unique.

Chronic because, as Chapter II demonstrates

the basic elements of conflict in

19i;8,

1956 and 196? remained

constant and may be subsumed to a legal analysis.

The succeed

ing chapters attempted to show how international law and

international organization met with this episodic crisis
and ultimately dealt with it as a chronic conflict so as to

fulfill the object of all law:

"To define the interests of

the parties concerned in a controversy and then to provide

adequate procedures for settlement on the basis of rational
argument."-^

In so doing, that international organization.

the United Nations,

sought to fulfill its primal
objective

as it is now constituted:

"to further political and

national security" for its members. ^

to our salvation

international law and international
organization did not
break down under the stress of the
196? war.

To their

credit law and organization produced
what might even be
termed an embryonic peace treaty in
Resolution 21+2 for the
warring states. But there are limits to
this credit.

Between the inception of this crisis in mid-May
and
the passage of Resolution 21+2 in late November,
a

great deal

went on which might be aptly put under the twin
headings of
statecraft and its absence.
Statecraft includes not only

transcendent law and the procedures of organization, but
threat, pressure, negotiation, compromise, shrewdness,
luck,
ideals, morality, bargaining, drive and adjustment.

The

surge toward war and the actual hostilities themselves were

notable for the lack of these elements.

The environment in

which the crisis played itself out was much different from
the one in which the Arab-Israeli conflict had last been

brought to the U.N. in 195^.

Then the international order

was much tighter in its bipolarity.

John Foster Dulles was

the American Secretary of State who personally presented the

United States case to the United Nations.
immorality of neutralism are well-known.

His views on the

There were not so

many actors to control in the United Nations, and there was

much more

a

habit of command, or at least predominance and
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accession to the American efforts.

It was an age of alliances,

and conflict and struggle in the United
Nations marked more

by contention than cooperation.
roles.

Smaller states played lesser

But as Dulles passed from the scene and
decolonization

produced more members both for ultimate U.N. membership
and
the international system, the smaller and newer
states began
to seek out policies sometimes quite discontinuous
with the

past wishes of the superpowers.

Both "congruence and dis-

continuities" began to appear in the international system
as the new states began to realize independence not only in

their domestic, but in their foreign policies as well."^

With-

in the United Nations, life became more than a matter of

getting the opinion or tacit support of the senior partners.^
The relationship of the superpowers with the Middle

Eastern situation and states also had changed.

Unlike what

happened in 1956 there was not the flagrant victimization of
the sovereign rights and invasion of the sovereign territory
of a weaker Egypt on the most shallow of justifications.

Nor

was there the cheap complicity of formerly colonial overlords,
thus raising the specter of imperialism, or the callow double-

cross of a trusted ally, the United States.

Instead, at a

time of economic weakness for both Eshkol and Nasser^ by

bluff and miscalculations the Arabs, led by an adventurous

Damascus and an iraprovisational Cairo provided Jerusalem
plenty of provocation.

The growing escalation of the Israeli

responses gave perceived proof to the Arab interpretation of

267

Israeli intentions.

Amidst all the uncertainty present
when
one risks the existence of a state,
Israel's policy-makers
put into action a plan more than sixteen
years
old,^

implemented by armed forces of whose worth
they had no
question,
and with whose capabilities the United
States
intelligence services shared a high estimation.^

But while

the 1967 episode was more area-confined in
its proximate

delimitations the superpowers, and especially the
Soviet
Union, were more deeply committed than in 1956.
The Soviet Union contributed by playing up reports
of

Israeli troop concentrations against the shaky Syrian
regime

which Moscow sought to buttress.

And while the existence of

these concentrations remains unproven today, reports of

Israeli threats in mid-May which, at the time, could not be

researched in a scholarly fashion, triggered Nasser's entry
into the fray to reassert his Arab-world ascendancy.
Also, these threats lent credence to the Soviet-circulated

intelligence.

Q

Soviet obstructionism in the Security Council

not only helped guarantee the outbreak of hostilities, but

also greatly contributed to the near bankruptcy which the
U.N. experienced in the vital realm of peace keeping.

Prior

to June 5 the Soviet Union appeared disinterested in the idea
of restraint.

True, there were midnight contacts made by

Soviet Ambassadors to Israeli Prima Minister Levi Eshkol and

Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, -^^ but within the
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vehicle of the United Nations little urgency can
be detected.
We do not hold that the Soviet Union sou^t a war.
But we

do hold that as the crisis developed, Kreralin
leaders saw
an opportunity to further divorce the Arab world from
the

United States by accentuating

a

pro-Israei American stance,

simultaneously drawing the Arabs more tightly into its
ambit, and furthering Russia's paramount aim of ejecting, or
at least drastically lessening the United States position

in the oil-rich and strategically vital Middle East land

bridge.

We hold, with C. B. Marshall, that while the

Kremlin leaders have no precise timetable, their prime aim
is to erode U.S. influence and to become

exercising paramount influence among
states. "^^

a

a

"regional arbiter

diversity of client

With its erosion of ideology, and consequent

loss of direction and purpose, fragmentation of decision-

making and globalization of foreign policy since Khruschev,
Soviet foreign policy has become more Ru.ssian in its drive
to the south and in its willingness to cooperate with states

less on the basis of ideology than national interest.

12

This

in no way conflicts with the Russian drive to outflank NATO
to the south, to grab as much gain as the traffic will bear,

and to simultaneously threaten ^^merican security with "a

possible shift in the global balance of power comparable to
Cuba in 1S62."-'-^

While it is unquestionable that both old

and new occupants of the Kremlin wished to be active in the

Middle East, one wonders how far their influence would
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extend without the Arab-Israeli conflict; by
and large,

Russia has been "invited" in by the Arab states
as Laqueur
says, in response to the threat they perceive
from Israel.

However, the danger in building such spheres of influence
are two-fold, given that all policies acquire a
momentum of

their own:

first, that Russia may be drawn in more than it

desires to be; and second that it may commit itself more

deeply than the area warrants

.

"'^

Therefore, much depends on

the course Kremlin leaders choose and find themselves drawn
into.

As the Israeli Government has correctly stated:

Moscow is not merely engaging in policy support and aid
for Egypt
[or other Arab states]. ... It is
pursuing a fundamental strategy of its own, one that is
dictated by its own self-interests and calculated to
achieve major Soviet goals. The U.S.S.R. is striving
for power in the Middle East.
In so doing, it has sought
to make maximum mileage out of the Israel-Arab dispute to
enhance its own presence and influence in the region and
to achieve predominance at Western expense. 1°
.

.

.

However, for the Arabs as Curt Gasteyger has pointed
out, this relationship:
is, of course, a function of their conflict with
and fear of Israel.
As long as this conflict lasts the
Soviet Union has a welcome pretext for continuing both
its presence in the Mediterranean and its influence in
the Arab world.
The main focus of the Soviet objectives
is the U.A.R., not only because it is the leader of the
"progressive" Arab states, but because it provides s key
to Africa and via the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean. 1/
,

.

.

In addition to the deep sense of humiliation which Arab

society in general suffered at the hands of Zionism, Arabs
fear Israeli expansionism and seek to restore the political
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community of Arab Palestine

There ia hardly

a

viable

convergence here of Soviet and Arab interests
as the events
of 1967 so nearly catastrophically proved.
As the Soviet
influence deepened, so did their commitmeat, but
the com-

mitment came without adequate control, as Chapter
dicates.

in-

I

The engine of Soviet imperalist ambi tion--the

Arab-Israeli conf lict--exploded in the face of Moscow for
reasons quite beyond Moscow's control.

The Soviet press during this period viewed the war
as part of a deliberate CIA-Pentagon "Salame" policy or

"local war doctrine" to "fight the national liberation

movement, to suppress revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin

America." 19

The perception in the Soviet press was that:

The "local war doctrine" seeks to attain piecemeal
what the total war doctrine was to attain all at once.
The idea is to unleash a local war first in one spot,
then in another, then in still another.
If these local
wars are successful the influence of progressive
principles will wane, the local wars vill merge and
gradually approach the borders of U.S. imperialism's
main enemy. ^0

According to this doctrine the prevention of

a

communist

takeover in South Viet Nam, and the "liquidation of progressive regimes in the Arab countries" were major elements
of U.S. policy.

With this there can be no argument.

And

certainly these were part of the overall global balance of
power.

But although De Gaulle appears to be right in his

view that Viet Nam made peace in the Middle East more

difficult to achieve following the hostilities, there is
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no historical evidence that any sort of

a

"deal" was struck

between Moscow and Washington linking these two areas.

On

the other hand, one of Washington's fears was the "Nasser-

ization" of the remainder of the Middle East, as we shall
see below.

Nasser too reiterated this Soviet perception of

Washington's desire to hasten the downfall of "progressive
regimes" in the Arab world in his July 23, 1967 speech on
the 15th anniversary of the July revolution. ^-^

The Soviet

case, however, was careful not to charge the United States

with actively planning and initiating the war.
Soviet view did make

a

While the

"connection" between the local wars

in the Middle East and South Viet Nam, it pointed out:

Needless to say this connection should not be turned
into a dogma, for it would be wrong to regard every
aggressive action of the imperialists ss a step of the
Pentagon devised and planned beforehand. Life is more
complicated than any plan. But the U.3.A. encourages
and supports all local conflicts if they coincide vrith
their "local war doctrine" and if they can be used for
a general offensive against the national liberation
movement of Asian, African and Latin Ar.erican peoples.
Acting as the agent of U.S. imperialisn in the Middle
East the Israeli government pursues its own aggressive
aims, which in some details may not coincide with those
Since Israel's interest does
of their American bosses.
not contradict V/ashington' s interest in principle the
U.S.A. encourages and promotes Israel's ventures, the
more so as they are directed against the national
liberation movement of the Arab peoples and can be
developed into a "local war" as part of their total
strategy, a war that will suit the U.S.A. to wage
through other people without deploying an American
expeditionary force.
According to this view, the "U.S. ruling circles would
not object" to an "aggressive front" anchored at one end by

South Viet Nam and at the other by the colonel's Greece.
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Asia would be encircled from the
south by a chain of military
bases shielding newly independent
East Africa, Southern
Arabia, and the Persian Gulf.
In the Middle East, the

Israeli-occupied West Bank and Israel's
attempt "to draw
Transjordania with Amman
into its orbit
.

.

.

future subjugation or the threat thereof]

... [by
... in order

to

come into direct contact with Saudi Arabia,
where feudal

reaction still holds strong positions" would
result in "an
imperialist corridor running across the Arabian
Peninsula

from south to north."

This would pose a direct threat to

the "progressive regimes" in Arab countries,
permit the

British to retain influence in Aden and Saudi Arabia by
"going without leaving," and buttress the positions of

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

There are
view.

a

number of points to make concerning this

First, it is predominantly geopolitical.

In its wide

expanse, it envelops a view of the global balance of power

between the Soviet Union and the United States which was
reciprocated by Washington.

Secondly, the fear for the

safety of "progressive Arab regimes" while having its

ideological undertones, also served the Kremlin's great

power aims most handsomely.

Third, this doctrine goes

beyond the mere satisfaction of the Arab states in con-

sidering the Soviet insistence on Israeli withdrawal from
the occupied territories; even beyond the principles of

international law the Soviet position would be threatened
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by an unwelcome and threatening "imperialist
corridor."
Lastly, the doctrine totally ignored the
issue of the

Palestine refugees and demonstrated the
long-standing
Soviet view of the refugees as an issue to be
kept alive,
but not solved so as to keep the Arab-Israeli
conflict

suitably active in the Soviet Union's own interest.

The

reopening of hostilities would most possibly result in
another Israeli victory, the further extension of Israeli

occupied land and the downfall of "progressive" Arab
regimes.

The massive airlif t-resupply of Arab states with

carefully selected defensive military supplies, the opening
of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and the

"domestic protection and the retrenching of our revolutionary
system, and the consolidation of the Arab revolutionary

movement "^^ in Nasser's words, would all serve the Kremlin's
interest
We should also realize that the adamant Soviet support
of the Arab position in the U.N. was based upon another

factor.

Moscow feared that Peking might utilize the poor

Soviet showing in the crisis to intensify its rivalry with

Moscow in the Arab states, and perhaps even offer nuclear
weapons to Nasser.

In addition,

a

withdrawal by Israelis

from the banks of the Suez Canal and its reopening would

considerably shorten, simplify and cheapen the shipment of

military supplies to North Viet Nam by Moscow.

Thus, some

of the complexity behind Soviet behavior in the United Nations
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becomes more clear.

The Soviet Union approved

a

cease-fire in the Security

Council before any of the Arab states accepted one.

This

was looked upon as "a complete capitulation from the

position of support for the Arab states.

It shows that the

Soviet Union fishes in troubled waters, but will not risk
its security on behalf of its friends in the so-called
26
third world."
If this doctrine of "local wars" truly

reflected part of the thinking of members of the Politburo

during the hostilities, it may throw light uopn Chairman
Kosygin's hot line message to President Johnson during the
Syrian campaign on June 10:

Johnson reported "Mr. Kosygin

said that they had reached a very crucial decision, that

they were prepared to do what was necessary, including using
the military.

"^"^

It may be that Moscow foresaw the physical

seizure of Damascus with attendantly greater chances for the

downfall of the progressive Syrian regime.

With the conclusion of hostilities, the Arabs felt
outraged at what they saw as
stunned by their defeat.

a

Soviet betrayal and were

Their own strategy in the United

Nations was to press for the indictment of Israel for

aggression and to secure the prompt and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli military forces from territories occupied

during the recent hostilities.
a quandary.

Here the Soviet Union was in

On the one hand, it sought accommodation with

Washington to reduce the possibility of skirting the nuclear
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precipice once again.

On the other hand, to further its

own policy, possibly roll back the U.S.
"local war"
doctrine, and satisfy the Arab states,
Moscow felt it
incumbent to behave on the basis of quite
different interests.
A certain amount of tension and oscillation
natu-

rally resulted.
As a general rule the Soviet Union perceives the

Security Council as a "forum of accommodation" and the

General Assembly as an "arena of conflict. "^^

Therefore,

following its failure to gain passage of its June 13 draft

resolution which condemned "Israel's aggressive activities"
and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of her troops,

Moscow requested the convening of the fifth emergency
special session of the General Assembly.

Here, too, while

putting forward its own condemnatory draft resolution,

it

worked diligently to secure the passage of the more moderate
non-Aligned draft which called for the unconditional Israeli

withdrawal to the positions held prior to June

5*

Given the

split that occurred in the General Assembly between this and
the Latin American draft resolution, the Soviets again faced

the humiliating prospect of leaving an organ of the U.N.

empty-handed.

Accommodation with the United States was

sought in the privately worked out draft resolution of

July 19, 1967.

However, there was no mention of Israel's

condemnation, as well as ambiguity concerning the terms of
withdrawal.

And so it was rejected by the caucus of Arab
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states.

Activity returned to the Security
Council in the
Pall where the norm of accommodation
was more prevalent.
The Soviet representative to the
Security Council approved
the November 22 resolution with
a clear emphasis
on the

"first necessary principle for the
establishment of Just and
lasting peace in the Near East. We
understand the decision
taken to mean the withdrawal of Israel
forces from all, and
we repeat, all territories belonging
to Arab states and seized
by Israel following its attacks on those
states on

5 June 1967.

"^"^

United States policy toward the Middle Eastern
states
epitomizes contradiction. The main juggling
act
simul-

taneously tries to keep in the air policies of
support for
Israel and influence with Arab states. But within
these

basal strictures, alternate policies have been introduced.
The 1950'

s

are the best example.

For the Arabs U.S. policy

veered from strong support for Nasser early in his tenure^^
to great antagonism after he had concluded the misnomered

Czech arms deal in 1955 much against his wishes. 31

In turn

this led to the abrupt withdrawal of American financial

support for the Aswan dam which embarrassed and insulted
Nasser, and led to his nationalization of the Suez Canal

Company, and the sorrowful scenario which led up to the
1956 war.

Since then, with the exception of the Kennedy

years when a new attempt at deepening understanding was made

between President Kennedy and Nasser,

the relationship
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between Washington and Cairo tended, at best,
to be formal
and correct.

Beginning in early 1966, U.S. footdragging

on a variety of matters, but in particular on
a PL

i;80

food program on which the U.A.R. was particularly
vulnerable,

led the Egyptians to suspect "a growing hostility
on the part
of the United States, and a very active endeavor
on our part
to overthrow the regime in Egypt and to isolate Egypt
from

the rest of the Arab world. "^^

This had the effect of

making American influence in Cairo negligible on the eve
of the June I967 war.

Policy took its twist towards Israel too.

blatant partisanship of President Harry

S.

From the

Truman, Secretary

of State John Poster Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower

attempted to institute
and even-handedness

.

a

policy of "friendly impartiality"

Early Dullesian efforts to entice

Egypt into a Middle East defense pact scared Israeli leaders

half to death while U.S. threats, for example, forced Israel

both to cease work in October 1953 on the Jordan River hydroelectric project it was continuing in defiance of a United

Nations Truce Supervision Commission injunction, and to with-

draw from the Sinai in 1957.^^

Dulles' policy of "friendly

impartiality," paradoxically enough, drove Cairo toward

Moscow and Tel Aviv toward Paris.

All these and others had

the effect according to Abba Eban of giving:
the Israeli public the impression that American
friendship for Israel had been a fleeting and accidental
.

.

.
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circumstance of history, linked organically
with the
Truman administration
therefore a greater
policy of militance should develop in
Israel for
two reasons: both as a compensation for
American
.

.

.

rriends.iip and perhaps, as a way of forcing

the
United States to recoil from any change
adverse to
Israel
the response in Israel was toward
greater
self -reliance, a very active policy of
retaliation
.

on

the frontiers.-}"

What has this to do with the American contribution
to
the 1967 crisis?

This is more than

Eban's words provide us with

a

a

residue of history.

very profou?id insight into

the evolution of the crisis.
In Washington in 1967 there was a very strong feeling

that one crisis was about all the United Spates could handle
at a time.

And the White House and Pentagon were immersed

in handling Viet Nam.

Eban's meeting with Johnson on the

evening of May 26 was "friendly but indecisive "37
.

^^d

while the President made it clear that he vould need the
full support of Congress on, for example, imerican efforts

outside the U.N. to open Aqaba, he was not clear on what he

would do if such support was not forthcoming.

While U.S.

and Israeli intelligence reports concurred on the superiority
of Israel's military forces, Israel alone and again was left

to test the speculation.

So Eban did not return to Jerusalem

on May 27 with any but the most ambiguous and vague of

assurances if that.

Eban's report to the Israeli cabinet

was a stormy one because his trip had forestalled any

military measures while producing nothing tangible.

The

bankruptcy of American policy in Israeli eyes was at its
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worst on the question of free passage
through the Straits of
Tiran.
President Johnson seemed to have forgotten
Eisenhower
verbal promises and Secretary of State
Dean Rusk appeared
unable to find Dulles' 1956 memorandum to
Eban on this matter
For a people whose collective consciousness
told them to
expect the turning away of Gentiles at the moment
of crisis,

the sinking feeling of abandonment once again
brought to
the fore the chief lesson of Zionism, that in the
last

analysis Jews could rely only on themselves.

Once again

Israel was alone because Washington's studied inaction had

placed the major responsibility for the crisis upon Israel.
Antithetically coupled to this American inaction was
the rising swell of pro-Israel sentiment which was sweeping
.

,

the country.

ill

And, for what it was worth, there was the

characteristically Johnsonian pique at American liberals,
often Jewish, who were "doves" on Viet Nam, but sudden
"hawks" on Israel.

These antagonistic riptides of

pressure helped lead to inaction and indecisiveness

,

verbal

huffs and puffs, as Alastair Buchan put it,^-^ by Johnson
as contrasted with the forceful actions of Eisenhower in

the disorganized hallucinogenic trip toward war the world

was taking in 196?.
The Middle East is an area of real and significant

value to the interest of the United States:
The region is still the fastest, cheapest
transportation route--by air or sea--between Western
And still more important, beneath
Europe and Asia.
.

.

.
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its desert sand lies close to 300
billion barrels of
three-fourths of the non-Commnis?
Sorrd'rn;nf
According to oil con?r T"''^'^^^'sultant S
Wplter
Levy, the complete loss of this oil
could not be made up by any combination
of
sources within a decade-if at all. Westernother
Europe
imports 5,600,000 barrels of Arab oil each
day
65 percent of its requirements, snd Japan 1,200,000
(60 percent).
if the Russians should achieve
domination of the Arab countries, as many Arabs
now
fear they will, they could blackmail both
Western
Europe and Japan by threatening to turn off the
taps
and cripple their economies. The ultimate
price for
assured oil supplies, some /American diplomats
grimly
speculate, could well be a sharp diminution of
U.S.
influence in Europe and Asia.^
•

•

•

But of great importance to the decision-making calculus

was the strategic position of the Middle East placed, as
it
is,

to the rear of NATO's eastern flank and to the southeast

of Europe itself in relation to a perceived drive to complete

the "Nasserization" of the Arab Middle East.^^

American policy toward the area has been balanced on
the horns of a dilemma.

A realization of the area's sig-

nificance would prompt policies of friendship with the

majority Arab inhabitants of the area while domestic support
and sympathy for Zionist aims, especially after the un-

imaginable holocaust of World War II, would encourage

a

policy of friendship with the much smaller state of Israel.

While both factors have deeply conditioned U.S. policy in
the region, on balance, Washington has come to be identified
as a protector of Israel (especially since the polarization

which began once Moscow started moving into the area in the
1950' s).
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The chief question which arises in considering the

behavior of the United States is to explain the shift in
U.S. policy on the point of national sovereignty and terri-

torial integrity concerning Middle Eastern states.

The Tri-

partite Declaration of May 25, 1950 stated that the Governments, of the United Kingdom, France and the United States

unalterably opposed:
the use of force or threat of force between any
.
.
.
of the states in that area.
The three Governments,
should they find that any of these states was preparing
to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would,

consistently with their obligations as members of the
United Nations, immediately take action, both within
and outside the United Nations, to prevent such
violations
These principles were reaffirmed by President Eisenhower
on November l5, 1955, Secretary of State Dulles on February

2k.,

1956, by White House statement on April 9, 1956, by Article 2
of the "Eisenhower Doctrine" approved on March 9, 1957, and

again by Secretary of State Dulles on September 10, 1957.

President John F. Kennedy provided continuity to these principles on August 5, I960 and May 8, 1963.

President Lyndon

Johnson associated himself with these principles in June,
1961;

>7
Majc

Frankel provided

a

prescient view of what would

later transpire in a New York Times article published on
June

for

8,

a

1967.^^

In it he wrote of the White House's plans

review of policy in the hopes that the war had

stimulated the chances for energetic peace efforts.

The

B.
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dispatch

f.on,

Washington continued that the
administration
expected "stirfer" terms fro.
Israel concerning a withdrawal
from occupied territory than
in 1956, and that there
was

"measured sympathy for the
Israeli decision to seize
an
improved bargaining position"
rather than wait for the
Western powers to challenge
Nasser's blockade of Tiran.
Prankel's dispatch continued:
A decisive Israeli viotorv

f^

t,.

Claims to what has been Arab
territory

decll?ati^n*th«r?^

"rfT^

*° ^^^^^^^'nt Johnson's

:u^p:rran°^I^nnex^?l-^iri1^a:^!^^!l?-:f„%desirf to co^mLd
certain
c^rta^rs?^:?:^!?
'''r^''
strategic

positions for which thev have rswho^e^rd Mr. Rusk
^^^^
^^inel'^h'^''i^P^^s^io"
that the United States would favor
hllTJt
'''^
'"^"^^ P^Pa^^^ positions while
a full-scale
fu?l
peace was negotiated.
^7
On June 5 and again on June 19, President
Johnson voiced

and echoed sentiments to the effect that
this conflict had
become a "burden to world peace" and that the
international
community should insist on proper steps to
resolve it.^°

John C. Campbell has noted:
On the conclusion of the war, the United States
took the
position that an attempt should be made to reach a
durable peace settlement instead of merely restoring
the
armistice arrangements, which had proved inadeauate to
keep the peace.
The desired settlement was to 'include,
in addition to withdrawal of forces, all the major
issues which were at the heart of the Arab-Israel conflict:
frontiers, refugees, freedom of navigation,
renunciation of belligerency, recognition of the right
of all states to exist.

.

,

.51
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In 80 doing the United States
sought a middle ground
between the exclusive stands of
Israel and the Arabs,

Washington:
^® totally identified with
i^Anli?"®^
Israel's cause v^^^
but its apparent acceptance
of the
Israel view that no Arab territory
need be given ud
except as part of a comprehensive
Arabs convincing evidence of total sett^ement^s to^he
partiality .52

This line of analysis is buttressed in
the U.S. case
by an unusual insight into the thinking
of at least one
American decision-maker afforded by Eugene
V. Rostow, former
Undersecretary of State for Middle East policy
during the
period under study.
ranean to be

a

Professor Rostow

fo^and the

Mediter-

cockpit of Soviet Cold War ^nachination and

felt that the weakening or destruction of Israel
"would be
a long step towards complete Soviet control
of the vast

region between Morocco and Iran."^^

He stated that the

British and French withdrawals, the velocity of Soviet
penetration, and the State of Arab politics had induced

a

review

of Middle East policy which led President Johnson zo conclude

in Winter 1966-6?

-

Spring 196? that Western economic,

political and strategic interests were "threatened" by
"Nasserization" such that NATO and the U.S. would face "a

security crisis of major and potentially catastrophic pro-

portions."^^

Rostow went on to write that an Arab-Israeli

war should be perceived "not as
stage in

a

a local

conflict but as a

process which threatened the security of Europe

and the United States in fundamental ways."^^^

Rostow felt
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that Nasser's imposition of a
blockade on Tiran was the
prime precipitative act leading to
hostilities and "Justified

Israeli military action" under U.N.
Charter Article 51. On
the point of aggression, Rostow later
backtracked a bit and
called the question of who fired the
first shot
one of

"Byzantine complexity" for the provocation
Nasser supplied.
"Before that mystery, sober opinion
refused to reach the
conclusion that Israel was the aggressor.
^nd no serious
attempt was made to obtain a resolution
declaring the United
Arab Republic to be the aggressor "^"7 Mr.
Rostow then
clearly states "... the experience of the
international
.

community with the understanding which ended the
Suez Crisis
of 1956-1957 led to the conclusion that Israel
should not be

required to withdraw from the cease-fire lines except
as
part of

a

firm prior agreement which dealt with all the

major elements of the crisis. "^^

On the key issue of "to

what boundaries should Israel withdraw?" the Armistice

Agreement of

1914-9

was cited in those critical sections which

provided that the Armistice Demarcation Line "is not to be
construed in any sense as

a

political or territorial

boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights
claims or positions of either Party to the Armistice as

regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question. "^^

Because the Armistice Agreements were to facilitate the

transition to permanent peace all nonmilitary "rights,
claims, or interests" were subject to "later settlement"
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in agreement among the parties in the
transition to permanent peace.

These paragraphs, which were put into
the
.agreements at Arab insistence, were
:
I^r"^!^^?®]
the
le^al foundation for the controversies
wording of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Security over the
Council
Resolution 2i|.2 of November 22, 1967.^0
*

,

Professor Rostow stated that while the "new and
definitive boundaries should not represent 'the
weight
of conquest'

.

.

.

they need not be the same as the

Armistice Demarcation Lines.

The walls and machine guns

that divided Jerusalem need not be restored."

Rostow con-

tinued by citing paragraph 2 of Resolution

as further

bases for "adjustments and boundaries

.

214.2

This series of

points is somewhat surprising because it appears to adopt
the Arab legal position on the existence of a continued

state of war, boundaries, and the demilitarized zones.

Rostow reviewed the point that Resolution

2I[.2

calls

for a withdrawal "from territories occupied" rather than
"from the territories occupied. "^^

(Emphasis mine.)

Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the
word "the" failed in the Security Council. It is therefore not legally possible to assert that the provision
requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories
now occupied under the Cease-Fire Resolutions to the
Armistice Demarcation Lines.
This aspect of the relationship between the Security
Council Resolution of November 22, 196? and the
ArirJ.stice Agreements of I9I4.9 likeivise explains the
reference in the resolution to the rather murky principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war." Whatever the implications of that
obscure idea may be, it would permit the territorial
adjustments and special security provisions called for
,
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by the Security Council resolution
and the
Armistice
^® AnnisLice
Agreements of 19[|.9.63
Rostov went on to state that "Israel
has said repeatedly and officially that it has no
territorial clai,
LITIS
as such; that its sole interest in
the territorial probl*.em
is to secure its security and to obtain
viable guarantees

of its maritime rights.

...

The assurances by Israel have

been the foundation and the predicate of the
American
position in the long months since June ^196? "^^
.

to implement Resolution

21^.2,

In order

Rostow called for NATO's "con-

certed Alliance diplomacy to protect its interests
in the
Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East.

But thus

far, unfortunately, those resolutions have not_ been used
as

the basis for a credible policy of warning and deterrence."

Rostow also proposed that U.S. troops be kept in Europe in
part, for possible physical commitment to the Middle East
in a crisis, and that a NATO-U.S. guarantee of the peace be

offered Israel and the Arab states on the basis of
Resolution 21^2.^^
Rostow also addressed himself to the question of which
nations have "accepted" Resolution

2i4.2?

He feels that

"this is not a real issue, since the key parties to the

hostilities gave it advance assurances to the British and
American governments that they would cooperate with the
Secretary-General's representative to promote the agreement

called for in the resolution."

66
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We have quoted at length because
of the near-uniqueness
of the source, and because the
intent was to gain whatever
insight is possible from the writings
of participants in
official American thinking and
decision-making
at this

critical juncture.

Professor Rostow perceived

conceived the problem primarily on

a

threat and

geostrategic plane to

U.S. interests and reacted on that basis.

Arab-Israeli conflict secondary.

a

He termed the

While we hold that some

boundary rectification would be beneficial
to long-term
peace, given that a peace settlement was
achieved, we cannot
submit that the principle of the Charter of
the "inadmis-

sibility of acquisition of territory by war"
possesses quite
the murkiness or obscurity to which Mr. Rostow
attributes it.

Indeed, had the tables turned and the war theoretically
gone

against an Israel which was truncated, but still in
existence
due to U.N. action, Jerusalem can be expected to have
appealed
to the same norm, and quite justly.
a basic equity to this norm

For there is

a

reciprocity,

which lies at the very heart of a

stable international system--a condition which Mr. Rostow'

conception does not seem to recognize.

The decision to

strive for a complete peace agreement is al30 quite under-

standable in view of the breakdown of the 1907 arrangements.

For in the view of one American intimately involved with
policy-making, "The Soviet Union and its chief Arab associates

wished to have Israel declared the aggressor and required,
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under Chapter VII if possible, to
withdraw to the Armistice
Demarcation Line as they stood on June
5,

fewest possible assurances

"^"^
.

in exchange for

The experience "with the

understandings which ended the Suez
Crisis of 1956-195? led
to the conclusion that Israel should
not be required to with
draw from the cease-fire lines except
as part of a firm prio
agreement which dealt with all the major
issues
in the con-

troversy

.

68

Since Johnson apparently did not choose
to link a

cease-fire with a prompt Israeli withdrawal
behind the
armistice lines and did not insist on an Israeli
withdrawal

following the cessation of hostilities (as Eisenhower
did
in 1956-1957), we can only conclude that U.S. policy
in
1967 appears to have envisioned the withdrawal of Israeli

military forces as part of an overall settlement reached
among area states.

If this view is accepted and combined

with the "hidden veto" which

a

traditionally predominant

United States was able to exercise in the U.N.^^ along with
Soviet subordination (both now changing) and coupled to the

somewhat less predictable third world nations, we may derive
a

clearer idea of why the battle in New York was so hard

fought and why the formulation closer to Washington's

than Moscow's stand finally was approved.
Short of the publication of a set of documents akin
to the Viet Nam Pentagon Papers, we cannot be absolutely

sure of the weight which should be ascribed to Mr. Rostow's
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pronouncements, especially those
concerning U.S. policy
toward the Charter principle of
"inadmissibility
of

acquisition of territory by war."

However, a certain con-

gruence on the question does emerge
from Kax Frankel's
June 8, 1967 New York Times dispatch,
John Campbell's
insights and Mr. Rostow's writings:
Washington appears
to have envisioned Israeli troop
pullbacks from occupied
territories as part of a larger peace
settlement between
the parties directly involved.
In The Vantage Point
Lyndon
Baines Johnson, then President of the United
States,
.

re-

viewed the "strong commitment" of the United
States to
territorial integrity in the area."^^ After
reviewing the

Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and the public
reaffirmations of this principle by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower,

Kennedy and himself, 71 Johnson cone luded: "But in the 1960'3
it was Israel whose territory was threatened by hostile
neighbors." 72 No further specific mention of this principle

was made.

In concluding his treatment of the 1967 crisis,

President Johnson wrote:
was convinced that there could be no satisfactory
future for the Middle East until the leaders and the
peoples of the area turned away from the past, accepted
Israel as a reality, and began working together to build
modern societies unhampered by old quarrels, bitterness
and enmity.
I

Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the
parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who
must make a settlement in the area.
It is hard to see
how it is possible for nations to live together in
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peace if they cannot reason together.

The Soviet Union and the United States were in
dilemma.

Both sought

to.

a

avoid worldwide nuclear war.

neither sought to regulate the crisis.

But

Where the Soviet

Union did not wish to pay the price of Jeopardizing its
influence in Arab capitals, Washington was paralyzed by
the contradiction between fear of another overseas in-

volvement, with far greater chance for

a

superpower con-

frontation, and the domestic support favoring Israel. '^'^
This is one reason why "the keys to the crisis were in
Cairo, Damascus and Jerusalem" rather than in Washington,
Moscow or New York. IS There was an acute abrogation of

responsibility here.

There was little coordination of

superpower efforts.
There were

a

variety of points where, had cooperation

than conflict ruled the supe2*power relationship, the outcome might have been different.

A

joint peacekeeping force

under U.N. auspices might have replaced UNEP, ships might
have been sent through the Straits of Tiran in

a

joint

venture, or perhaps led by the U.S., but with Russia's
tacit approval.

Either one or both of these alternatives

would not have left Nasser "face-to-face vfith an infuriated,

mobilized Israel with no intervening hand between them,"
while allowing Nasser to de-escalate the crisis in

saving way while relieving the threat to Israel.

76

a

face-

Stern
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and parallel action in the
Security Council prior to June
5
could have been utilized in
tandem with diplomatic bilateral
contacts with client states to let
them know that hostilities
would not be tolerated. Once
fighting began Jordan and
perhaps Syria might have been
pressured into staying out of
action entirely. The United Arab
Republic might have been
induced to accept a cease-fire earlier
than
June 10, thus

making less weighty the problem of
withdrawal from occupied
territory. Washington might have held
Israel to her professed
desire for a cease-fire earlier and,
once having accepted
it,

might have been persuaded not to break it
to invade Syria.
On a grander, but perhaps more realizable
scale,

the super-

powers could have instituted controls on arms
shipments to
the area.
And, on a greater but more profound basis,
there

could have been

drive toward settlement of the fundamental

a

questions by the U.S. and Soviet Union in years past.
The superpower split, the nature of international organ-

ization and of the people who happened to hold policy-making
decisions also played a role in the crisis through the period
of hostilities.
a

For the first, it would appear dubious that

Secretary-General such as Dag Hammarskjold would have per-

mitted the U.A.R. to have so easily or quickly effected the
withdrawal of UNEF

forces.''''''

Hammarskjold in 1957 outlined

the procedure for the withdrawal of UNEF forces which included

notification of the Advisory Committee of

UlTEF

by the
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Secretary-General of such

request which would then

a

determine if the question would be brought
to the attention
of the General Assembly.

General act on his own.'^Q

Only then could the SecretaryMoreover, Derek Bowett points

out that Hammarskjold repeatedly made it clear
after 1956
that UNEF had been created by a bilateral agreement
between

Egypt and the United Nations:

"were either side to act

unilaterally in refusing continued presence or deciding on
withdrawal an exchange of views would be called for toward

harmonizing the position.

""^^

However, U Thant's pre-

cipitative action is ameliorated by the unadorned fact
that three weeks passed after the request for UNEF with-

drawal and the opening of hostilities, during which time
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. did little to amend the situation.

Trouble may be the United Nations' chief business,
as Andrew Boyd put it, 80 but during both the swing toward

hostilities and during the hostilities themselves, the U.N.
did not do a very good job of it.

From the Achaean League

on doivn through history, international organizations have

faced the problem of the reservation of sovereignty on the
part of its members.

In addition,

the permanent seats which

Article 23 of the Charter accords to China, France, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
and the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of

international peace and security" conferred upon the
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Security Council by Article
2k and almost all of Chapters VI
and VII point to the ascendant
role of the great powers in
peacekeeping. But the wartime unity
upon which the concept
of the concerted peacekeeping by
great powers was constructed
had long since passed away. The fact
that the representative
of China held the Presidency of the
Security Council during
the month of May did far more to hinder
than help
peace-

keeping efforts.

For because of diplomatic tensions between

his country and various Council members, the
informal

processes in which the Security Council excels
because of
its small size were hamstrung.
If we add to this, Russian

obstinacy through June

6 against

any Council action at all,

the difficulty of the U.N. emerging with sny
independent role

becomes obvious.

While the United States was more active

and consistent in its calls for moderatioD and peace during

this period, it too exercised only the mildest restraint from
its cockpit in the Security Council.

Oran Young suggested two roles for D.N. activity in
this crisis:

direct political action and service roles.

He pointed out that while the U.N. machinery in the Middle

East was able to act as

a

go-between in ccoinuni cat ions between

the Arabs and Israelis, was able to send Titally needed

information back to Council sessions, and was instrumental
in helping tc effectuate the Israeli -Syrian cease-fire, the

"partisan disagreements of the interventionists" paralyzed

29k
the U.N. in its political action role
and dealt it a heavy
82
blow.
once again, the tension at the
core of international

organization was 30 taut, due to commitment
to client states
and the unwillingness to pay the price
of superpower
co-

operation, that very little space remained
for the U.N. to
work out an independent role amidst the fast
pace of events.
So long as the superpowers pursued competitive
than co-

operative interests, so long was the United Nations
unable
to muster peacekeeping strength of its own.

The bewildering pace with which events unfolded and
Israel won its military objectives introduced

a

high element

of risk and uncertainty in superpower restraining action.

On the first day of the war, June 5, the Soviet Union

evidenced little interest in

a

cease-fire and the United

States was either unable or unwilling to push hard for
one.

It was not until the second day of the war, as the

enormity of the Arab defeat became clear that the Soviet

Union brought forth

a

demand for

a

cease-fire conditional

upon the condemnation and withdrawal of Israeli forces which
was at the heart of the Arab demands.
One may glean an indication of the gap between the

Soviet Union and the U.A.R. by realizing that it was not

until June 10 that Egypt agreed to

a

cease-fire.

the United States was consistent in its cells for

And while
a

cease-

fire, throughout the war, it also was consistent in not
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including withdrawal in its draft resolution as it
had in
1956, a move which served to strengthen the hand of Israel

after the 196? hostilities, but then barreling on to
victory.

cone

a

Finally, of course, in behavior which was to be-

pattern, the Soviet Union moved toward the U.S.

formulation for an unconditional cease-fire which ultimately
prevailed.

In fact, it was not until after the invasion

of Syria began that Ambassador Goldberg announced that his

Government was "willing to concert its actions with every

member of this Council
circumstances."

...

at any time

.

.

.

under any

Or again, that on the full authority of

his Government, he wished to let it be known that:

"The

United States strongly opposes aggression by any one in
the area, in any form, overt or clandestine."^^

It is more

than interesting to note that President Johnson recently let
it be known that in a "hot line" call after the Israeli

invasion of Syria had begun, Kosygin threatened to take
"necessary actions, including military" unless Israeli

military activities were not quickly restrained by
Washington.
There was little recourse to law in the conflict
phase.

The prime goal was to stop the fighting.

And here

the superpowers began to demonstrate the degree to which

their positions were rigidifying parallel to the views of
the clients who represented them in the area.

And
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unfortunately, in a quick-moving
situation in which the
vital interests of smaller powers
are involved, the latitude
for superpower influence was not
wide-whether or
not this

was chosen to be so by Washington
and Moscow.

Because of

their contrary commitments, because the
war ran out from
under them, because the superpowers chose
to emphasize
their competitive than cooperative interests,
the United
Nations emerged from the hostilities in a state

of shambles.

Axiom:

the United Nations has little relevance to
peace-

keeping in times of fluid flux when the superpowers
disagree.

Failing to satisfy the Arab states with

a

satisfactory

resolution in the Security Council, the Soviet Union moved
the scene of action to the General Assembly.

The Soviets

reflected Arab interests, but they began to exhibit

a

role of

their own in acknowledging the de jure existence of Israel

which the Arabs did not though Soviet relations with Israel
had been severed.

But in reflecting Arab interests, the

Soviets overstepped the line of partisanship.

So Arab and

Soviet support focused on the Non-aligned resolution.

The

rationale and chief thrust behind this was that Israeli

withdrawal must occur behind the positions held on June 5
on the basis that any other alternative would reward

aggression.

The non-aligned states were on strong ground

here and could appeal, especially, to the self-interest of

smaller states in

a

manner which rang of legality.

Certainly
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this is the basic norm of the
international order:

that

neighboring states shall not strike the
first blow, seize
territory and then demand negotiations
and concessions
before sovereign territory would be
returned. While the
Arabs spoke of belligerent rights which
justified blockade
and invoked the phantom of the Palestine
Arabs who had been
refugees for so long, they too concentrated
their

efforts on

the point of Israel's use of force to
violate this most basic

of legal norms.

However, the Arab states were strangely

quiet concerning their own threats to use force
which had

contributed so mightily to the crisis.
Israel was not about to let them forget this.

Eban presented

a tight legal case

Abba

which concentrated on

the many Arab threats against Israel's existence and the

blockade of Tiran which Eban identified as an act consistent

only with a state of war.

Focusing his verbal eloquence

upon Israel's right to exist under the Charter, and on Israel's
right to defend itself since neither the United Nations as

a

body nor the Security Council had demonstrated excellence in
this area, Israel felt compelled to sit tight atop the Arab

lands until

needs

v;as

a

settlement satisfactory to national security

forthcoming.

Israel, adamant on face-to-face

negotiations concerning an Israeli Jerusalem and an "inde-

pendent quest" for peace and security outside the bounds of
the United Nations, did not conform to the thrust of other

efforts in the United Nations.

For Israel Arab "aggression''

298

Helped Justify her continued retention of
Arab territories
which she claims to have occupied in "self-defense."
The United States draft resolution was in
keeping on
9iany

points with its announced search for a fundamental
and

4uPable peace in the area.

Many elements of this General

Assembly draft ultimately can be found in Resolution

2I|.2.

Fop all its foresight and comprehensiveness, the United
States draft was as visionary and distant in application
in the beginning as the Soviet draft was partisan and

Immediate.

Ultimate virtue here was an immediate flaw

as there were insufficient, pragmatic and interim steps to

lead to the more distant principles evoked.

More important,

the U.S^ draft suffered from haziness and ambiguity on the

ftll-important question of withdrawal.

Here the Israeli

position drew strength, here the U.S. and Soviet Union could
i^Q^

actualize the norm of cooperation.
Into the breach Lord Caradon had been trying so

valiantly to stem came the Latin American states with their
own draft which judiciously strove to lift the debate out of
the context of purely political positions and to place them

on the plane of legal principle and Charter norms.

With the

failure of the League of Nations on the points of armed in-

vasion and territorial aggrandizement in the nineteen-thirties
ringing in their ears, the Latin Americans made the greatest
single contribution in the genesis of Resolution

214.2

by

linking Israeli withdrawal "from all the recently occupied

"

territories" with the termination of the state of belligerency,

299

the establishment of the conditions of
coexistence and good-

neighborliness and reliance upon Charter provisions
for
peaceful settlement in all cases.
It was this linkage

of

basic norms, founded upon the reciprocity end
mutuality

which underlie all law, which later broke the deadlock in
the Security Council.

This is an example of how an appeal

to law and the effective operation of international organiza-

tion can go hand-in-hand.

It is not necessary to review the

other paragraphs of the draft here since we have dealt with

them earlier.

Suffice it to say that in their open and

consistent resort to sound legal principles they provided
the format and created an atmosphere in which the efforts

were removed from the sterility of a conflict between parties
to a level on which the approach taken was what is legal,

what is right?
As deadlock in the emergency session loomed imminent
the Soviets on July 18 and 19 twice came to the United States

representative, physical acts whose diplomatic import should
not be overlooked, and agreed on

crisis.

a

proposal to meet the

Below the surface rigidity which marked Assembly

sessions, both powers were aware of the necfsssity for

momentum to meet the challenge to civilization posed by the
continuance of inaction.

Cooperation had unexpectedly gained

ascendancy over contention as, for the first time we are
aware, the superpowers closed the gap between them and chose
a parallel course of action.

However, the maneuverability of
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the Middle Eastern states was
not yet that circumscribed
and the Arab states were not yet
ready to compromise. The

suddenness of the Soviet shift left
little time for the
Arabs to react flexibly and the
proposal was rejected.
Although the emergency special session
was formally fi-niitless, a sense of consensus did emerge
among the membership

which was to have echoes later in the
Security Council.
The assistance and consultations which the
smaller

nations

had initiated was to bear fruit in the Fall.
In the grand sense,

the behavior of France in this

crisis was directed by President Charles De Gaulle's
drive
to reassert the great power status of France by
assuming

an independent, non-aligned status between Washington and

Moscow, and thus contributing to the balance of power between

nations which he saw as vital to peace.

One of France's

roles, therefore, was as "a potential conciliator. "^^

chief avenue here would be

a

four-power conference.

suggested this to Abba Eban in Paris on Kay

2l\.,^'^

A

De Gaulle

Another

similar proposal to have the big powers settle the crisis
was turned down by Moscow on May 30, 196?.^®
Pompidou'

s

Premier Georges

journey to Moscow in early July with

a

four-

power conference as at least, one of the objectives received
a similar rebuff.

89

A second facet to De Gaulle's perception of France's
role was the emphasis upon "deliberate objectivity by

Paris."

90

France opposed sending

a

vessel through the Straits
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of Tiran to test Nasser's blockade.

Following the outbreak

of war, Paris announced the withholding
of arms shipments to
all parties to the hostilities ^2 p^^^^^y^
fearing in general
.

a drift toward war by the great powers and
specifically the

outbreak of war in the Middle East, De Gaulle warned
Eban on
May 2ky 196? not to make war by firing the first
shot and

announced on June
bestow

its

2

that Paris would not give support or

approval to the party commencing hostilities.*^^

Later, De Gaulle publicly announced that Prance would not

become entangled by going to the assistance of either side
and would determine its stand on the basis of "who fired the

first shot."

This melded into France's stand on its own

neutrality when it became the first Western power to refuse
to support Israel's territorial claims flowing from the

hostilities.
only

a

At the same time Paris announced that while

freely negotiated settlement was realistic the

physical and psychic effects of the war were so great that
Israel and the Arabs needed the four powers to bring them

together. ^
a

Thus, De Gaulle wanted no French involvement in

Middle Eastern war beyond France's soil (especially after

the costly involvement of 195^), sought to regain French

prestige, and maneuvered toward

a

diplomatic position free

to encourage ultimate negotiations.

96

But, of course, the seat of diplomatic activity was

the United Nations, not

a

four-power conference.

France, of

course, voted for all the cease-fires
during the hostilities.
It abstained from the vote on
the Soviet draft in the Security
Council on June 11;, calling for Israeli
condemnation and withdrawal, probably on the grounds that during
the "long road
before us" discussion and agreement by all
parties on all
issues would eventually be necessary if peace
was to be
97
restored.
During the emergency special session of the

General Assembly, Prance abstained on the Soviet
draft resolution which called only for withdrawal without
further activity
under Council supervision which might lead to a
settlement.

Understanding France's position on withdrawal and provisions

for Council action which might lead to

a

settlement, it

comes as no surprise that France lined up with the Soviet

Union in supporting the non-Aligned draft resolution.
September

1,

On

196? France announced its support of the

British draft resolution which was essentially passed as
Resolution

214.2.^®

The Security Council certainly was an appropriate

framework for action in France's eyes, given its great power
presence.

In a statement to this body on November 22,

196?

the French representative pointedly said:
I must confess that
the three power-draft, or a
draft based on certain ideas of the Latin American
text proposed in the General Assembly in July would
in our opinion have had considerable advantages.
It
appeared, however, that the desired agreement could not
be achieved on those texts, whatever their merits. 99
.

.

.

France voted in favor of Lord Caradon's draft, but only
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after pointing out its ambiguity of language,
its view of the
"equally authentic" French text which speaks of
withdrawal
"des territoires occupes," though in general, approving
of

the other enunciated princ iples

.

"^^^

France's independence certainly turned out to favor
the Arabs.

In consequence, French influence, commerce,

and

its cultural presence climbed sharply after the events of

1967.

France hoped for, but was disappointed in, the award

of oil concession agreements, but was not disappointed in

her sale of military jet aircraft to both Iraq ($70 million)
and later Libya ($1+00 million), while maintaining at the same
time an arms embargo upon the same type material (heavy tanks

and the vital Mirage-fighter-bombers) to the direct parties
to the conflict.

states.

This affected Israel more than the Arab

With the U.S. bearing Arab enmity and Britain

steadily seeping out of the area, only France was left in

De Gaulle's eyes to provide "balance" in the area to counter
the possibility of Soviet "hegemony

"'''^^
.

De Gaulle believed

also that "all world tensions had one root--Viet Nam"-and that there was no chance for world peace until the
102
American involvement in Viet Nam ended.

By urging this

upon V/ashington, by being the only western state on the
scales counterbalancing the Soviet presence in the Middle

East and by being

a

potential conciliator in the crisis,

De Gaulle was, in his vision, serving world peace.

But

301;

certainly, in serving the interests of
world peace, De Geulle
also served the interests of Prance-and
vice-versa.
Even
Raymond Aron who was highly critical of what
he perceived as
an anti-Israel policy by De Gaulle tried
"to provide a basis
for the interpretation of General De Gaulle's
diplomacy
in 1955 he was thinking of a move aimed at
strengthening the

non-Arab or non-Muslim minorities in the area, today
he is

backing the Arabs, not because he is anti-Zionist or
still
less anti-semitic

,

but in the interest of France.

""^^"^

Over the summer and into the autumn Israel settled yet

farther into the occupied lands, parts of which it deemed so
vital to security.

At the same time, the full weight of

defeat settled more heavily upon the Arab states.

Israel

was a victor and, as defeats go, it was more for the

vanquished to compromise.

The submission of the three-

Power draft was an admission of this.

We need not re-

capitulate the debt openly acknowledged to the Latin American
effort.

Withdrawal was called for, but so was the termination

of the state of belligerency, the right of all states to

peacefully exist without threats or acts of war, and respect
for the political independence and territorial integrity of
area states.

Not only had Charter and legal principles been

incorporated, but the organizational nature of the United

Nations--a place where all states were represented, in close
contact and with the opportunity for consultations--began to
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be felt as time passed and this
quality asserted itself.

^0^^-

Unthinkably in 1956, the smaller states
played and were
even asked to play as large a role
as they could in the
urgent drive for a resolution although

final approval by

the superpowers was necessary.

Their cumulative and united

efforts, as Lord Caradon might have said,
together with the
parties involved, directly and indirectly,
were successful
as the three-Power and the United States
drafts were successfully bridged by Lord Caradon in the most
delicate and astute
of negotiations.

Caradon came from a non-superpower state.

Great Britain's

association with the Middle East has been long and intimate,
if not always satisfying.

Peter Mansfield, an acute British

observer of the area, has noted:

"Britain cannot dsny

a

heavy share of responsibility for the present condition of
the Middle East.

It was perhaps the least successful of all

our overseas enterprises

""^^^
.

If this be so,

then British

policy toward what was termed the ''Jewish" or "Palestine"

question certainly ranked near the bottom of its Middle
East enterprises.

From the alternate and deliberately

ambiguous promises held out to both Arabs {the Sherif -Husayn-

McMahan Correspondence) and Zionists (the Balfour Declaration)
in World War

I

to the admission of chaotic failure which

attended the formal termination of the British Mandate over
Palestine at midnight. May

Ii;-15,

19i|.8.

British policy was
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riddled with inconsistency and
incompatibility,

postwar period major changes were
occurring.
dependence in

191+7

m

the same

Indian in-

marked the start of the process by

which the Suez Canal was transformed
from the lifeline of
empire to an artery pulsing with
petroleum.
The rise

of nationalism in the area simultaneously
deprived Britain
of many of her land, sea and air bases
while her economic

weakness prevented her from exercising dominant
power in the
Middle East without bases--as the United States
came to do

through its Sixth Fleet.

The Tripartite Resolution of

May 25, 1950 which sought to ensure the armistice lines of
191;9 and to

limit arms to both sides, and the Baghdad Pact

of 1955 which was the Middle Eastern reflection of the

American containment policy (after 1959 the Central Treaty

Organization [CENTO] after Iraq's withdrawal) were at least
symbols of

a

British presence.

Whatever the reality of bheso

moves, Britain's influence was dashed in the wreckage of

the 1956 British-French-Israeli war against Egypt.

Following

this debacle and the assassination of the loyal Nuri es-Said

and the royal family in Baghdad in July 1958, Britain's con-

tracting strategic interests appeared limited to Cyprus,
Aden, Bshram and Sharjah in the Persian Gulf and other sheik-

doms and sultanates along the fringes of the Arabian
108
Peninsula.
It v;as during this time that a Chatham House

Study Group set down their analysis of Britain's interests
in the area:
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Britain's first and paramount
interest in t-h« onoo
under study is to obtain oil under
fair com^^Pcral
conditions from the states which
produce
Jt^nd to
bring it to Europe by the cheapes?
and 3afe;t route
Her second interest is to keep
other communications to the lands open trade and
east of Sue/
encouragement of'mutual
friendnnei^irr^''
irlendliness and respectI' among the states
of the area
developments Which would
maL for
?nr^''''/°
r'^""^
make
social and
political stability
,^"®^/ourth interest is that the Middle East
V
land
bridge to Africa should not fall under
the Influence or
possession of any Great Power hostile to
Britain. 1(^9
C.

M.

Woodhouse, former Director-General of the
Royal

Institute of International Affairs refined
and buttressed
the points further:
^° ^ generation ago the importance of the
Middle East was that it lay across the route to
India,
today Its main importance lies in its oil resources
Its geographical position, at the crossroads
of the*
east-west route between Europe end India and the
north-south route between Russia and Africa, is still
a matter of great importance, but not for the time
being of primary importance. What is vital for the
present is not where the Middle East ia so much as
what it has in it. HO

Earlier Woodhouse made the useful distinction that
while Washington tended to look upon the area more in the

older British geostrategic view, to London the Middle East
wa3 vital as

a

economy

vrhy

.

source of oil and its impact upon England's
was this so?

A

brief resuin^ will suffice.

In 1966 Britain imported 69 percent of its crude oil

from the Middle

IIP

East.-^-^*^

British oil investments in the

Persian Gulf area alone were estimated
of $2.1| billion and provided

million.

a

to be

in the vicinity

payments surplus of $750

At the same time Britain enjoyed

a

favorable
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balance of coimnercial trade with the area
of $2?? million
in 1967,

In the mid-sixties Middle Eastern
countries held

about $1.5 billion of Great Britain's total
external

liabilities of $5.3 billion.

Finally Britain is

a

major

weapons supplier to the area (though especially
since the
entry of the Russians and French, a proportionately
declining
one), supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel

,

"'•'^

and

having, for example, concluded a $300 million arms deal

with Saudi Arabia on December

7,

1965. -^-^^

A 1959 Memorandum submitted by the Minister of Supply

to the Select Committee on Estimates listed six main reasons

why the Government and private British manufacturers sell
arms abroad. "^"^^

Standardization of equipment of allied

(especially Commonwealth) forces, additional recovery of

research costs, more efficient use of armaments factories,
and outlets for obsolete weapons were listed as four of such

reasons.

Foreign currency earnings certainly are another

reason for such sales.

During the nineteen-f if ties

total arms exports averaged

$14.00

,

Britain'

million annually (and were

increasing) while on February 10, 1966 Denis Healy, Minister
of Defense explained to Commons:

While the Government attaches the highest importance to
making progress in the field of arms control and disarmament, we must also take what practical steps we
can to ensure that this country does not fail to
•secure its rightful share of this valuable commercial
market 117
.

The sixth and final point was that the ''supply of arms
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to overseas governments may help to strengthen
political as

well as military ties.

Obviously Britain derives

a

great

deal from and relies quite heavily upon the Middle
East.
Yet, despite its great investments, Britain's power and

position have been contracting in the area, speeded along,
of course, by the anti-imperialistic and nationalistic

efforts of such Arab leaders as Gamal Abdul Nasser.

It

could be that in certain English policy-makers' eyes,
Israel represented as much of

a

counterbalance to the

forces Nasser symbolized as the conservative Arab regimes

within whose borders British-owned oil installations were
found.

Arms shipments might indicate this.

For as time

passed British arms shipments increasingly went to the more
traditional, conservative and often oil-rich monarchies such
as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan and, to a lesser degree,

Israel and virtually ceased to the less pro-Western, repub-

lican-militarist states of the United Arab Republic and
Syria with whom, presumably, the Anglo-Arab community of

interest was smaller.

Or Britain in its then junior-

partner status, may have, in certain ways acted

American proxy.

as an

We cannot pinpoint the perceptions which

drive policy-makers to attempt to realize certain interests.

We can only speculate in an inconclusive fashion until,
perhaps, in future decades, British archives are opened.

What we can be sure of in an immediate sense is the

gravity of the economic consequences for Britain of the
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hostilities.

Indeed, Harold Wilson, then Prime
Minister

affords us an insight.

The economic consequences of this June
week
extremely serious for Britain. The closure were
of the
Canal alone, it was authoritatively
estimated was
costing Britain h 20 million a month on
our balance
of payments.
No less serious was the loss of Middle
East oil. We had to seek to replace this
from other
areas at a higher price and, in the main,
at
higher freights. Supplies from Libya, the onemuch
source
west of the Canal, were cut for a time. Nor
could we
make up a substantial part of the loss from
Nigeria,
our other short-haul source. Within weeks, the
civil
war there cut off all our Nigerian supplies too.
had to shop for supplies in the United States and We
Latin America, at high cost, high freights and in
competition with other hard-hit countries. We had
^"^^^^^^3 for the following winter
[196?'^^AA
1968],
The crisis was a serious blow.
By the early
autumn with other difficulties arising, it seemed almost
a fatal one to our economic recovery.
The Middle
East crisis of June 196? was the biggest contributing
factor to the devaluation which came five months later.
Confidence in sterling was eroded by the war and further
weakened when the monthly figures reflecting its consequences were published. From a strong and improving
balance of payments position, we had returned by the
autumn once again to a vulnerable position and domestic
events, notably two damaging dock strikes together with
some manoevering on the Continent, were sufficient to
bring sterling down. Without the impact and continuing
effects of the Middle East crisis we could have weathered
these disturbances without grave deterioration in tha
pound.
It was to be two years more and at heavy cost
--economic, social and political--bef ore we were able
to regain our surplus position. 118
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Great Britain was no disinterested spectator in the
drive to bring peace to the Middle East in 196?.

Indeed,

her economic viability was gravely endangered by the consequences of the hostilities and their continuation.
As often occurs, while the greater powers were wrapped

up in defending the interests of those states whom they
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represent, or in partisan or visionary
proposals, it is the
smaller states which, given the relaxation
of the bipolar
matrix, especially in the U.N.
are able to jockey and
negotiate the necessary compromises.
Caradon was a superb
man for the job he took on. He epitomized
for this issue
the best elements of statecraft.
He appealed to transcendent
,

law.

He invoked members' higher responsibilities
to this

world organization and the peoples it represented.

He knew

when to threaten the ominous price of failure if
international organization could not fulfill its purpose
as his
faith told him it could. But perhaps the basic point was
that Caradon embodied the ancient art of statecraft
whose

tradition he carried on in the finest manner.
did not possess the coercive power of

a

Lord Caradon

major state, but he

did utilize the "institutionalized moral pressure" provided

by the principles and on which the very continued existence
of the United Nations itself relied

.

'^''"^

In the seventh

decade of the twentieth century he used the advantages provided by the forum of international organization to breathe
the breath of law and principle into this episode in

standing, tragic conflict.

H.

G.

a

long-

Nicholas has delineated the

basic techniques of pacific settlement of disputes In the

Security Council as investigation, interposition, conciliation,

recommendation and appeal.

''"^^

Nicholas goes on to draw

a

parallel betwean pacific

settlement by the Security Council and ''government conciliation
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machinery in

a

analogies do.

democratic state."

This analogy limps as all

The chief deficiency lies in the
deviant

expectations which the national and
international roles place
upon Security Council representatives.
But
the analogy also

is insightful.

For both bodies do tend

selves to "fact-finding, conciliation

.

restrict them-

to
.

.

[and]

...

the

making of recommendations"; while both bodies
may "bring
moral pressure to bear on one side or the other

...

does not impose any settlement."

it

Most importantly:

just as the democratic state relies ultimately
for the settlement of its industrial disputes upon
P^^^^^ opinion on the disputants, together
with the disputants' own awareness of where their real
interests lie, so the Security Council acts by
mobilizing opinion and trying to get the disputants
to see reason. 121
.

.

.

There is a certain congruence here between Nicholas'

perception of Security Council activity and our earlierstated objective of international law:
interests of the parties concerned in

"to define the
a

controversy and then

to provide adequate procedures for aettleroent on the basis
of rational argument."

But two points need to be made here.

First, that

according to these conceptions, much of international law
and Security Council activity is voluntariatic on the part
of the parties directly involved.

put it:

resolution

2ii2

Or, as Eugene Rostow

"is not self -executing. "^^^

In

the last analysis it will be up to the parties themselves
to make peace if peace is to be made.

Moshe Dayan put it
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succinctly not only for the Israelis, but for the Arabs as
well:

"We must learn to live with the Arabs," he said,

"face-to-face, without the intermediary of even our best

friends."

12Ll

Second, both conceptions explicitly state that

settlement would come only through the exercise of reason.
Once again, while the world should hope for this if it

wishes to avoid incineration, there has been too precious
little of it demonstrated in the past.
The principles of international law found in Resolution
21^2

were

arrived at, as they were in an international organization,
a

consequence of policy choices, jockeying and the per-

ceived interests of states.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps the

greatest interest here operative was self-interest.

Christian Science Monitor reported on November

1,

The

196?

that the U.N. was then faced with the "gnawing belief that
the seeds of another Arab-Israeli war are now taking root

unless they can be dislodged by diplomacy."

125

An editorial

in the Manchester Guardian published on November 22, clearly

stated what was at stake and the almost negative motivation
in the drive toward approval:

The British coirnromise plan for the Middle East has been
attacked by both Israelis and Arabs. That in itself might
be promising, for it was intended to stir b middle course
between an Afro-A'^.ian resolution which had been acceptable
to the Arabs and a U.S. one which had been acceptable to
the Israelis ... no Security Council member wants to
take the responsibility for precipitating a final breakTrue an agreed resolution in the U.N. will
down.
But it is the only chan'^.e
not pacify the Middle East.
.

.

.

^^^Pi'^'g a dialogue
VrZ T.l , to consolidate her going. The alternative
conquest for the Arabs
to n^Lf!^r
prepare for the next round, and for the
refugees to
rot
their camps. I'^o

m

It is interesting to note that interpretations
of Resolution
21^.2

varied distinctly, and perhaps dangerously
so, even be-

fore passage.

The representative from Syria, Georges Tomeh,

announced his country's "non-acceptance of the draft
resolution" even before the vote on

Tomeh justified this

it."^^*^

action by saying that the resolution ignored the roots of
the problem,

the rights of the Palestinian refugees

"^^^
,

would reward the aggressor and thereby violate the basis
of international law and order.

"^^^

Ambassador Parthasarathi

of India announced his Government's understanding that the

British draft "if approved by the Council, will commit it
to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of

Israel forces from all the territories

territories-'occupied by Israel as

which began on 5 June

1967."'^-^°

a

—I

repeat, all the

result of the conflict

In light of this, India,

Mali and Nigeria announced they would not press their draft
to a vote then.

Lord Caradon recognized these diversions

of opinion when he stated:

"All of us, no doubt, have our

own views and interpretations and understandings.

my own when

I

spoke on Monday last.

,

.

.

draft resolution.

explained

On these matters each

delegation rightly speaks only for itself."
Goldberg then stated:

I

31
1^

"We will vote for that

Ambassador
.

.

.

[British]

We do so in the context of, and
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because we believe to be consistent with, United States

policy as expressed by President Johnson on 19 June and as
subsequently reaffirmed in statements made by me to the
Security Council."

132
^

Abba Eban made it clear that Israel's

position remained unchanged:

That Israel would stay where

it was until a permanent peace directly negotiated and con-

tractually binding was arrived at which provides guarantees
in the areas of boundaries, free passage, and others of

interest to Israel.

Eban also, as will be recalled, sent

only the English text of Resolution

2^.2

to his Government ."^^^

We have earlier reviewed the position of France and here
note only the emphasis placed upon withdrawal from all the
territories."'"'^^

The stand of the U.S.S.R. here reflected

its concern for an Israeli withdrawal and "to implement

without delay the decision which has been taken.

""^-^^

The

delegates both from the U.A.R. and Jordan emphatically

reiterated the points of withdrawal of Israeli troops and the

restoration of Palestinian rights. ^-^^

But while bargaining,

adjustment, pressures and compromise were realistically
reflected, the net content of the resolution appealed to the

most basic nonr.s of contemporary international law.

The

"inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,"
the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency,"
the "acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
to
and political independence" of states and their "right"
of
live "free from threats or acts of force," the "freedom
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navigation through international waterways,"
and, "a Just
settlement of the refugee problem" all
reflect such basic

norms.

A. the actual hostilities and the
passions aroused

by war receded in time, the structure of
international
organization which encourages constant, close
and confidential
consultations merged with the essential purpose
of the United
Nations expressed in Article I and began more
to
live up to

its responsibilities:

To maintain international peace and security, and
to that
end:
to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring out by peaceful means, and
in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace.

The legal approach taken by the Latin /American countries

lifted the dialogue from the plane of

a

parties, rancorous and long-lasting, to

dispute between
a

plane of principle

and law in which the essential question to be answered con-

cerned principle and right.

As time passed law reasserted

itself as a factor in the conflict.
were reaffirmed:

Basic conduct norms

Charter article llik) "all members shall

refrain from the threat or use of force," article 11(3) "all
members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means," and article 11(1) states the United Nations "is

based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members" were among them.

The basic legal principles of free

passage and the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
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by war" were also notable.

Whereas the neglect of law was

one of the chief reasons for the acceleration of the crisis

into conflict, its reaffirmation in Resolution 2^2 which

provided the parties with "collectively legitimized"^^?
guidelines for settlement assisted in passage of the resolution.

The beginnings of the crisis and the hostilities them-

selves illustrated the dependence of the international

organization upon the agreement of the superpowers in times
of crisis.

The purposes of this world body were ignored and

the actions of the area states, fettered only by the perceived

interest and pressures of the superpowers, were followed.

During the fighting and most of the emergency special session
of the General

assembly, parallelism of policy in the United

Nations was between area client states and superpower protectors, as U.S. and U.S.S.R. positions rigidified.

But

there prevailed the fundamental reason for cooperation be-

tween the superpow0rs--the avoidance of nuclear holocaust--

which was coupled with the U.S. policy of judiciously providing the means for resolving the conflict without prej-

udicing the positions of the direct participants who, themselves, must ultimately find peace.

Of utmost importance,

the United States respected the position of Israel on with-

drawal against those advocating

a

return tc the old status

quo perhaps less to protect Israeli gains than to prcriote

a
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more durable peace. ^^8

attempt by both the Soviet Union

and the United States to produce an
agreement on July 18-19

points in this direction.
As

point,

a

the superpowers came closer to cooperation
on this

more dynamic, viable role for the United Nations

became more possible.
in negotiating

a

The vital role of the smaller states

compromise, encouraged but limited by the

big powers, cannot be overlooked.

The acceptance by the

three-Power draft of the legal, principled approach of the

Latin American states was crucial and contributed greatly to
the final resolution.

The general intent of the United

States Security Council draft indicated the desire for agree

ment by the superpower trying to represent its own and

Israel's interests.

The very structure of organization, the

proximity and opportunity it provides states for intimate,
quiet and continuous contact coupled with the fact that in a
large sense, the future of the United Nations was involved,

provided the means and

a

vehicular motivation for effort.

The fact that the United Nations was the vessel here more
than symbolized what was at stake.

world body could only presage

a

For

a

failure by this

failure and worse for all

the states and peoples of the globe.

This historical

accident of Lord Caradon's presence was of inestimable good
fortune.

Men, not organizational purpose or legal principle
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populate this planet.

And it took someone pragmatically

aware of politics, but possessed of ideals and contagious

faith to make the resolution become

a

reality.

Amidst all the considerations of geopolitics, balances
of power, penetrations and "local wars," amidst the issues
of free passage through international waterways,

states of

war and recognition, the danger is consistently run that
the direct parties to the dispute, the Israeli Jews and

Palestinian Arab3--both seeking political community and
national life on the same land

— will

be forgotten.

We

have reviewed in Chapter II the legal positions of the
parties to this question.

Beyond the legal claims and the

charge and countercharge of irresponsibility and lack of
good faith, there rests

for both sides.

a

question of humanity and morality

In the introduction to his fine book, The

United States and Israel

,

Nadav Safran wrote:

Of course, one cannot write about Israel, and accept her
as an established fact--which is what I do--without
thereby taking an implicit stand on the Palestine issue.
If a reader wishes to interpret such a stand as placing
the author morally on the side of Israel against the
For my part,
Arabs, he is of course free to do so.
I believe that fundamentally both Arabs and Jews have
A person who cannot
an unassailable moral argument.
understand the
not
does
possible
this
is
see how
he realize that
does
much
less
tragedy;
essence of
that the Palestine q
assure
to
his position serves only
question should have another sequel, and yet another.

To ignore this problem

— one

at the root of the conflict

--is to embark knowingly upon a dangerous course, one of whose

sequels may bring great tragedy to us all.

The events of late
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May and early June 196?, are frightening reminders
of why
the, in one sense, misnomered Arab-Israeli
dispute is perhaps

the most persistent and dangerous flashpoint
in the world.

The readmission of the Palestine refugees, Israel says,
poses grave problems.

tension of

a

There is the security risk and the

larger non- Jewish minority in

a

Jewish state.

Palestinians invoke the uncompromising right to return to
what they claim is their land, property, and their own

national and political community.
has written:

An Israeli, Amos Oz,

"This is our country; it is their country.

Right clashes with right.

'To be a free people in our own

land' is a right that is universally valid or not valid at
all.""^^^

It is platitudinous but necessary to state in view

of this that the problem is indeed complex.

appear either ruthless or naive.

Simple solutions

The tension is acute:

The

Arabs cannot defeat Israel; Israel cannot remove itself from
the presence of her Arab neighbors.

We have no great store of instant solutions to bestow

upon the world concerning this problem.
Peretz that:

We agree with Don

"If the key issues between Israel end the

Palestine Arabs can be resolved then points of dispute with
the neighboring countries can be settled.

""^"^

But the super-

powers have been woefully inadequate in moving toward such
goal.

Until 196? the Soviet Union had not contributed one

ruble to help the refugees and "frequently opposed Arab

a
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attempts to have the U.N. General Assembly
order the Conciliation Commission to enforce U.N.
resolutions dealing
with refugee repatriation and compensation. "^^^
president
Harry S. Truman attempted to alleviate the
refugee problem
in 191^9, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
and Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles in 1955, and President
John F.
Kennedy in the early 1960's with the aid of special
repre-

sentative Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace. "^^^

But all these efforts

foundered, generally because they involved compromise on an
issue looked upon as uncompromi sable by one party or the
other.

Obviously the problem of the refugees is difficult.

We can only endorse the general outline of the principles
of a settlement on this point sketched by Quincy Wright:

Israel should permit as many refugees as she deems
possible to return to their homes over a period of
time to permit returning groups to accommodate themselves to Israeli citizenship before the number becomes
so large as to endanger Israel's security.
Full compensation should be given to those not permitted to
return, the amount to be determined by the International
Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal ^^M.

Obviously in its assumptions and manifest
sketch of principles satisfies neither side.

fo2?m

such a

And it would

require hard negotiating and good faith by the parties to go

beyond principle to implementation.

But in the safeguard

allotted to Israel and the alleviation afforded the refugees,
such

a

settlement might open

a

new psychological stage for

the future development of more normal relations between
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states and peoples of the area.

Granted this involves con-

cessions which both sides find distasteful.

But if Israel

is not to become overwhelmed by the economic and spiritual

costs of a heavy military establishment, if the plight of
the Palestinian is to begin to be alleviated, if the Arab

states are to perceive Israel as a state with whom normal

relations are possible, and if the world is to be spared
another dangerous war, the issue of the Palestinian refugees
must enter

a

new era, however small and faltering that first

step may be.
In this episode the United Nations, while it could not

prevent the fighting, provided
some limit on its spread.

were necessary was

a

a

means to halt it and put

That four cease-fire resolutions

sign of the U.N.'s weakness, however.

After the fighting ceased the U.N. provided

a

forum where

the Arabs feeling aggrieved could make their case without

resort to direct negotiations, while it enabled Israel to

justify its actions in the matrix of undeniable past threats
and provocations while laying out its own proposals for

future peace.
It is difficult to conceive a document such as Resolu-

tion

2I4.2

emerging from any source except the United Nations.

While it is more than symbolic that it came out of the big

power-dominated Security Council, the resolution involves
elements of principle in state interplay in a balance that
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direct negotiations, four-power talks,
or

a

Judgment by

the International Court of Justice
probably could not have
equaled.
The Court might have provided the
legal principle,

but not the state interplay in quite
the same fashion. Direct
or four-power talks ipso facto formally
exclude one or the
other of these parties, as well as the other
members of the

international community.

Plenty of state interplay certainly

would have occurred, but one wonders if there
could have
been such an appeal to the principles of international

law,

had not the vehicular balance-wheel of the Latin American
states for example, been present.

Only in the institutional

matrix of the United Nations, then, were all these actors
and elements present.

But while it is necessary to extol the virtues of an

organization or action, it is also important to realize
its limits.

U.N. usage and resolutions become effective

only "at that point at which states regarded themselves as

legally bound by the prac tice

""^^^
.

And since international

law is at base a weak law for its placement in a "fragmented

competitive coexistence of rival societies
U.N.

""^^^
,

both law and

resolutions rely upon the voluntarism and reason which

affected parties choose to exercise.

On the other hand,

within the definitions both of international law and organization cited above. Resolution

2i4.2

was a success:

it defined

the interests of the parties to a conflict, provided them
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with procedures for

a

rational settlement and reaffirmed

the transcendence of norms which had been violated.

It

reflected greater common agreement on norms and issues than
had been ever before realized since the beginning of the

19-year-old conflict.

But because of the passions, psy-

chological, strategic and negotiating elements involved,
its promise remains yet unfulfilled.

On the other hand, until the parties choose in a

voluntary and rational fashion to mutually realize the means
and ends of international law and organization made avail-

able to them and isolated by Resolution
to peace may not be near.

21^.2,

the approach

Lieutenant-General E. L. M.

Burns, former Chief of Staff, UNTSO and Commander, UNEP,

has made this clear on the basis of his earlier experiences:
Mr. Haramarskjold and his envoys could appeal to reason,
point out that certain courses of action would probably
lead to unfortunate results, and advise that more conciliatory lines should be followed. But it seemed to me
that eventually the U.N. negotiators were reduced to
trying to produce a protocol, a form of words to which
both sides could agree. However, when the objections of
both sides had been circumvented, these protocols usually
turned out to be so vague that each side could later
adopt the interpretation which suited them, end the interpretations of the two sides would of course be conflicting.
There was no provision that either side would accept an
independent interpretation (by U.N. of other arbiters)
J-m-'
if they felt it to be to their disadvantage
.

In a very realistic sense Burns' words do no more than

to describe

a

very natural phase of the negotiating process.

can
But unless parties go beyond the stage, only sterility

result
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The chief operational failing
of Resolution
that it remains ambiguous on
the question

2i^2

is

of the precedence
of withdrawal or termination
of belligerency and recognition.
While it is unequivocable that
the

occupied territories should

be returned as a matter of
principle, the resolution has left
this question of precedence to
discussions which have ex-

perienced unfortunate deadlock.

Abba Eban was careful not

to Jeopardize Israel's position in
future negotiations on

borders by publicly announcing the
transmission of the English
rather than the linguistically stronger
French version of
the text to his Government.

The dropping of the word

"occupation" coupled to "acquisition of territory"
in the
Latin American text--provides Israel with stronger
legal

grounds to occupy territory taken in 196? until

a

formal

peace treaty is signed, much like the case of Berlin.
Substantively, the absolute nature of the "inadmis-

sibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was weakened

by the ambiguity introduced by the textual elimination of
the word "the" before "territories."

Arabs claim that

absolutely all occupied territories must be returned, while
Israel claims otherwise.

Nor did the resolution deal in

a

substantive sense with the question of aggression or selfdefense in relation to the competing claims to the land.
Israel claims self-defense in the face of Arab aggression,
and therefore legitimate occupation of the territory.
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Israel insists on conditional withdrawal
from Justifiably
occupied territory to help protect Israel
from future such
similar acts by Arabs which precipitated
Israel's original
self-defense.
Arabs claim self-defense in the
face of

Israeli aggression.

The illegitimate occupation of Arab

territory cannot permit preconditions to its
return.

Only

its unconditional return to help protect Arab
states from
the persistence of Israeli aggression into the
final

settlement.

Possible future resort to Arab claims of duress

and the argument rebus sic stantibus may be used
to challenge
the validity of any future settlement.

Resolution

21+2

Procedurally,

did not specify the method of settlement.

This was cause for delay.

Moreover, the resolution's

absence of a "tiered approach" to settlement, the call

instead by Israel for

a

"total" agreement, and by the Arabs

for a "total" withdrawal has served only the cause of
delay. li^S

The clear intent of the resolution, that Israel with

withdraw, was balanced with

a

detectable feeling on the part

of the U.N. membership that Israel is entitled to peace

and security as a state--just as much a bulwark of the

international order as the return of conquered land.

The

basic freedom of navigation in international waters is

undiluted and the recognition of the territorial integrity
and inviolability of states is clear.

While Israel's
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boundaries would be "secure" from
Arab commando raids.
Arabs could feel secure from the
Israeli expansionism
they fear.
Israel finally would be recognized
and the
"recognized boundaries" it has sought
would replace the
cease-fire lines. There is no implicit
undertow toward
direct negotiations which the Arab states
rejected;
rather, a Special Representative of the
Secretary -General
is specified.
It is regrettable that the provisions
concerning area

arms limitations, perhaps the one best way the
superpowers

can control the level of conflict, was dropped at the
insistence of
states.

a

Soviet Union intent upon rearming the Arab

Resolution

2i;2

points in many directions to

a

just peace, one lasting, strong and juridically defined.

But it touched only most fleetingly on

and fundamental issue:

a

basic, underlying

The Palestinian refugees who have

not yet been allowed to return to their homes, or receive

compensation for their property.

Israel's security will

always be subjected to raids, and incessant deaths and

destructions will continue to plague the citizens of Israel
until the Palestinian refugees can feel that they have received justice.
of Resolution
is necessary.

A settlement more specific

2[|.2,

than the norm

"a Just solution to the refugee problem"

But if any single provision of Resolution

awaits final and precise agreement between the aggrieved

214.2

328

parties themselves, it is this vital and
emotional issue.

While Resolution
fulfilled.

21^.2

is promising, it remains un-

The many reasons for this are cited above.

But law and organization while normative and
purposeful,

cannot be divorced from their political context as
the

genesis of this resolution has demonstrated.
the past must be the path of the future.

It

The path of

will take

the same sort of political dynamic to realize this promise
if law is to prevail.
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